<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/4/13 Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:mikeo2106@msn.com">mikeo2106@msn.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div dir="ltr">
<pre>Dave:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>On Apr 12, 2012, at 6:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
><i> I said that Plurality only lets you rate one candidate. That isn't
</i>><i> true. You're still rating all of the
</i>><i> candidates in Plurality, but you're required to bottom-rate all but
</i>><i> one of them.
</i>
Looking ahead, Plurality lets the voter present a small amount of
information; Approval a bit more; and Condorcet additional - each such
as the previous methods do not permit.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>As I was saying, it isn't that Plurality allows less information than does Approval.<br>It's just that Plurality requires a lot of _false_ information. Most of the information<br>
on many or most Plurality ballots is false. You could say, however, that Plurality allows<br>less _genuine_ information.<br><br>Forced falsity has no place in a democracy's voting system.<br><br><br>You continued:<br>
<br>Agreed that Approval allows approving more than one, and that each
approved is preferred over each unapproved, just as the one approved
in Plurality is preferred over all others.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>That's the myth. The myth that voters in Plurality are voting for their favorite.<br>Millions aren't, of course. If Plurality's justification is based on the assumption that<br>
votes are for genuine favorites, then Plurality is based on a false assumption. An assumption<br>as false as most of the information on a Plurality ballot.<br><br><br>I'd said:<br><br>><i> That can't be said for Condorcet or Kemeny, or any other rank method
</i>><i> or complex method.
</i>
You replied:<br><br>Now it is time to be more careful.
In Condorcet if I give one rank to all I prefer I have given the same
preference to those ranked over those unranked as I could do with
Approval's approving.
But ability to use multiple ranks in Condorcet or Kemeny gives me
additional power - among the ranked candidates my preferences can be
unequal and I show this by ranking higher each that I prefer over
other ranked candidates.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>When "That can't be said for Condorcet or Kemmeny, or any other rank method<br>or complex method", I was referring to my statement that Approval is quite<br>
obviously an improvement on Plurality, and only an improvement. That can be said<br>for Approval, due to Approval's extreme elegant simplicity, and the fact that it's<br>a minimal change from Plurality, one small freedom-modification.<br>
<br>I stand by my statement that that can't be said for Condorcet, Kemmeny, or any other<br>rank method or complex method. <br></pre></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I disagree. Yes, you can make up plausible stories where Condorcet, MJ, or Range could give pathological results in a case where Plurality could have gotten it right. Such a result is orders of magnitude less probable than the reverse, but it's possible.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Not so for SODA. Yes, SODA is more complicated, and so some people will not trust it. But I still contend that it is strictly better in all regards (including both results and voter simplicity) than approval, which is in turn strictly better than plurality.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I'm not claiming here that SODA is better, on the whole, than the other advanced systems I named. Since there are advantages on either side, that's a judgment call. But between SODA and approval, all the advantages except simplicity of definition lie with SODA.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><pre><br>No doubt, Condorcet, Kemmeny, MJ, etc., are improvements on Plurality. You know that. <br>
I know that. Nearly no one knows that.<br><br>An elaborate contraption like Condorcet or Kemmeny will be viewed as likely to have<br>unforseen consequences--as, in fact, rank methods do tend to have. People won't know<br>
if it's really an improvement on Plurality, or whether, instead, it will bring some<br>dreadful problem that will create disaster. <br><br>Media, opponents and corrupt politicians will, of course pick that up and run with it.<br>
They're sure to say, "That will require a lot more study". Translation: It will never<br>be enacted.<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>Condorcet perhaps should be described as a family of election methods,
usually agreeing as to details such as winner chosen - such as Kemeny.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>No perhaps about it: Condorcet is a family of methods. Condorcet(wv), too is a family, or<br>maybe a subfamily, of methods. When I introduced the Condorcet(wv) subfamily of methods,<br>
it didn't occur to me to call it "Ossipoff's Method", unlike some other method-introducers.<br><br>><i>
</i>><i>
</i>><i> I don't know anything about Kemeny's properties, and I was just
</i>><i> asking what it does with the
</i>><i> 2nd set of rankings in my previous posting, and whether or not it
</i>><i> passes FBC. I don't claim to
</i>><i> know Kemeny's properties.
</i>
You continued:<br><br>"2nd set" implies misunderstanding - in the Condorcet family voters
are normally permitted to use more than two rank values.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I said "the 2nd set of rankings in my previous posting" (or something close to that and meaning<br>the same thing).<br><br>I was referring to this set of rankings:<br>
<br>27: A>B<br>24: B<br>49: C<br><br><br>You continued:<br><br>"FBC" is simply one of many acronyms for which definitions are hard to
find (and to verify having found correctly).<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>FBC is very well-known. It stands for "Favorite-Betrayal Criterion", though<br>it could just as well be regarded as "Favorite-Burial Criterion.<br>
<br>FBC says that there should never be incentive to bury one's favorite (vote someone<br>else over hir).<br><br>In a little more detail, it says that under no circumstances should burying one's favorite<br>give a result such that you can't get as good a result without burying your favorite. (given<br>
some particular configuration of candidates and other voters' votes)<br><br>For the purposes in the above definition, the one result 1 is more good than result 2 if <br>you prefer result 1 to result 2. In other words, you prefer the candidate elected in result 1<br>
to the candidate elected in result 2.<br><br>[end of FBC definition]<br><br>FBC has been used for a long time, and not just by me. It's common knowledge here what FBC<br>is.<br><br>To give more precisely-worded statement of the more detailed definition given above:<br>
<br><br>A method meets FBC if it isn't possible to contrive a configuration of candidates, voters,<br>and the votes of voters other than you, such that you, by burying your favorite, can get<br>a result better than any that you could get without burying your favorite.<br>
<br>For the purposes of the above definition, saying that result 1 is better (to you) than result 2<br>means that you prefer the candidate elected in result 1 to the candidate elected in result 2.<br><br>[end of definition of FBC)<br>
<br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br><br><br> </pre> </div></div>
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