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MTA2, better than MTA or MCA:<br><br>MTA2 is the same as MTA, except that, when there are 2 or more candidates with<br>top ratings from a majority of the voters (call them "top-majority candidates), the top-majority candidates whom you've<br>middle rated don't get your middle ratings if any of your top-rated candidates are<br>among those who have top ratings from a majority of the voters.<br><br>For anyone who hasn't seen the definition of MTA, I'll write the entire definition of<br>MTA2 here:<br><br>1. Voters mark each candidate "Top", "Middle", or unmarked.<br><br>2. If one candidate is rated Top by a majority of the voters, then s/he wins.<br><br>3. If no candidates are rated Top by a majority of the voters then the winner is the<br>candidate who is rated Top or Middle by the most voters.<br><br>4. If two or more candidates are rated Top by a majority of the voters (call them majority-top candidates), <br>then each ballot that doesn't have any top-majority candidates among its top-rated candidates is said to<br>"still middle rate" its middle-rated candidates. The winner is the candidate who is top-rated or still middle-rated<br>by the most ballots.<br><br>[end of MTA2 definition]<br><br>As I said, I consider MTA2 to be better than MTA and MCA.<br><br>Dave comment:<br><br>Dave: <br><br>You said:<br><br>Deciding on implementing would require decisions on ballot format and counting rules.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Exactly. And the more different the balloting, and the more different and complicated the count, the more<br>skeptical, doubtful, hesitant and resistant the public will be. The media and the opponents are sure to say,<br>"This proposal needs a lot more study." In other words, table it forever. <br><br>That's a big advantage of Approval. It's the most minimal change from Plurality. The balloting needn't be different<br>from what it now is with Plurality. Instead of "Vote for 1", the ballot would say, "Approve one or more". That's the<br>only change in the ballot. <br><br>As for the count, there's only one way to count approvals: Add them up. <br><br>With all of the other proposals, someone could ask, "Why this method, why this count, instead of some different one?"<br><br>They can't ask that about Approval, because there's only one simplest, easiest improvement on Plurality.<br><br>At EM, we discuss some complicated methods, and some proposals that are really for proposing farther down the<br>line. That's fine, but it's clear that Approval is the proposable, enactable, feasible first proposal for voting system<br>reform. We can disagree on what's the ideal best, or on what should be proposed when automated counting<br>is fraud-secure, or when complicated methods are proposable, but we'll get significant new-method results<br>soonest if we propose what's most enactable now.<br><br>Though MTA2 is better, as a method, or (better yet) as an approval-management option in an Approval election,<br>there could also be a method "MTA/MCA", in which the voter could select, for each of hir middle-rated csndidates,<br>whether or not s/he wants to give hir middle rating for that candidate to count when 2 or more candidates, including that one, have top<br>rating from a majority. I consider MTA2 to be much better than MTA/MCA.<br><br>Strategy is similar for MTA2, MTA and MCA. Someone has already pointed out that you aren't helping your top-rated <br>candidates very much against your middle-rated candidates. --only if one of your top-rated has a top-majority.<br><br>So, give top ratings as you'd give approvals in Approval. Except, when you're uncertain as to whether you'd give candidate<br>C an approval, or if C is barely good enough to get an approval, or is almost good enough to get an approval, then give<br>to C a middle rating.<br><br>That wording is imprecise. No method can have anything like the clear and simple strategy of Approval. Still, what MTA2<br>adds is of value. Its strategy, as I suggest it, starts with Approval strategy.<br><br>You won't give many middle ratings. Kevin said that that kind of strategy seemed to get the best results in a simulation.<br><br>But I still say that the first proposal should be plain ordinary Approval. MTA2 could later be added as an option.<br><br>Of course so could the options of MTA, MCA and MTA/MCA. But, because MTA2 is better than all of those, I don't<br>know if there'd be any point in including those other options.<br><br>ABucklin could be included too, as an option. Though I like the conditional versions of all these methods, and would use<br>it in an actual election, I admit that the AOC kind of conditionality is too computation-intensive for a feasible handcount.<br>Maybe GMAT and MMT as well. Probably so. <br><br>If you had to choose between using the MTA option or the MCA option, then I'd suggest that MTA might be better if<br>you expect for one of your middle rated candidates, but none of your top-rated ones, to get a top-majority. Or if you<br>like the middle rated candidate or trust hir voters.<br><br>Otherwise, if you expect that it's more likely that a top-rated and a middle-rated candidate of yours will get top-majority,<br>or if you like the middle rated candidate or distrust hir votes, then choose MCA.<br><br>But, with MTA2, you needn't bother with such a choice.<br><br>With a handcount, ABucklin would have to not use the delay that I've described here, because it makes too much<br>count labor. Just as a matter of fact, I might add that, if automated counting were fraud-secure, the voter could<br>choose for hirself whether s/he wants the delay to operate in hir ballot, if s/he uses the ABucklin option.<br><br>Of course you might want to vote the same way in 3-slot RV. But it has more practical value in MTA2. MTA2 offers something<br>genuinely (a little) more strategically varied and expressive than Approval. An opportunity to vote more expressively, and for that to have some<br>practical meaning, more than it has in 3-slot RV.<br><br>MTA2's provision could probably be somehow added to Chris's full-rankings generalization of MTA.<br><br>MTA2 is probably the most deluxe method of its type that meets FBC and isn't conditional or defection-resistant.<br><br>Of course MCA is 3-slot ABucklin. Though ICT is handcount infeasible, that probably isn't true of 3-slot ICT. It might be a good<br>method. It would be worthwhile to compare its merits to those of MCA2.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br> </div></body>
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