<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On 5.2.2012, at 5.39, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: auto; "><div class="im"><br>
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With information like this it should be (in principle) a quite mechanical process to check all relevant available methods against the targets and environment description, and then pick the best method (and ballot format) (and guidance to the voters on how to vote).<br>
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really? okay so, with a simple well-defined environment: Two-choice question, Competitive interests, High stakes, Decisive deadline, and Equal franchise for every voter; then what further questions need be settled to adopt a ballot format, tabulation method, and voter instructions?</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>Those conditions beg the question. Of course, under those conditions, majority is the obvious choice. But you can't necessarily generalize that and say that anything but the CW is always wrong.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If there are more than two choices, then we have some more space to make also other conclusions than using a Condorcet compatible method. If we expect some particular voting pattern to be common, then we might compromise and use a method that doesn't always give us the CW, even if one exists (in the given set of potentially strategic ballots).</div><div><br></div><div>There can also be targets that do not point at the CW. The question of weak CW has popped up many times. Maybe we indeed want the winner to come from a group that has 51% first prefernece support, or at least not only 10% first preference support. We may want the society to have two (maybe occasionally changing) main parties, and we want the election method to support this state of affairs. For example in such cases we can have (targets that point to) a majority oriented method that does not respect the Condorcet criterion.</div><div><br></div><div>Juho</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: auto; "><div class="im HOEnZb"><br>
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r b-j <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
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