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I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for<br>public political elections, more so than Condorcet, which, too, is inadequate due to FBC failure.<br><br>And I also said that IRV would be a fine method, were it not for the public's inclination towards resigned, cowed overcompromise,<br>and their very sad and disastrous lowering of standards for acceptability. "Vote for the least bad of the corrupt candidates, because they're the<br>winnable ones".<br><br>But how could IRV be alright, even with better voting? Wouldn't people wanting to maximize their expectation still favorite-bury sometimes?<br>Sure. But if their judgement was at all reasonable, they wouldn't do so in a way that would bother me. It comes down to what one calls<br>"acceptable". <br><br>IRV's strategy in non-u/a elections would be especially complicated to describe, but it's a sure thing that it would often involve favorite-burial,<br>to maximize a voter's expectation. Without knowing the details on how to vote (no method matches Approval's clearly-defined simple strategy,<br>for any kind of election), voters would still do favorite-burial.<br><br>As with Approval, and probably all methods, IRV's expectation-maximizing strategy is simpler in a u/a election. But that doesn't mean that<br>it's simple enough for anyone to know what it is, exactly.<br><br>IRV has two great advantages: It is, as I understand it, entirely defection-proof. And it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion.<br><br>If we had the kind of electorate who could handle FBC failure, then we could discuss the relative desirability of Condorcet and IRV. But we<br>needn't bother, because they both fail FBC, disqualifying both of them under existing conditions.<br><br>Anyway, ICT has all of what I consider to be the most important properties. Regrettably, of course, it's almost surely too complicated to be considered as<br>a first proposal. But, when the public are more informed and used to voting system reform, ICT would become a good proposal. ICT is probably the<br>best, unless something much more complicated could improve on it.<br><br>to be continued<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br> </div></body>
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