<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb 9, 2012 at 2:10 PM, <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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<br>Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Re: Utilitarianism and Perfectionism. (Juho Laatu)<br>
2. Re: Utilitarianism and Perfectionism. (Juho Laatu)<br>
<br><br>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Juho Laatu <<a href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">juho4880@yahoo.co.uk</a>><br>To: EM list <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2012 22:07:07 +0200<br>Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.<br><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>On 9.2.2012, at 17.21, David L Wetzell wrote:</div><br><blockquote type="cite">
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---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Juho Laatu <<a href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">juho4880@yahoo.co.uk</a>><br>
To: EM list <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>Cc: <br>Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 22:29:02 +0200<br>Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.<br>
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:</div><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><font color="#000000">...</font></div><div>dlw:At any rate, this is why I've argued that ascertaining the best single-winner election rule is nowhere near as important as pitching the importance of mixing the use of single-winner and multi-winner election rules, with the latter replacing the former more so in "more local" elections that are not competitive often in single-winner elections.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>JL:I think I agree when I say that the first decision (in the USA) is whether to make the current two-party system work better or whether to aim at a multi-party system. </div></div></div>
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<div><br></div><div>dlw: I think the power of $peech in the US has made that choice for us.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In every system there are many entities that try to defend the status quo and their current good position in it.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw:Successful electoral reforms have tended to find a middle way between their ideals and accommodation of the status q uo... </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> But I'd argue that to make our two-party system work better, we need to provide a constructive role for 3rd parties in it. This wd be accomplished by the use of 3-seat LR Hare in state reps elections. If the Hare quota is used in the "more local" election and the Droop quota is used in the "less local" election, like the US congressional elections then we'll keep a two-party system. An analogous case could be made for the use of Hare quotas in aldermen elections and Droop quotas in city council member elections. But without giving third parties a constructive role to play, we're never going to be able to enforce regulations of $peech. </div>
<div><br></div><div>The kicker needs to be to separate the advocacy for such from a perfectionist approach that presumes we need an EU-style multi-party system ASAP. When those are connected, too many people say it's not possible and down-grade it's short-run importance as an issue. </div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>JL:I agree. From tactical point of view one can drive the reform forward in many more or less hidden ways. But if we talk directly about the targets, I believe an attempt to establish an improved two-party system where also third parties can survive, challenge the current parties, and maybe even bypass them one day and become a new dominant party if the current dominat parties are not good enough, will have a different supporter basis than a proposal to switch completely to a multi-party system with coalition governments etc.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: The kicker also is to figure out who'd benefit from a contested duopoly and get them to fund it's initial push. The difficulty of doing such may be why FairVote seems to have dialed back its push for proportionality in representation, as indicated by Richie's NYTIMES editorial. </div>
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<div><div>JL: After that has been agreed, it is easier to pick the used election methods. </div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw:I think the best way to build consensus is to take inspiration from our practical difficulties. Our difficulty is that to get reform, we need to get support from leaders of the two parties that dominate our two-party system. This should make that agreement a lot easier.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes. Proven practical benefits are better than priven theoretical benefits.</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>JL: Now, in addition to technical problems one has also a mixture of political higher level targets injected in the discussion, and that does not make it any easier.</div><div><br></div><div>dlw: That is part of what holds up electoral reform: we get caught up in reaching the political higher level targets and don't reach for the low-hanging fruit that will have a significant "trickle-up effect". </div>
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<div><div>JL: At the top level there is the presidential system that is tailored for the two-party approach. If one would give up the two-party approach at that level one might move also e.g. away from the single-party government approach towards multi-party govennments.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: I think Ralph Nader has shown the barrenness of focusing on the prez system. Anything that requires a US constitutional amendment should be ruled off the table, IMO. </div>
