<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/5 Kevin Venzke <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div style="margin-left:40px"><br></div><div style="margin-left:40px"> </div><div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt">
<div style="font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif;font-size:12pt"> <div style="margin-left:80px" dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial"> <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">De :</span></b> Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">À :</span></b> <a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com" target="_blank">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a> <br><b><span style="font-weight:bold">Cc :</span></b> EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>> <br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Envoyé le :</span></b> Vendredi 3 février 2012 22h06<br> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Objet :</span></b> Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at
Condorcet<br> </font> </div><div class="im"><div style="margin-left:40px"> </div><div style="margin-left:80px"><br></div><div><div><blockquote style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 12.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div><br>
<blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing. They try to maximize the odds of electing the Condorcet winner, even though it's a proven mathematical fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the electorate prefers.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Trouble is that the ballots ARE the voters' statements as to which candidate IS the CW. The above paragraph seems to be based on the ballots sometimes not truly representing the thoughts of the voters voting them.<br>
<br><br></blockquote><div style="margin-left:80px">No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth making, because most people who don't already agree will think it's a stupid one.</div>
<div style="margin-left:80px"><br></div><br> </div></div></div>From my perspective the trouble with the top statement is that sincere Condorcet efficiency and utility performance seem to be correlated. I don't know any way<br>
to design a method to specifically perform better at utility, assuming strategic voters.<br><br>Note that, if you try to take this issue back to Warren's sims, strategically-voted Condorcet methods within his framework have not just bad utility but bad sincere<br>
Condorcet efficiency as well. (I don't know the numbers but it's impossible to believe they are any good.) So I don't know where one could look to argue that <br>maximizing sincere Condorcet efficiency vs. utility performance can be done.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br></font></span></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div>This is an important point. I agree that it's basically impossible to separate "(sincere Condorcet) efficiency" from utility in an election with significant strategic voting. But in that case, as Kevin points out, Condorcet methods are NOT necessarily the best way to maximize the former.</div>
<div><br></div><div>(And more research is needed to find out what is, because I don't trust Warren's 10-year-old BR numbers on this question at all; his strategy assumptions for several methods I find badly unrealistic. His numbers establish a lower bound, but the realistic numbers could be significantly higher for certain methods. And I'm not just unproductively criticizing from the sidelines here. I'm busy working on research that would improve this; I suspect that Kevin is, too.)</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div></div>