<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Feb 9, 2012, at 9:02 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><span style="RIGHT: auto">Hi Robert,<br class="yui-cursor" style="RIGHT: auto"></span></div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><blockquote dir="ltr" style="RIGHT: auto; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"><blockquote dir="ltr" style="RIGHT: auto; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"><div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><div dir="ltr" style="RIGHT: auto"><font face="Arial" size="2"><div class="hr" style="BORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; PADDING-TOP: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; HEIGHT: 0px" readonly="true" contenteditable="false"><font class="Apple-style-span" face="'times new roman'" size="4"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: 16px; line-height: normal;"><br></span></font></div><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">De :</span></b> robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>><br><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">À :</span></b> <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a> <br><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Envoyé le :</span></b> Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07<br><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Objet :</span></b> Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet<br></font></div><br>On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:<br>> On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:<br>> <br>> ...<br>>> if it's not the majority that rule, what's the alternative?<br>> I'm not aware of any good alternatives to majority rule in competitive two-candidate elections (with some extra assumptions that rule out random ballot etc.).<br>> <br>> Juho<br><br>thank you Juho, for stipulating to the obvious. i will confess that i am astonished at the resistance displayed here at the EM list to this obvious fact.<br></div></blockquote></blockquote> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">Nobody on EM said anything contrary to Juho's statement. I agree with Juho. And Bryan said something similar at the end of his post.</div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">With two candidates, most of us agree that yo<var id="yui-ie-cursor"></var>u have to use majority rule. That doesn't mean it gives perfect answers according to some ideal. If your ideal is maximum utility, then it's pretty clear majority rule isn't always giving the correct answer. Not because the ballots make it clear that this is happening, but because almost any model of voter preferences will lead to this conclusion. It would be frankly bizarre, if "fairness" and utility always gave the same answers.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Actually, a majority is not needed here, but is close enough that we almost never complain. For an excuse for making trouble I offer:</div><div>40 A</div><div>41 B</div><div>8 A,B legal to vote for more than one in Condorcet.</div><div>8 spoiled ballots - can happen even here. </div><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">(Your idea of all the utilities being 0 or 1 can't even be made to work as a model, I don't think, unless voters really only have two stances toward candidates. Because what happens when you introduce a third candidate that some people like even better? Utilities don't change based on who else is in the race, they are supposed to represent in absolute terms the benefit from a candidate being elected.)</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Utilities do not change? I buy that they do - given that A or B offer no special value and that neither is worth voting for, getting C in the race can matter if C is known as willing and able to be useful.<br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">When you try to make an argument for Condorcet and 3+ candidate scenarios, based on the inevitability of using majority rule with two candidates, you will fail to convince an advocate of utility, because an advocate of utility probably doesn't think the method options are as limited anymore, once you have 3+ candidates. The majority rule procedure with two candidates may be necessary (Clay may even disagree with that though), but that doesn't mean it was always doing the right thing.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Those of us that dislike runoffs might argue against demanding majority in what follows : </div><div>40 A</div><div>30 B</div><div>15 C>B>A</div><div><br></div><div>I count 45B>40A, 30B>15C, 40A>15C - with B winning if we do not demand majority<br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">Is this clear enough? I understand you want to make a fairness argument in favor of majority rule with two candidates, and then build off of that. But a utility advocate may reject fairness and prefer utility, even without offering a different method that could be used with two candidates. (He may perceive that there is no utility improvement to be had by doing something else.) So even if you attack Range as silly in the two-candidate case, you're not making the point that fairness is paramount over utility.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Seems to me the voters saw utility - but there is nothing here giving it a measurable value because there is nothing to measure it with other than the vote counts (but it is the vote counts that show how much they saw backing the value they voted for).<br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><span style="RIGHT: auto">I'd note also that utility goes far beyond the question of whether Range is a workable method. A utility advocate is free to leave Range in the trash-bin while seeking to maximize utility under other methods that you might recognize as less prone to exaggeration strategies.</span></div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><span style="RIGHT: auto"></span> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><span style="RIGHT: auto">And from your last mail to me:</span></div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><span style="RIGHT: auto"></span> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"><span style="RIGHT: auto"> <div style="RIGHT: auto"><span style="RIGHT: auto">>> It could be true if it so happens that nobody wants to vote truthfully under<br>>> Condorcet methods, while Approval in practice never has any bad outcomes, etc.<br>><br>>it could be true that hundreds of people who have testified to such have actually been abducted by extraterrestrial aliens who poked needles into them </span></div> <div style="RIGHT: auto"><span style="RIGHT: auto">>and did experiments on human subjects. but it's an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence.</span></div> <div style="RIGHT: auto"><span style="RIGHT: auto"></span> </div> <div style="RIGHT: auto"><span style="RIGHT: auto">Yes, you're right. However, the important point here is just that it could be true. "More Condorcet than Condorcet" isn't inherently nonsense. You just have to read it as "better sincere Condorcet efficiency than under Condorcet methods." Such a thing is possible.</span></div></span></div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif"> </div> <div style="FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif">Kevin</div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></body></html>