<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Apr 20, 2012, at 5:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: -webkit-monospace; white-space: pre; "></span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: -webkit-monospace; white-space: pre; ">You said:</span></div><blockquote type="cite"><pre>I choke when I see IRV called "fine"<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Have I ever said that, without qualifying it? No.<br><br>I've said that IRV would be fine with an electorate different from <br>
the one tht we now have--an electorate completely free of inclination<br>to overcompromise, so that even IRV's flagrant FBC failure wouldn't <br>induce them to overcompromise.<br><br>I've said that IRV would be fine for me, as a voter.<br>
<br>I'm not one of those who is inclined to overcompromise for a lesser-evil.<br><br>Its MMC compliance and defection-proofness would work fine for me.<br><br>You continued:<br><br> - it too easily ignores parts of
what the voters say. For example, look at what can happen with A
being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing:
20 A
20 B>A
22 C>A
Joe ?
Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's
63rd). <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>It would help to specify more about Joe. Examples with a voter whose preferences<br>and vote are unknown are difficult to comment on.</pre></blockquote>Mike chose to ignore the rest of what I wrote. I will copy that at the end and comment.</div><div><br></div><div>A is well liked - except for Joe, every voter votes for A.</div><div><br></div><div>B and C contend, with NO voter voting for both.<br><blockquote type="cite"><pre>A and B voters are a majority, but not a mutual majority. the A voters are indifferent</pre></blockquote>Huh! B and C each got 1/3 of the votes - about tying each other, but far from a majority.<br><blockquote type="cite"><pre>between B and C. So, maybe you're pointing out that for {A,B} to win or not win, it depends on<br>which one gets eliminated first. True. Not ideal, I agree, but the B voters want the coalition<br>and the A voters don't. So whether there's a coalition will depend on which one gets eliminated<br>
first.<br><br>And we do know that the A voters are indifferent between B and C, because IRV gives them<br>no incentive to defect.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff</pre></blockquote><div>End of my email, that Mike did not include:</div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); "><br>Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's 63rd). IRV would be affected by Joe's vote:<br>. A - 63 votes with B and C discarded.<br>. B - 22 for C after 20A and 21B&20A discarded.<br>. C - 23 votes with A and B discarded.<br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Joe could have voted for A, B, or C, and have this noticed by IRV. A vote for A or C would cause them to win; a vote for B would cause C to win.</div><div><br></div>DWK</div></body></html>