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I like ABucklin (an easier name by which to refer to ER-Bucklin, as defined in the electowiki), because, when done<br>right, it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC), and, thereby, even gives co-operation-defection protection under certain<br>conditions (lots of parties; the two parties in question don't add up to a majority).<br><br>In ABucklin, maybe there won't be a 1st-choice majority, an immediate initial majority. But, even if not, then there is obviously<br>a very good chance that the next stage, wherein ballots give to their next choice, will result in a majority.<br><br>If so, then, if you've ranked someone below 2nd choice, then you haven't helped hir. S/he might lose, where s/he would<br>have won, had you ranked hir higher. There's good strategic reason to rank important compromises at least in 1st or 2nd<br>place. So, ABucklin's unlimited number of rank positions might not really be a good idea to use.<br><br>ABucklin retains the unmatched simple and clear strategies of Approval. If it's an option in an Approval election,<br>the Approval strategies are still valid if you're voting an ordinary Approval ballot. If the method is ABucklin, then<br>the Approval strategies are valid for you if you vote Approval, by only using ABucklin's top rank position.<br><br>But one thing that is lost if Approval isn't used is Approval's unique optimization: No matter what kind of election it is,<br>and no matter whether or not it's 0-info, Approval maximizes the number of voters who are pleasantly surprised by<br>the outcome. The use of options for other ways of voting would lose that optimization.<br><br>And it (obviously) elects the candidate marked as approved by the most voters. That counts for a lot, if public approval<br>and satisfaction with the govt matters.<br><br>Here's something that can be said for ABucklin: Under the condtions outlined above, ABucklin gives co-operation/defection<br>protection. But, because that's only under specified conditions, that doesn't change the conclusion that I stated earlier:<br><br>Approval can't be improved upon, other than questionably and doubtfully.<br><br>(Jameson: I'm referring to a comparison of Approval with other ballots-only methods. Of course delegation is one<br>of several options that can be offered in an Approval election. Though SODA's FBC violation isn't the worst kind, it still<br>represents a departure from full, ideal compliance with FBC. Tolerable, but not complete. I have no objection to adding<br>the delegation option to an Approval election. I consider it a valid and maybe desirable option, as are ABucklin,<br>MTA and MCA. As I've said, objections would be difficult to oppose (I don't oppose the above-named options. <br><br>But "SODA" means Approval with the delegation option, and not any other options, as I understand the definition of SODA.<br>The delegation option could be offered, but can you really argue that the ABucklin option shouldn't be allowed? Or MTA or<br>MCA?)<br><br>Mike <br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br> </div></body>
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