<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Whatever the election method, voters are concerned with three groups of candidates:<div>. Favorite: Desire electing one of these.</div><div>. Compromise: Not desired, but can help to avoid electing Worse.</div><div>. Worse: Want to avoid these getting elected.</div><div><br></div><div>Not covered here, seeing to better candidates getting nominated is also a worthy goal.</div><div><br><div><div>On Apr 26, 2012, at 11:21 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote, as:</div> Re: [EM] Article with some wording improvements, and ommissions fixed.</div><div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div>Adrian:</div><div> </div><div>This is (what I consider) an improvement on my article. I've replaced some awkward wordings, and added things that I'd left out, and left out a few things too.</div><div> </div><div> But you should feel free to edit in any way necessary, &/or use an earlier version. </div><div> </div><div>For instance, if I've now made it too long, then I have no objection if you take out whatever necessary, to shorten it--or use a previous shorter version.<font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"></font> </div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If it's of use to tell this, I wrote it in Word, then copied it, and pasted it in this e-mail.</font></font></div> <div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3" face="Calibri">Also, of course, use any title you prefer.</font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"></font></font> </div> <div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">My article:</font></font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"></font></font> </div> <div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Some problems and undesirable social results of our current voting system, Plurality Voting.</font></font></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Suggesting a minimal but powerful <span style=""> </span>improvement called “Approval<span style=""> </span>Voting”.</font></font></p> <div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Our current voting system, of course, is the “vote-for-1” method. <span style=""> </span>Also called "Plurality", or the "single mark method".</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">In our Plurality elections, we often hear people saying that they're going to vote for someone they don't really like, because he/she is the "lesser-of-2-evils". Note that they're voting for someone they don't like, and not voting for the people they really do like, because the people they like are perceived as unwinnable.</font></font></p></blockquote>Unable to vote for more than one, above voters give up on Favorite and vote for Compromise as the best they can do.</div><div><br></div><div>They fear that voting for Favorite is more apt to let Worse win.<br><blockquote type="cite"><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"> </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3"><span style=""> </span>What do we get when we vote for people we don't really like? We get something that we don't like. Everyone complains about how all the viable politicians are corrupt and bought. Does it really make sense to believe corrupt and un-liked candidates to be more "viable"? How viable would they be if everyone could feel free to support candidates whom they actually like?</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">We'd be voting from hope, instead of just from fear and dismal, pessimistic resignation. And the results would reflect that. Voting, and its results, would become something positive.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">So how does this strange situation come about? What causes it? When you compromise in Plurality, for a "lesser-evil", you're saying, with your vote-support, that s/he is better than your favorite. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Plurality can be regarded as a point-rating system, but a funny one in which you're only allowed to give a point to one candidate. You're required to give 0 points to everyone else. Top rating to one, and bottom to everyone else. Those bottom-ratings that you must give to all but one are materially real, in the sense that you're giving to those candidates zero points instead of 1, the lower of the two ratings levels--and thereby voting for them to lose.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Note that it is _not_ that Plurality only lets you rate one candidate. You're rating them all. But you're required to rate all but one of them _at bottom_, voted to lose. That's why I referred to Plurality as a _funny_ point-rating system. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Someone at the forum said that Plurality doesn't count enough information. But that isn't true. Plurality counts plenty of information, but it's mostly false information--all those compulsory zero ratings. <span style=""> </span>When you say something because you have to, even if you don't feel it, that's falsity. It's no exaggeration to say that Plurality forces falsification.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3"><span style=""> </span>It should hardly be surprising that this results in a lot of dissatisfaction with the results of that falsification.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-bottom: 10pt; margin-left: 0in; "><font size="3" face="Calibri"> </font><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Some defend Plurality by saying that, with it, we vote for our favorite. But millions of voters—when they need to "hold their nose" when insincerely helping someone they don't like, over someone they do like--might not agree.</font></font></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If Plurality is supposed to have us voting for our favorites, then it is failing miserably. If Plurality assumes that we're voting for our favorites, then Plurality is assuming wrong.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">How to avoid this problem? Why not repeal the rule that makes Plurality so funny?<span style=""> </span>Let people rate _every_ candidate with a <span style=""> </span>1 or a 0. Rate every candidate as "Approved" or "Unapproved". The candidate with the most "Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most approved candidate, wouldn't we.