<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Mar 28, 2012, at 10:42 AM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>Dave:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>Which leaves me promoting Condorcet. It allows ranking but, unlike
ABucklin or IRV, all that a voter ranks gets counted. Further, any
voter able to match their desires to Plurality or Approval for a
particular election, can vote by those rules and have them counted
with the same power by Condorcet rules.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote><div>Why bother? I see Fine and Soso as best so would consider approving both. Trouble is that this would imply equal liking, perhaps getting Soso elected while I like Fine much better.</div></div><div><br></div><div>With Condorcet I can rank Fine above Soso, so that my ranking can improve the chance of Fine getting elected, while Soso has a chance if Fine fails.</div><div><blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>[endquote]<br><br>Several problems with Condorcet:<br><br>1. Any method at all more elaborate than Approval, and especially a method<br>as different and elaborate as Condorcet is going to be much more suspect<br>than Approval is, to the public. Opponents will be able to say, "We don't<br>know enough about this voting system. It needs much study." Approval is<br>unique among voting system reform proposals, in that it's so simple, and such<br>a small modification of Plurality, that it's easy to show that it's an improvement<br>on Plurality, and only an improvement. That's much more difficult for more<br>complicated methods such as Condorcet.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>Agreed that in many elections many voters would be satisfied with Approval ability. Condorcet lets voters use that same ability - but use a bit more when they feel need for that much more.</div><div><br></div><div>Conceded that counting is more complex than for Approval, but the voting is only a bit more complex and the complexity only matters when the voters wish to use the capability.<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>2. For a handcount, Condorcet has much more count labor than does Approval.<br>If there are N candidates, then there are N(N-1)/2 pairs of candidates. For each<br>voter, a vote is counted among each pair of candidates. Now, in Approval, let's<br>estimate that, on the average, a voter approves half of the candidates. N/2 <br>approvals to be counted per voter. That means that Condorcet has (N-1) times more<br>votes to be counted, as compared to Approval. Sure, the Condorcet handcount needn't <br>take longer, if you hire more counters. But, for one thing, the count is equally<br>more expensive, whether you hire more counters to work the same hours, or the <br>same number of counters to work longer. Besides, the more count-work there is,<br>the more opportunity and risk for count-fraud there is.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>I question "handcount" when the labor gets heavy, such as for a senator or governor. Anyway:</div><div><br></div><div>Approval estimates are a bit heavy - even with many candidates, voters cannot afford to vote for much more than 2 or 3 - voting for more risks electing those they like less. Condorcet voting can not expect voters voting for many for the same reasons, though some more due to the ranking.</div><div><br></div><div>However the necessary complexity is overstated above. Do need to count how many votes for each candidate as in Approval. Then what of the pairs? 00 - nothing if neither voted for. 01 or 10 - just count the one voted for in the later add. 11, but equal ranked - counting them both leaves a tie. 11, but unequal rank - adjust the loser while counting the ballot so that when the count is adjusted for the 11 the result will be correct. After counting all ballots, add each candidates vote count to each of that candidate's pairs.</div><div><br></div><div>Looking for winner. Look at any pair - the loser cannot be the CW so, with luck, N-1 comparisons will delete all the non-CWs. Cycles, etc. can complicate this a bit, but not enough to expect hundreds of compares for 20 candidates.<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>3. Condorcet fails FBC. Though it's unlikely, there are situations where you<br>can only prevent a worse result by favorite-burial. No matter how rare those<br>situations are, some, probably many, people will favorite-bury therefore, because<br>, for many people, helping their "lesser-evil" is everything. With Approval, ABucklin,<br>MCA, MTA, and their conditional versions, and also with ITC, it's possible to <br>_guarantee_ that there can never be any reason to vote anyone over your favorite.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>Assuming FBC is doable, what are the chances of getting the message out to enough doers without the word getting out to enough anti-doers and thus them seeing to flunking?<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>Even if you only value reason #1, above, that alone is reason enough to only propose<br>what is proposable, enactable _now_. Approval.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>Agreed that Approval is cheap enough to do for its small value. That does not stop something of more value being worth considering.<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>One other thing: I used to claim that burial strategy is well-deterred in Condorcet.<br>But now I admit that I was only considering 3-candidate elections. With more candidates<br>burial isn't well-deterred. If I can find a candidate who will be sufficiently well-beaten,<br>then I and my faction can safely make hir soundly pair-beat the sincere CW, without risk<br>of electing that candidate whom we're ranking over the sincere CW.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>Huh? If you do not risk your candidate getting elected you have no chance of more than annoying the CW.<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre>ICT has some good protection against burial, because burial can only work for a<br>candidate who is ranked #1 by more people than anyone else in the cycle.</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>ICT or ITC? Your zillion titles are beyond understanding.<blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-size: 32px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div class="hmmessage" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><div dir="ltr"><pre><br>ICT would be a better proposal than Condorcet, since it also meets FBC and CD (it's<br>defection-resistant, unlike Condorcet). But ICT share's Condorcet's problems #1 snd<br>#2, above.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff</pre></div></div></span></blockquote>Dave Ketchum</div></body></html>