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<div><div><br></div><div>JL: At the lower levels one might consider also two-party oriented methods that are allow also third parties to take part in the competition. I mean that if one wants to stay in the two-party model, one may not need full multi-winner methods at the lower levels. It would be enough to e.g. guarantee that also third parties can survive and get their candidates elected, and that some third party may also one day replace one of the major parties as one of the two leading parties in some states, and maybe at national level too. I think this more lmited approac to multiple parties is quite different from typical multi-party requirements that typically include requirements like proportional represnetation.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: But a "less-is-more" PR cd help such come about, as it arguably did with IL and NY historically. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><br></div><div>Of course one may also adopt different models in the two layers, two-party system for the rop level and proportonal representation for some state level representative bodies. Above I also made the assumption that the strict tw-party approach where there are two fixed parties and that's it, is not considered acceptable / sufficient.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw:I agree that the only good two-party system is one that is meritocratic, whereby which 2 parties are at the top and dominate can change or where one of them can be forced to merge with a successful 3rd party, like with the Democratic Farm-Labor party in MN. </div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A system that allows third parties to grow could easily lead to 1) one of the major parties changing its opinions in the direction of the rising party or 2) merge with the rising party. That is ok as long as the change in opinions is true, since in this way the voice of the people will be heard and the system will change in the direction that the voters want. A very pure two-party system on the other hand may much easier become a ping pong game between two equally unwanted alternatives.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: The use of civil disobedience can hold the leaders of the major party accountable to their promises made to 3rd parties. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><br></div><div>JL: The message I'm trying to carry with this, is simply that after one names the targets, it is much easier to discuss what the best methods to implement those targets would be. Is it a two-party system, a flexible two-party system, or a proportional system, and are the targets different at different levels and in different bodies.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw:I agree, would you agree that if we were to target a flexible 2-party system that a modified form of IRV would be more acceptable for single-winner elections than in an EU-style multi-party system? </div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Pure single-winner elections have a strong (fixed) two-party tendency. An "approximately three-party" method would make the system more flexible. Full proportional multi-party elections would be an overkill. If you want to have a more flexible two-party system the ideal methods are methods that are targeted to meet just these requirements. Proportional methods with limitations to e.g. three candidates could do in some cases, no problem with taht, but only if they happen to implement teh agreed "flexibel two-party" targets well.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: You didn't really answer my question. If PR with limitations inevitably gets coupled with single-winner elections in the pursuit of a flexible 2-party system then wd an Approval-Voting enhanced form of IRV help us reach the target? Burlington VT shows that the top 2 parties can get changed by the use of IRV, and (at least part of) the former major party wd remain a sizeable minor party that could contest the duopoly relatively easily. </div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><div>Juho</div><div><br></div><div>
<br>
</div></div></div>From: Juho Laatu <<a href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">juho4880@yahoo.co.uk</a>><br>To: EM list <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2012 22:07:20 +0200<br>Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.<br><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>As I earlier wrote, I think the US has many options on how to go forward with the reform. The presidential election is maybe the most interetsting one. If one uses Condorcet, that means that the president may come from a minor party or be independent. Let's say that there is an independent gentleman candidate whome republicans prefer to the democrat candidate and vice versa. That candidate wins. Now the problem is that this candidate has no supporting party machinery, and he is supposed to form a government and nominate numerous people to other major positions. It seems that the role of the president would change considerably from what it is today.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>But to change the prez elections so much is not easy. It wd probably require a constitutional amendment. Isn't it better to focus on changes at the state level, after getting the current law prohibiting the use of multi-seat elections for fed'l elections ruled as unconstitutional on account of its discriminatory effects against minorities. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br></div><div>The softer approach is to use some advanced method but allow only representatives of major parties to win. One example of such a method is to first use a rankings based proportional method to pick two of the candidates, and then arrange a runoff between these two. This method would allow people to vote also for third party and independent candidates, just like in Condorcet. But the gentleman of the earlier example would probably not be elected. If there is a third party that has almost as many first preference supporters (or "above dem/rep" supporters), then the candidate of that party could win.