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<pre>Jameson:<br><br>I'd said:<br><br>><i> Say my sincere ratings are:
</i>><i>
</i>><i> x: 100
</i>><i> y: 90
</i>><i>
</i>><i> (other candidates considerably lower)
</i>><i>
</i>><i> Your sincere ratings are:
</i>><i>
</i>><i> y: 100
</i>><i> x: 90
</i>><i>
</i>><i> (other candidates considerably lower)
</i>><i>
</i>><i> x and y are similar, but different enough to be supported by
</i>><i> different factions.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> This situation is hardly unusual.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> My ratings:
</i>><i>
</i>><i> x: 100
</i>><i> y: 0
</i>><i>
</i>><i> Your ratings:
</i>><i>
</i>><i> y: 100
</i>><i> x: 90
</i>><i>
</i>><i> Guess which of those two is more likely to win.
</i>><i>
<br>You replied:<br><br><br></i><i>Neither. Once people are strategizing as you are, chances are high of a
</i>chicken dilemma crash, and the other extreme (A?) will win.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Sorry, but you misunderstand. The assumption was that you rate sincerely.<br><br>You said that it takes a big majority of strategizers to defeat sincee voters.<br><br>I've just told how strategizers can defeat an equal number of sincere voters.<br><br>So make up your mind: Do you want to rate sincerely in MJ or not?<br><br>But, if you're saying that MJ has the co-operation/defection problem, the<br>chicken dilemma, then you're right about that.<br><br>For that reason, it is no improvement over Approval.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br></pre> </div></body>
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