<span style=""> </span>Who can criticize that?</font></font></p></blockquote><div>Anyone who realizes that there is more to wish for.</div><div><br></div><div>Here you can vote for both Favorite and Compromise to help defeat Worse, but cannot vote for both without implying equal liking for each - and thus risking unwanted election of Compromise.</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">When everyone can support the candidate(s) they really like, instead of just a "lesser-evil", that can only mean that we elect someone more liked.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3"><span style=""> </span>That voting system, the minimal improvement on Plurality to fix its ridiculous problem, is called "Approval voting", or just "Approval".</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3"><span style=""> </span>Occasionally we hear a claim that Approval violates “1-person-1-vote”.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">But Approval is a points rating system. Every voter has the equal power to rate each candidate as approved or unapproved.<span style=""> </span>1 point or 0 points.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If you approve more candidates, does that give you more power? Hardly. Say you approve all of the candidates. You thereby have zero influence on the election.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">And obviously, any ballot will be cancelled out by an oppositely-voted ballot.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Suppose you approve all of the candidates but one. I approve the candidate you didn’t approve, and not ones that you approved . My oppositely-voted ballot cancels yours out. You voted for nearly all of the candidates. I voted for only one. But I cancelled you out.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Some Approval advantages:</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Approval<span style=""> </span>is one of the few voting systems in which you never have any reason to not top-rate your favorite(s).<span style=""> </span>For the first time, everyone would be able to fully support their favorites.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">As said above, when people can fully support the candidates whom they really like, we elect someone better-liked--someone to whom the most people have given approval. That makes an Approval election into something positive and hopeful. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">In a presidential straw-poll, using Condorcet, I’ve personally observed someone ranking compromises over their favorite.<span style=""> </span>In Plurality and Condorcet, that can be the only way to maximally help the compromises against someone worse.<span style=""> </span>But never in Approval.</font></font><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"></font></font> </div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">That observed favorite-burial in Condorcet suggests to me that many would feel a need to bury their favorites in Condorcet, as they do in Plurality.</font></font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri"></font></font> </div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Never underestimate voters' need to help a compromise all that they can, even when that's at the expense of their favorite.</font></font></div> <div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">I should add that, in Approval, not only does the voter never have any reason to not top-rate their favorite(s), but it is transparently obvious that that is so. If you have given 1 point to Compromise, and 0 points to Worse, then it’s obvious that also giving a point to Favorite won’t change the fact that you’ve fully helped Compromise against Worse.</font></font></p></blockquote>The above sentence emphasizes what happens to Compromise vs Worse, ignoring that it destroys Favorite's desired advantage over Compromise.</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Another thing, which really counts as a separate advantage:<span style=""> </span>In Plurality, whether people compromise (as they seem so prone to do), or whether, instead, they all vote for someone they like--either way, their votes will be split between their various compromises or favorites. Suppose the progressives add up to at least a majority. That won’t do them any good in Plurality unless they can somehow guess or organize exactly which candidate they’ll combine their votes on That’s especially a reason why voters now let the media lead them by the nose. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">That wouldn’t be a problem in Approval, where each person is approving a _set_ of candidates, maybe various favorites and various compromises. It would no longer be necessary to guess where everyone else will combine their votes. In Plurality, that need, especially, makes voters let the media lead them by the nose.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Approval , as I said, is the minimal change that gets rid of Plurality’s ridiculous problem. <span style=""> </span>There won’t be any question about whether that’s an improvement.<span style=""> </span>When Plurality’s falsification problem is discussed,<span style=""> </span>Plurality’s inexplicable problem-causing rule, <span style=""> </span>then anyone trying to claim that that problem should be kept will be arguing an indefensible position, and will be seen by all for what he is. <span style=""> </span>I’m not saying that desperate arguments for keeping Plurality’s problem won’t be made. I’m saying that they won’t work.</font></font></p></blockquote><div>Agreed that Approval was an easy, but valuable, step up from Plurality.</div><div><br></div><div>But, Approval does not help us vote our preference for Favorite over Compromise. I offer Condorcet as one easy step for this capability.</div><div><br></div><div>Easy for the voter - rank each approved candidate:</div><div>. Each candidate ranked by a voter is preferred over each candidate unranked, with much the same power as in Approval.