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<br>Jameson:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>Abd: You are right that C will probably win the chicken dilemma Mike
stated, where C has 49%, under almost any system except SODA. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>No, A will win in Approval, if A all the A voters approve B, and all the B voters approve A.<br><br>Forest posted a solution for the C/D problem, for Approval and RV. I've discussed several other ways whereby the problem can<br>be dealt with in Approval. <br><br>In AOC, MMT, or GMAT, A will win, because the B voters know that they'll get nothing from the A voters if they don't approve A, at least<br>conditionally. That's because they'll know that the A voters will probably only give to B a conditional approval.<br><br>MMPO2 and MDDTR automatically elect A. People have said "What if the B voters are sincere about their A vs C indifference? <br><br>Answer: Then A isn't the CW. But if the B voters prefer A to C, then A is the CW.<br><br>It's more important what happens when there's a CW, than when there isn't one. Therefore, it's best if A wins in that example.<br><br>MMPO2 and MDDTR are doing right when they elect A.<br><br>Their problem is their burial strategy. Because of that, I no longer like them as much as I did.<br><br>In ICT, A will win, for the same reason as A wins in AOC, MMT, and GMAT.<br><br>I've never claimed that Bucklin or ABucklin solves the C/D problem, the Approval bad-example problem. It doesn't.<br>But AOCBucklin, ACBucklin, GMATBucklin and MMTBucklin do solve it. Of course Approval with any or all of the<br>conditional options solves it.<br><br>So it's an exaggeration to say that only SODA solves it.<br><br><br><br><br><br>You continued:<br><div><br></div><div>In the end, I do not believe that AOC conditionality
really fixes the problem any more than Bucklin does.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Bucklin doesn't solve it at all, nor ABucklin. AOCBucklin, etc. does.<br><br>AOC solves it for the reason described above.<br><br>You continued:<br><br>If C voters give
conditional approvals to A and B, then A and B voters are again tempted
to seek a leg up on the others by conditionally approving C, and again
if both do so C wins. I doubt they'd be so shortsightedly partisan,
though, just as I doubt it with Bucklin.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>We've already discussed that. I acknowledged that possibility, and I said that I don't know of any FBC-complying method (at least one that<br>uses only ballots) that really completely avoids a co-operation/defection problem. With all the FBC methods I know of, a C/D problem<br>can come back, via burial strategy, as you describe above.<br><br>I've told why that isn't as bad as the C/D problem that AOC, ICT, etc., solve. The persistent C/D problem requires burial<br>strategy. It won't be as much of a problem.<br><br><br><br>You wrote:<br></div>
<div><br></div><div>There are only two ways I know of to truly fix this
dilemma. One is as with IRV<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>IRV is a method that seems to completely avoid a C/D problem, and it fails FBC. That's worse than having a completely unmitigated C/D problem,<br>and especially worse than the lesser C/D problem had by the defection-resistant methods such as ICT, AOC, etc.<br><br><br><br><br></div><div>You wrote:<br><br></div><div>Still,
as I said above, half-solutions like AOC or Bucklin <br><br>[endquote]<br>'<br>Bucklin isn't even a half solution, unless it's made conditional, like AOCBucklin.<br><br>AOC could be called a half-solution, as could ICT, MMPO and MDDTR, and AOCBucklin, GMATBucklin and MMTBucklin--because,<br>with those methods, the C/D problem can come back via burial strategy.<br><br>IRV is a complete solution to C/D, at the (unacceptable) cost of FBC failure.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>may be enough if C
has more like 40%; by merely making the slope down to a C win less
slippery, such systems may avoid that outcome.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Still, since AOC is not really better than Bucklin
here, while it is clearly more complex, I think there's no reason to
waste our breath on it.</div><div><br></div>Jameson </div></body>
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