<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/29 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><br>Jameson:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br></div>
<div>Still, again I have to ask you, Mike: where's SODA?
You were right earlier that SODA fails FBC. But there are three
mitigating factors.</div><div><br></div><div>1) Failure would be very rare; I hope to be able to be more precise about this in the near future.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I told you why that doesn't help. You can't assure a voter that SODA can't make them regret that they didn't vote someone else over their favorite. If you can't give that<br>
assurance, then voters will continue to favorite-bury.<br><br></div></div></div></blockquote><div>Actually, with SODA, it does help, because you can know ex ante (by looking at the predeclared preferences) when you are safe by FBC. That is, if you prefer A>B, and B prefers A, or A prefers B, or A and B both prefer a certain viable C, then you are safe. Only if B prefers the most-viable third candidate C, but A is indifferent between B and C, then you might consider a favorite-betraying vote for B. And even then, it's only appropriate if A very nearly, but not quite, is able to win... not exactly the situation where favorite betrayal is the first thing on your mind.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This is a specific enough circumstance that favorite-betraying strategy would never "take off" and become a serious factor in SODA.</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div>You continued:<br><br></div><div>2) Even when failure happens, SODA would never fail
FBC without at least giving the non-betrayed favorite a chance to
restore FBC by giving the win to the should-have-betrayed-for-them lower
choice. (This is not mathematically necessary, but to make it untrue,
you must divide the candidates in question into several clones, or give
them a negligible fraction of their votes in delegated form, either of
which makes an already-strained scenario completely implausible.)<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>You'd have to give more detail. The above paragraph isn't specific enough.<br><br>You continued:<br><br></div>
<div><br></div><div>3) There is a polytime(?), summable fix for the
method, which restores full FBC; though I admit it's an ugly hack.
Basically, there's a way to use the co-approval matrix to check if FBC
has been violated and make those voters for whom it was violated
"virtually" betray their favorite. Since, when that happens, it is the
only way to give these voters a winner who they approved, it is not
hurting them at all. There's also a slightly less-ugly, but imperfect,
fix that merely makes the process in step 2 automatic; this would be
good enough in practice.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Again, something more specific would be necessary. <br><br>But, just from what you said, I suggest that the automated virtual favorite-betrayal that you suggested would<br>
change the method to an entirely different method, bringing with it a new set of problems. For those problems to show, so that their seriousness can<br>be discussed, the suggestion in your above paragraph would have to be spelled out specifically, in detail.<br>
<br></div>
<div>You continued:<br><br></div><div>I believe that with these three factors, and most
particularly the first one, SODA's FBC failure is tolerable. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>As I said yesterday, even IRV's FBC failure would be tolerable, if voters weren't so resignedly over-compromising.<br><br>
An FBC failure can't be tolerable, because it means that you can't assure voters that it's safe to vote their favorite<br>in 1st place.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>With SODA, you can give that as a solid ex-ante guarantee to most voters, just not quite all of them. This is unlike the situation in most voting systems, where you can make no solid guarantees before the vote unless you can make them to all voters.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><div> As I said, for the excessively timid, giveaway-resigned, over-compromising voter, "probably" won't do.<br>
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<div><br></div><div>You continued:<br><br>And as for cooperation/defection: SODA without
question solves that problem more completely than any of the alphabet
soup you mention.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Nonsense. Methods and criteria are routinely designated by letter-abbreviations. You mean alphabet soup like "SODA"?<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>
I wasn't saying that SODA was superior because you used acronyms and I didn't, I was just using a collective term to refer to your proposals. I'm sorry if you found it offensive, there was no disparagement intended, and certainly not on the basis of names.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>You continued:<br><br> (Though I'd still really appreciate it if you made
quick electowiki pages for all of that<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I definitely intend to, within the next few days.<br><br>You continued:<br><br>, because I'd bet that nobody but
you actually knows what every one of those means ,and it would be
considerate of you not to ask us to continually look up all the
definitions and redefinitions in the archives).<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Again, nonsense. You were reading the mailing list at the times when I defined each and every method and criterion that you're referring to. Most were initially defined in posts<br>
that named them in the subject line. All of the new method and criterion definitions of mine were posted during a period of a few months, from October or November to the present.<br><br>Yes, new definitions should always be posted to the electowiki too. --even though a search at the archives page will quickly find recent references to <br>
a method or criterion name. <br><br>So yes, I will definitely post the new definitions to the electowiki.<br><br>By the way, how many times have I asked for the definition of IRV3/AV3? It's not at the electowiki either. The definition didn't come up in archives<br>
searches. Dave repeatedly refused to post its definition.<br><br>Alright, a few of my new method definitions weren't posted with a subject line that named them, so I'll repeat here something I've several times posted:<br>
<br>MMT and GMAT are defined at postings that name them in the subject line.<br><br>MTAOC was defined in a posting that named it in the subject line. That posting consisted of pseudocode for an algorithm for determining which middle ratings are<br>
to be kept and which are discarded due to lack of mutuality, and for thereby re-calculating the candidates' numbers of middle ratings.<br><br>As I've said several times:<br><br>MCAOC is identical to MTAOC, except that the method is MCA instead of MTA.<br>
<br>AOC is Approval, in which optional conditionality-by-mutuality is implemented as shown in the MTAOC pseudocode.<br><br>AOCBucklin is ABucklin in which optional conditionality by mutuality is implemented in that manner.<br>
<br>As I've said before, ABucklin is just a more convenient name for ER-Bucklin, as defined at the electowiki.<br><br>In AOCBuckliln, the conditionality-by-mutuality calculation (the one described by the pseudocode) must be done anew for each round of<br>
Bucklin vote-giving. In AOCBucklin, every vote that a ballot has, so far, given to a candidate (other than by 1st ranking) counts as a middle rating,<br>for the purposes of the pseudocode algorithm.<br><br>AC means Approval in which conditionality-by-mutuality is automatic rather than optional. That could just mean that the method is AOC, except that<br>
instead of designating unconditional and conditional approvals, the voter desginates favorites and less-than-favorite approved candidates, for whom<br>the approvals are counted as conditional. <br><br>But MMT and GMAT qualify for the name "AC", because they amount to automatically conditional Approval.<br>
<br>MTAC is MTAOC in which all middle ratings are automatically conditional. MCAC is MCAOC in which all middle ratings are automatically conditional.<br>ACBucklin is AOCBucklin in which all middle ratings are automatically conditional. (As I said, any vote that a ranking gives to a candidate, other than<br>
at 1st rank, is a "middle-rating" for the purposes of the conditionality-by-mutuality algorithm that I posted.)<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span></div></div></div></blockquote><div>
Thank you for the definitions. It really is easier when you put them all in one place like this. Anyone who's looking for these definitions later can search for "definitions in one place" or "definitions together" and they'll find this message with the definitions above.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><div><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Mike Ossipoff<br>
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