</div><div>. Among those a voter ranks, each given a higher rank is preferred over each given a lower rank. </div><div><br></div><div>Picking the winner is based on the candidate pairs - best is for a candidate to win all its pairs. Note that, like Approval but unlike such as IRV, batches of ballots can be counted into arrays and the arrays summed. </div><div><br></div><div>The negatives below suggest this is a difficult step. Agreed, but its value says it is worth trying.</div><div><br></div><div>Dave Ketchum</div><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">In contrast, when anything more complicated than Approval is proposed , opponents, media pundits and commentators, magazine writers, politicians, and some hired academic authorities will point out that it could have unforeseen and undesired consequences. They’ll take advantage of the fact that the public can’t predict all of the method’s consequences.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">They’ll point out that the method could cause disaster, because we don’t know what it would do. Sure, we voting system reform advocates all agree that Condorcet is better than Plurality. But the public won’t know that.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Authorities and pundits will say “It needs a lot more study”, and...</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">...it will never happen.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">That objection won’t work against Approval,<span style=""> </span>because Approval is so elegantly simple and transparent, </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Approval has a unique optimization. All of the Approval strategies (which I’ll get to in a minute) amount to approving all of the candidates who are better than what you expect from the election. That means that the winner will be the candidate who is better-than-expectation for the most voters. That’s the candidate whose win will pleasantly surprise the most voters.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Anyway, it’s obvious that electing the candidate to whom the most people have given approval is, itself, a valuable optimization.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Approval strategy:</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">Experience with the several interesting and instructive presidential mock-elections that we've conducted at the election-methods mailing list suggests to me that, in an Approval election, people will typically just know whom <span style=""> </span>they want to approve. People will have an unmistakable intuitive feel for whom they want to approve. </font></font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">For instance, you likely will approve all the candidates whom you like, or who deserve your support. You'll know who they are.</font></font></div> <div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3" face="Calibri">The suggestions below are just for when you don't have a feel for whom to approve:</font></div><div style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"> <font size="3"><font face="Calibri">First, you can just approve the candidate you’d vote if it were a Plurality election, and also for everyone whom you like better than him/her (including your favorite).<span style=""> </span></font></font></div><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">That would be good enough.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">But Approval has strategy instructions that aren’t available for Plurality, because, for Plurality, they’d be too complicated to fully describe, and much more difficult to implement. So don’t let these suggestions make you think that Approval is more complicated. Approval’s strategy is incomparably simpler than that of Plurality.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If there are unacceptable candidates who could win, then approve all of the acceptables, and none of the unacceptables.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If there are no unacceptable candidates who could win, and if you have no predictive information or feel about winnability, then Approve all of the above-mean (above average) candidates.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">If neither of the above 2 paragraphs applies, then Approve all of the candidates who are better than what you expect from the election. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">One way to judge that directly would be to ask yourself: “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the election?”<span style=""> </span>If so, then approve him/her.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">But, because we don’t have the power to appoint officeholders, we might not have a good feel for that judgment.<span style=""> </span>A better question would be:</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Is s/he better than what I expect? Do I expect less? If so, then approve him/her. </font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">In other words, vote optimistically.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">In fact, even if s/he is right _at_ the merit-level that you expect from the election, then approve him/her if you like him/her.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Why does that maximize your expectation? Because, when (by approving him/her) you improve the win-probability of someone who is better than your expectation, that will raise your statistical expectation.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">_All_ of the Approval strategy suggestions are special cases of the rule just given.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font face="Calibri"><font size="3">For example, maybe you have a feel for who the top-two vote-getters will be. Then, of course, approve the better of those two, and everyone who is better still.<span style=""> </span>But I hasten to emphasize that the candidates who you might expect to be frontrunners in Plurality are very unlikely to be the frontrunners in Approval. <span style=""> </span>Never let anyone tell you who the frontrunners will be.</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><p style="margin:0in 0in 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Mike Ossipoff</font></font></p><div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"> </font></div><div> </div><div> </div><div> </div><div> </div> ----<br>Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>