<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Bryan Mills <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:bmills@alumni.cmu.edu">bmills@alumni.cmu.edu</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="im">> From: Bryan Mills <<a href="mailto:bmills@alumni.cmu.edu" target="_blank">bmills@alumni.cmu.edu</a>><br>
> To: David L Wetzell <<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com" target="_blank">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>><br></div><div class="im">> > If there are 3-5 seats STV then the number of candidates won't<br>
> proliferate<br>
> > too much and there'd be 5-7 places to vote. This would keep things<br>
> > reasonable.<br>
><br>
> To get reasonable proportionality with only 3-5 seats per district<br>
> you'd probably need to go to an MMP system, with all its added<br>
> complexity. Otherwise Droop proportionality doesn't buy you much over<br>
> FPTP; with 5 seats the Droop quota measures to a precision of ~17%,<br>
> and the remaining 17% in each district is still susceptible to<br>
> gerrymandering.<br>
><br>
<br>
Not much?<br>
The goal here is not perfectionism wrt proportionality.<br>
The goal is to increase proportionality and to increase the number of<br>
competitive seats<br>
and to reduce the cut-throat competitive nature of US political rivalry<br>
between its two biggest parties<br>
so they can't dominate the other and have more incentives thereby to work<br>
together on the many issues that need work.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'm doubtful that 3-5 candidate districts actually would "increase the number of competitive seats". Each major party ends up with 1-2 safe seats, and at that level of granularity gerrymandering and geographical polarization are still significant enough to render the last seat non-competitive in most districts. (It would increase proportionality somewhat - by transforming some of the safe-by-gerrymandering seats into safe-by-Droop-proportionality seats - but you seem to be arguing that proportionality isn't as important as competition.)</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw; Well, proportionality matters to the extent it makes the control of the legislative body in question more likely to be competitive... and even the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>Suppose we have two parties with a 50/50 split</div></div></blockquote><div>How about a 45-45 with 10% being random... this wd keep the 20% non-safe seats more likely to be competitive, even w. attempts at gerrymandering. </div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> and 5 seats per district, with one party more popular in urban areas and one more popular in rural areas. And suppose that the district lines are drawn such that 4/5 of districts are slightly more rural than average and 1/5 of districts are more urban than average, so that the 5th seat in each district becomes relatively safe as well. (We can do this fairly easily using geographical boundaries by centering 1/5 of the districts around cities.)</div>
<div><br></div><div>Scale that up to 400 legislators (80 districts). What do we end up with?</div><div>320 "natural" safe seats guaranteed by Droop proportionality (160 for each party)</div><div>80 gerrymandered-safe seats for the rural party</div>
<div>20 gerrymandered-safe seats for the urban party </div></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div>
<div>Now, despite a 50/50 natural split, the rural party has a 60% supermajority. And, of course, if you draw the district lines differently you can do the same thing for the urban party. </div></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>So there's still relatively little hope that a system with such small districts would produce a party-proportional legislature. As you point out elsewhere, it might still be possible to get an ideologically-proportional legislature if you can get the parties themselves to shift ideologies.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im"><div>dlw:But don't you see, this does constrain the damage possible via gerrymandering. You've given the extreme case. If it had been all single-winner districts, the max someone could theoretically get for their party would be just shy of 100%. So the variance of the bias introduced by gerrymandering is dwarfed to be a small fraction of what it could have been.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>And, it'd be easier for a minor party to gain ground and either threaten to spoil things for the party who'd get 3 seats or to take that seat away. This means some power and even more influence is redistributed because of the use of American forms of PR. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Or if there's a significant fraction who are independents (completely or leaning left or right) then it'd be harder for a party to rig the election in this setting. In an STV election, they'd have to limit their candidates to 2 or 3 and that isn't easy to do without giving more groups within the party more exit threat that thereby increases their voice within the party. </div>
<div><br></div><div>So the party itself will be changed by virtue of the changes in the rules. Even if we still get 2 major parties and the districts get gerrymandered some, there will be two different major parties and lower barriers of entry for minorities/third parties to get voice on issues they care about. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> If you assume two major parties with ~40% of the electorate each, that<br>
> means that the 5th seat in each district is noisy -- but it's not<br>
> random noise, it's systematically biased by the parties' voting<br>
> strategies and the choice of district boundaries. Larger districts<br>