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: How is this preferable to the use of IRV+, presuming that the US system as a whole continues to foster the existence of two major parties? </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br></div><br><div><div>On 9.2.2012, at 18.49, Dave Ketchum wrote:</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>On Feb 8, 2012, at 3:29 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:</div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>On 8.2.2012, at 16.18, David L Wetzell wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><div><font>...</font></div><div>At any rate, this is why I've argued that ascertaining the best single-winner election rule is nowhere near as important as pitching the importance of mixing the use of single-winner and multi-winner election rules, with the latter replacing the former more so in "more local" elections that are not competitive often in single-winner elections.</div>
</blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>DK: I disagree:</div><div>. We have single-winner purposes such as mayor or governor, unless we redesign the goals.</div><div>. And purposes such as legislator which can be packaged as single-winner or multi-winner, with the PR backers promoting multi-winner.<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div>dlw: Yes, but if you switch the legislator elections to PR then that will inevitably improve the inherently single-winner elections, regardless of which election rule is used. This is because of spill-overs across elections. From a public choice perspective, if a party cannot dominate one legislative body, it cannot leverage it to get an advantage in other sorts of elections. Thus, other elections become more competitive as well and there emerge more checks and balances...</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><blockquote type="cite"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><font size="7"><span style="font-size:25px"><br>
</span></font></div><div><font size="7"><span style="font-size:25px">DK:Note that, unlike with TPTP, or even IRV, Condorcet voters can back, besides the "better" of the two-parties, those for whatever issues this voter considers important - and get their backing noted in the vote counts (the big difference between IRV and Condorcet). </span></font></div>
</div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div>dlw: They can rank 3rd party candidates with IRV too. And, even if a growing 3rd party were to "spoil" for its more proximate major party for one election, if the 3rd party remains rooted in the belief that they are right, they will force the political center to shift in the next election, which will not be easily over-turned. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Condorcet, IMO, is perfectionism. Just imagine what a nightmare might emerge if there is no CW and like 2% of the ballots got spoiled? </div></div><br>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: "James Gilmour" <<a href="mailto:jgilmour@globalnet.co.uk">jgilmour@globalnet.co.uk</a>><br>To: "'Juho Laatu'" <<a href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk">juho4880@yahoo.co.uk</a>>, "'EM list'" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 00:02:12 -0000<br>Subject: Re: [EM] Utilitarianism and Perfectionism.<br>> Juho Laatu > Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 8:29 PM<br>><br>> I think I agree when I say that the first decision (in the<br>
> USA) is whether to make the current two-party system work<br>> better or whether to aim at a multi-party system.<br><br>Juho<br>Don't you think you might just be starting in the wrong place? Asking the wrong first question?<br>
<br>In a representative democracy, surely the first requirement is to ensure that any "representative assembly" (e.g. state or federal<br>legislature or city council) is properly representative of those who vote. If when provided with the means to choose freely among<br>
all significant viewpoints, the voters choose to cluster around two parties, then a "two-party system" will properly and fairly<br>represent those voters. In other another jurisdiction, the voters may choose to cluster in significant proportions around three or<br>
more parties when one would hope the voting system would be sufficiently sensitive for all the significant clusters to be<br>represented directly.</div><div><br></div><div>dlw: My 2 cents is you must start with what is and bear in mind how your opponents are going to react to any proposed change.</div>
<div>This is an application of game-theory, whereby one must choose the best strategy given one's opponents' likely reactions.<br><br></div><div>JL:IRV is a method that loks good at first sight, but that has some problems. It clearly seems to respect the idea that a pairwise winner should win at the last round, and maybe be strong also in the other rounds. I think IRV has also another nature, i.e. the tendency to favour large paries. This property correlates with the othe approach to single-winner methods that I discussed earlier. But also here IRV is quite heuristic and approximate, and does not systematically implement that approach either. It is thus possible that some people see IRV as "a bad Condrcet-like method", and some see it as a "improved two-party method with some problems". The method that I described earlier could be seen to be a cleaner method that represents this other approach to IRV (while Condorcet represents another approach to it).</div>
<br><div>dlw: You'd understand that IRV remains supported by pragmatists who question whether your method is enuf of an improvement to justify the replacement of IRV by it. Or maybe the use of 2 stages is something we want to avoid... </div>
<div>I think changes in voter habits that come with learning by voting would suffice to ward off the sort of pathology exhibited in Burlington. </div><div><br></div><div>dlw</div><div><br></div>