<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>Cc: <br>Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2012 21:13:51 -0500<br>Subject: Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois<br>On 2/19/12 8:53 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:<br>
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It seems quite a few election rules get quirky in one way or the other with a 3-way competitive election.<br>
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That might be a point worth considering in the abstract in a paper or something.... why are 3-way single-winner elections quirky?<br>
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isn't it obvious?<br>
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<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law" target="_blank">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/<u></u>Duverger%27s_law</a></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Duverger's law was based on the assumption of FPTP. I'm being more general, suggesting that any single-winner rule(apart from hybrids like a 2-stage rule) will </div>
<div>tend to get quirky when there's a competitive 3 way election, which will tend to make it hard to sustain there being 3-competitive parties. . </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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to wit: Duverger suggests two reasons why single-member district plurality voting systems favor a two party system. One is the result of the "fusion" (or an alliance very like fusion) of the weak parties, and the other is the "elimination" of weak parties by the voters, by which he means that the voters gradually desert the weak parties on the grounds that they have no chance of winning.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'm dealing with a fuzzy monster on this more general quirkiness of 3-way competitive elections. That's just one case. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 5:31 PM, Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a> <mailto:<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.<u></u>com</a>>> wrote:<br>
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..., cuz the simple fact of the matter is that IRV works best<br>
with only 3 candidates.<br>
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geez, i wish people used only plain text email. or that the list server converted every post to plain text, perhaps wrapping lines at 70 columns.<br>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
2.5, actually.<br>
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yeah, i don't get the reasoning behind David's claim. IRV works just as well with 4 or more candidates as with 3. if there are 3 nearly equal candidates IRV may screw up just as bad as if there are 3 nearly equal candidates with more minor candidates added. i am not assuming "IRV3".<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Cuz, there's more opportunities for the order of elimination to make a difference when you eliminate more candidates? </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I don't think there's a big diff between IRV w. 3 candidates and IRV with 4 candidates, but my debates with Dale Sheldon Hess have confirmed that according to the measures they found with simulations that IRV was closest to their favorites with only 3 candidates. <br>
-- <br>
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r b-j <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
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<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org><br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>BTW, Richard, you're a pretty good dancer!!! I saw the U-tube video from your website...</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
As for the U.S., the biggest (but not the only) election unfairness occurs in primary elections as a result of vote splitting. "Special interests" -- the people who give the largest amounts of money to election campaigns -- have learned to give money to candidates in the primary elections of _both_ the Republican party and the Democratic party (as needed), and give additional support to "spoiler" candidates when needed. The result is that the money-backed candidate in each party's primary election wins, and then it doesn't much matter whether the Republican or the Democrat wins the "general election".<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Our system is too entrepreneurial with pretty weak intra-party diffs to maintain party brands against this sort of opportunism. </div><div>IRV(and other rules) gets rid of some primaries. </div>
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Simply getting one political party or the other to use a fairer voting method (any of the ones supported by the Declaration of Election-Method Reform Advocates) in the primary elections would greatly improve the ability of voters to elect problem-solving leaders -- instead of special-interest puppets. (After one party adopts such fairer primary elections, the other party would soon have to do the same or else risk losing lots of support.)<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: primaries are good places to push for electoral reform. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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That's all I have time to write now.<br>
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Richard Fobes<br>
<br><br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Kevin Venzke <<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>><br>To: election-methods <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 02:39:40 +0000 (GMT)<br>Subject: Re: [EM] élection de trois élection de trois<br><div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div><span><var></var>They are quirky because of IIA. The papers on this are from the 1970's. Quote Wikipedia:</span></div>
<div><span></span> </div>
<div><span>"The <b>Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem</b>, named after <a title="Allan Gibbard" href="http://fr.mg40.mail.yahoo.com/wiki/Allan_Gibbard" target="_blank"><font color="#0645ad">Allan Gibbard</font></a> and <a title="Mark Satterthwaite" href="http://fr.mg40.mail.yahoo.com/wiki/Mark_Satterthwaite" target="_blank"><font color="#0645ad">Mark Satterthwaite</font></a>, is a </span></div>
<div><span>result about the deterministic <a title="Voting system" href="http://fr.mg40.mail.yahoo.com/wiki/Voting_system" target="_blank"><font color="#0645ad">voting systems</font></a> that choose a single winner using only the preferences </span></div>
<div><span>of the voters, where each voter ranks all candidates in order of preference. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite </span></div>
<div><span>theorem states that, for three or more candidates, one of the following three things must hold for every </span></div>
<div><span>voting rule:</span></div>
<ol>
<li>The rule is dictatorial (i.e., there is a single individual who can choose the winner), or
</li><li>There is some candidate who can never win, under the rule, or
</li><li>The rule is susceptible to <a title="Tactical voting" href="http://fr.mg40.mail.yahoo.com/wiki/Tactical_voting" target="_blank"><font color="#0645ad">tactical voting</font></a>, in the sense that there are conditions under which a voter </li>
</ol>
<div>with full knowledge of how the other voters are to vote and of the rule being used would have an incentive to vote in a manner that does not reflect his preferences. "</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>
<div>dlw: Hmm, doesn't this cast a different light on the fact that in Burlington VT the Republican voters were susceptible to tactical voting for the Democratic candidate? </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div> <span style="font-size:12pt">One cannot say that there'd never be a situation where such could arise with seemingly any election rule, which gets to my point that with IRV or IRV+ that the pressure to vote strategically incidence is on supporters of a major party that has been ideologically captured by its extreme and thereby refuses to re-center itself nearer to the true center. And that's not the same thing as forcing dissenters from the two major parties to vote strategically....</span></div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw </div></div>