<div>The extra step described below sounds like the "Voter's Choice" that I used in one or more EM polls.</div><div> </div><div>The reason for Voter's Choice was: We wanted to choose a winner, when we didn't agree on what voting system to use. Especially a problem when voting to elect a winning voting system, but just as much a problem in any election without a pre-chosen voting system.</div>
<div> </div><div>I suggested the following:</div><div> </div><div>1. Every main balloting system discussed here is included. Approval, rank-balloting, and Ratings(0-100) were</div><div>included. A more up-to-date mix would include 3-slot balloting,as did the poll that I proposed a few months ago.</div>
<div> </div><div>2. As part of the ballot, the voter is invited (but not required) to designate noiminated method.</div><div> </div><div>3. All of the ballotings are used, to count all of the methods that have been nominated.</div>
<div> </div><div>4. If you have designated method M, then your ballot gives an Approval vote to every candidate who is ranked, in your ranking, at least as high as M's winner. </div><div> </div><div>In other words, you are using M, the method that you most trust to find the CW, to choose how far down you should approve. If you know, or strongly suspect, which candidate is the CW, then, in Approval, one good strategy is to approve down to that CW. (I didn't mention that strategy, among the Approval strategies that I described, because ordinarily a person doen't have information about who the CW is--But the choice made by M might be regarded as giving you a good guess about who the CW is.).</div>
<div> </div><div>5. The winner is the candidate who gets the most approvals from paragraph #4.</div><div> </div><div> (But, instead of designating a method, you could, alternatively, designate "Manual". That means that you</div>
<div>want your Approval ballot (part of the overall poll balloting) to give your approvals for the purposes of paragraph </div><div>#5's count--instead of giving those paragraph-#5-count approvals as described in paragraph #4).</div>
<div> </div><div>(The results of the poll's Approval balloting are counted too, and reported. But the winner of the poll is the result</div><div>of the aggregation that I've described, completed byand which I called "Voter's Choice".</div>
<div> </div><div>I should add that, in the poll that I proposed a few months ago, I used a slightly different version of Voter's Choice.</div><div> </div><div>In that other version, which I'll now call Voter's Choice 2, likewise counts every nominated method. It gives to each</div>
<div>method's winner, a number of points equal to the number of people who designated that method. The winner is the candidate who receives the most points.</div><div> </div><div>That makes sense, because it amounts to weighting each method according to the number of people designating that method.</div>
<div> </div><div>But that can also be regarded as letting each voter give a Plurality vote to the candidate chosen by his/her</div><div>designated method. So it occurred to me (or someone): Why not make it an _Approval_ vote instead, wherin the voter approves down to the choice made by his designated method. </div>
<div> </div><div>I'm not sure, but that change might have been suggested by Forest.</div><div> </div><div>But it hadn't occurred to me to use a procedure similar to Voter's Choice when only one method is used. It would be</div>
<div>interesting to find out if it brings improvement in regards to the properties that I consider important.</div><div> </div><div>Mike Ossipoff</div><div> </div><div> </div><div> </div><div> </div><div> </div><div><br><br>
</div><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 1:09 AM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote">
I have an idea for adding an extra step to IRV which has the effect of throwing out its compliance with Later-no-Harm in exchange for Minimal Defense, while trying to hang on to Later-no-Help.<br>
<br>
*Voters strictly rank from the top however many or few candidates they wish. Until one candidate remains, provisionally eliminate the candidate that is highest ranked (among candidates not provisionally eliminated) on the fewest ballots. The single candidate left not provisionally eliminated is the provisional winner P.<br>
<br>
[So far this is IRV, used to find a "provisional" winner. Now comes the extra step.]<br>
<br>
Interpreting candidates ranked above P as approved and also P as approved if ranked, elect the most approved candidate.*<br>
<br>
This method might be called "IRV-pegged Approval" (IRVpA). It is more Condorcet-consistent than IRV, because when IRVpA produces a different winner that candidate must pairwise beat<br>
the IRV winner (so it keeps IRV's compliance with Mutual Dominant Third). Also the IRVpA winner must be more approved than the IRV winner.<br>
<br>
I'd be interested if anyone can show that this fails Later-no-Help.<br>
<br>
Some other methods might gain from adding the same extra step, for example Schulze(Margins), MinMax(Margins) and Descending Solid Coalitions.<br>
It will fix any failures of Minimal Defense (and my Strong Minimal Defense criterion) and Plurality.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
----<br>
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</blockquote></div><br>