<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/3/9 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:km_elmet@lavabit.com">km_elmet@lavabit.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
On 03/09/2012 01:46 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
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*De :* Kevin Venzke <<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>><br>
*À :* election-methods <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.<u></u>com</a>><br>
*Envoyé le :* Jeudi 8 mars 2012 18h36<br>
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff.<div class="im"><br>
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Hi Mike,<br>
I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too<br>
apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one<br>
is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the<br>
finalist positions. If this happened regularly it would be just an<br>
expensive version of FPP.<br>
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Actually, it would be an expensive version of Approval.<br>
Still, I am not sure why it would be any easier to propose an approval<br>
runoff vs. plain approval.<br>
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It could be better than Approval in one particular case. In a Gore/Nader/Bush situation where Nader's support is so close to Gore's that the Nader-voters don't know whether to approve one or two candidates, a runoff would let them approve of both with little fear, since the worst that can happen by overestimating is that both Nader and Gore go to the runoff, in which case Nader would win if he really had greater support.<br>
<br>
However, that advantage is lost if the parties start cloning the candidates. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>I would have thought so too, but actually, surprisingly, not so. The point is that Nader voters don't approve clone-Gore, and vice versa. So only real Nader and real Gore make it into the runoff. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Obviously, this is not the only way it could work out. But insofar as runoff solves the chicken dilemma at all, it solves it in spite of clones. That actually makes me think clones are not so much of a problem, as long as everyone but partisans ignore them. Even if one partisan side has over 50%... well, they shouldn't need clones to achieve a non-scary runoff, the rules should just say that there's no need for a runoff if there's a unique majority winner.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So I withdraw my earlier statements about clones being any problem for approval-runoff.</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
To keep it, I think one would have to have an exhaustive runoff, and that would be very impractical.<br>
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