> allow finer-grained Droop quotas and thereby reduce that noise.<br></blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>But you are giving the party's too much credit and neglecting the problems of balancing intra-party democracy and intra-party discipline. Plus, there's the greater "bias" due to the greater ease w. which a 3rd party could make inroads into the situation. That entry threat is even more credible in some gerrymandered situations... </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
dlw: Smaller districts engender less opposition from those in power.<br>
They keep the constituent-legislator relationship more so.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Absolutely agreed that smaller districts engender less opposition from those in power. That's because smaller districts don't fix the biases that keep them in power.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: We don't need to fix the biases in total, nor do we need to get them out of power to reduce their ability to game the system and to change the play of the game needed for them to stay in power in ways that will make a difference! </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>They do maintain the constituent-legislator relationship, *for the subset of voters who voted in favor of the legislator*. For the remaining Droop quota of un- or under-represented constituents the nonexistence of the constituent-legislator relationship is also maintained.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Aye, but they'd at least be in a better position to be swing voters who get more say-so as a result. As JQ makes clear, gerrymandering is not an exact science and there's less margin to error with a 5-seat PR-Droop quota in use, which can thereby be gamed by outsiders who can shake up the system in important wways.. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">
<div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> >> But if we assume that partial rankings are effective, there's still the<br>
> >> strategy/computation tradeoff to deal with: allowing truncated ballots<br>
> >> still doesn't help with favorite-betrayal, and STV variants less<br>
> >> susceptible to favorite-betrayal are also less susceptible to efficient<br>
> >> counting.<br>
> >><br>
> ><br>
> > dlw: Truncated ballots may not end favorite betrayal, but it'll help with<br>
> > it.<br>
><br>
> I don't see how; please elaborate.<br>
><br>
<br>
This is essentially the same arg that IRV does not end the fact that some<br>
will still on occasion be pressured to betray their favorite.<br>
But it'll be of less consequence when it happens. It won't be 3rd party<br>
dissenters, it'll be the supporters of a major party that does<br>
not position itself near the true political center who get pressured to<br>
betray their favorite and that in turn will pressure the major party<br>
to adapt or die.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Are you saying that favorite-betrayal isn't a problem when those forced to do it belong to a major party? I hope I'm just misunderstanding your point, but it sounds to me like you're describing a system like FPTP but with major-party spoilers substituted for minor-party spoilers.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Only the supporters of a major party that refuses to moderate itself. Those who more often need protection for their rights, since they are more likely to be w.o. representation will be able to vote sincerely. This prevents a major party from getting captured by its tails, as unfortunately happens too easily in the US. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="h5">
<div>
<br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">> >> With an implicit "first-preference" approval, it has the same problem as<br>
> >> traditional STV (i.e. IRV), namely of unduly rewarding<br>
> favorite-betrayal.<br>
> >> With an implicit "all-ranked" approval, the overall system would likely<br>
> >> violate later-no-harm with much higher frequency; by expressing a<br>
> >> preference between two dispreferred candidates one might unintentionally<br>
> >> put the higher of the two in contention.<br>
> >><br>
> ><br>
> > dlw: I'd say empirically we'd see just how high of a frequency LNH would<br>
> be<br>
> > violated. Jameson Quinn had a hard time coming up with a pathological<br>
> > example for IRV3/AV3 and I imagine it'd be similar for the above. The<br>
> 1st<br>
> > stage would reduce the number of candidates to N+2 and it seems likely<br>
> that<br>
> > the N+2nd and N+3rd candidates in terms of "all-ranked" approval are less<br>
> > likely to be among the N winners.<br>
><br>
> Hmm, ok. I'm operating on the assumption that voters will vote<br>
> strategically if doing so is easy, and will vote approximately<br>
> honestly if strategic voting is difficult.<br>
><br>
<br>
okay.<br>
<br>
><br>
> We're taking the top S+k winners and running some ideal STV method on<br>
> them; let's try to find an "easy" strategy. Here's my idea:<br>
> 1) Gather a set of related parties to form a majority-coalition.<br>
> 2) Have the coalition propose exactly S+k candidates.<br>
><br>
<br>
good luck coordinating that..<br>
<br>
3) Ask coalition voters to vote for all of the coalition candidates in<br>
> any order they choose.<br>
><br>
> Since a majority of candidates approve of every coalition candidate<br>
> and disapprove of every competing candidate, the coalition candidates<br>
> win the approval vote.<br>
> By adding the "approval" phase to the STV election, I'm able to turn a<br>
> simple majority into a 100% supermajority.<br>
<br>
<br>
> Is there a flaw in my strategy? (I don't think there is, but I may be<br>
> missing something.) If not, we'll either need to abandon a fixed<br>
> limit on the number of candidates or we'll need something more<br>
> sophisticated than a simple approval-vote to filter them.<br>
><br>
<br>
dlw: It's not realistic.<br>
<br>
You'd need to have serious intra-party discipline to keep the no. of<br>
candidates down to S+2<br>
and to get a majority of voters all to vote for all of that S+2 candidates.<br>
That is a serious coordination problem.<br>
<br>
But if it did happen then it'd "work" in terms of making the leading<br>
coalition of parties cast a broad net that strongly met the needs of most<br>
people. This would be much better than a bunch of non-competitive<br>
single-winner elections. In that case, we're in DINO land.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div><div>By "strongly met the needs of most people" you appear to mean "met the needs of a bare majority of people marginally better than the alternatives". </div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, I mean that more of the people in the party coalition have a more credible exit threat and thereby more voice within the setting of its priorities. </div><div><br></div><div>It's not easy to hold together a broad coalition in real life. </div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>My concern is that in this scenario 25% of the electorate would benefit substantially, 25% would benefit marginally, and the remaining 50% would be arbitrarily worse off. That's essentially the same worst-case behavior as the current majority-of-majorities setup, but with a simpler strategy required to implement it.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: If the bigger districts make it more likely that the percent diff between the "ruling coalition" and those outside it is smaller then there's a higher chance that things could switch or that the bigger parties within the ruling coalition will need to partner with parties outside it in the future, which will affect how they treat them...</div>
<div><br></div><div>So long as the slices of the population who are in the 25-25-50 category may shift, this worse case scenario ain't so bad. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br></div><div>That being the case, I think we'd be better off with small-district STV than with large-district STV with this sort of approval-based filtering.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree. And the truth is you don't see too many large-district STVs in practice, as it is. </div>
<div>The proliferation of candidates brings its own difficulties. </div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> >> It may well be that these issues are all less severe than in the<br>
> >> deterministic alternatives to STV, but I still think they're enough to<br>
> >> merit consideration of nondeterministic alternatives.<br>
> >><br>
> ><br>
> > In terms of the US's political culture, nondeterministic alternatives are<br>
> > not going to happen anytime in the near future and we need electoral<br>
> reform<br>
> > ASAP!!!!<br>
><br>
> Sadly, I think both nondeterminism and STV share the "not going to<br>
> happen in the near future given political culture in the US"<br>
> classification, given that US law requires single-winner FPTP<br>
> elections for federal representation and the major parties (who<br>
> control the legislature and benefit greatly from FPTP) have no<br>
> incentive to change that law.<br>
<br>
dlw: STV need not end 2-party domination. Reforms that do not end 2-party<br>
domination are more fit in the US and should be the only ones pushed.<br>
And, as I've shown, it's implementation can be simplified.<br>
Thus, it can become a political jujitsu issue, whereby it is more rational<br>
for those in power to accommodate than to resist the proposed change.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>The belief that the 2-party system can accurately reflect voter consensus relies heavily on the assumption that voters' differences of opinions correlate sufficiently well with a single dimension of variability, so that tending toward the center along a single axis produces centrist results on all issues. I do not accept that assumption: in my experience, Americans disagree along at least two axes that do not correlate perfectly (fiscal policy and social policy).</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Aye, but if we get more voices getting heard, the principal components of these axes can be changed so that there is a center and the assumption is more likely to be true.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im"><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
> So as far as I can tell the only option for meaningful reform is a<br>
> constitutional amendment, and that means reforming 75% of the states<br>
> as a first step. This is not a short-term process. </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
I think one could argue that the current law requiring single-winner<br>
elections is discriminatory twds minorities, and adopted under bad<br>
circumstances, and thereby unconstitutional. This would not require a<br>
constitutional amendment.<br></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>I think you're perhaps overly optimistic about the willingness of courts to overturn election law. But we'll see - I'd be thrilled to be proven wrong about this one.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, Clarence Thomas likes cumulative voting, not unlike what was used in IL for their state reps elections from 1870-1980, as an anti-discriminatory measure and it cd be argued that the sort of votes is less important than the quota used. Also, Barack Obama introduced legislation to bring back cumulative voting in 2001 while he was a state senator. We need to make sure that he appoints SCJs who will do the right thing.</div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div></div><br>