<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/3 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">On Fri, Feb 3, 2012 at 5:00 AM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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I consider the whole "encourages big parties to follow the moving center" thing to be so ridiculous as not to bear argument, given that, as DSH points out, the center is one of the worst places to be in IRV. </blockquote>
<div><br></div></div><div>I said "follow" and I presume that one cannot pinpoint the center... In my heuristic, we get to see the numbers, but the parties don't. They can choose direction and to move a little or a relatively lot, but they cannot stake any point, cuz it will change. </div>
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<div> </div></div></div></blockquote><div>Enough words. </div><div><br></div><div>If you propose a model that is well-specified enough to be tested in silicio, we'll talk. Certainly, nothing you've said so far is unreasonable for that; a one-dimensional spectrum with an unknown shift between elections, voters with some bias towards the top two parties from the last election, and parties with some cost for mobility, especially with an inability to switch positions, trying to maximize their win percentage with the least movement. I believe that in such a model, IRV would be closer to Plurality (ie, bad) than it would be to any other good system (approval with reasonable voter strategy, Condorcet, MJ, Range, or SODA). I hope we could make some kind of a bet, and that my expected winnings plus my curiosity would be enough to make it worth my while to actually do the test.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Otherwise, I'm tired of debating this back and forth. I'm an empiricist, not a platonist. (Middlebrow?)</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Sure, it does a better job than plurality. But if you want a system which preserves two parties but makes them track the center, and you think that US exceptionalism means this is a two-party nation by nature, then you have a great array of systems which will accomplish your goal, and IRV is not one of them.</blockquote>
<div><br></div></div><div>Now, who is being ridiculous? </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>See above.</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div><div>My whole point is that it's much more important to push for the strategic use of multi-winner elections in part of the US's system, rather than chase our tails around trying to figure out the best single-winner election rule. You all cannot agree. I think it's because in fact the diffs aren't that great and there's no good reason that IRV can't be immunized from a Burlington-like reversal. </div>
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<div>dlw </div></font></span><div class="im"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br></div><div>Jameson<br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div>2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com" target="_blank">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br></div></div>
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<a href="http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7696446405100112491&postID=7962761243854932802" target="_blank">http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=7696446405100112491&postID=7962761243854932802</a>
<div><br></div><div>Dale Sheldon Hess has provoked me to explain my views about IRV wrt to a 1-d politics game. </div><div><br></div><div>Here's what I wrote, </div><div><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">DSH:"Place a party directly in the center. Now, if I can place two more parties, I can always make your centrist lose. ALWAYS. And you can't move more-centrally to do anything about it (I can actually make it so that you can still win by moving AWAY from the center; how's that for perverse incentives!)"</span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">dlw: Ah, but in this example, the two biggest parties are in fact close to the center(as I predicted)... and so the fact that the most centrist party doesn't win is relatively small potatoes. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">And as for the 3rd party candidate winning by going way from the center, that's a curiosity due to the uniform dist'n of voter preferences. That isn't realistic...</span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">I've played with Yee's voteline thingy. The issue is with the uncertainty as to what is the center, since it's something that's dynamic. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">That's why I downplay the import of "center squeeze". The center can't be cordoned off by anyone and so to pick a rule based on how it pins down the center is like chasing after the wind. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">With both IRV and FPP, there's pressure to move twds the center by the biggest parties, it's stronger with IRV. Thus, the de facto center ends up becoming more closely tied to the true center.</span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">Let's say a shift in voter preferences has D and R at the 70 and 71 penny marks and G sets up shop at 35. G wd win with both FPP and IRV, but both D and R get to move again. But there are rigidities that prevent them from moving too much too fast. And so the D's move to 55 and the R's to 56. And then G still wins if it's FPP, but with IRV then R wins. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">But what if D moves and R (perhaps stuck in FPP thinking) doesn't move, so the positions are 35, 55 and 70? In that case, G would win. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">Tragedy, right? But it can be expected that the next election will change things further so that the G's must move to the right(or merge w. the Ds) and the R must move to the L or merge with the Ds. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">The moral of the story is that parties are like the people groping around in the dark in Socrates' cave. They cannot choose exactly where on the spectrum they will be. But IRV helps us to adjust and makes the outcome closer to the center than o.w. with FPP. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">If Approval Voting had been used then D would have won by moving to 64. In fact all the parties wd be strongly encouraged to beeline for whatever the center seemed to be and with a shifting center, they'd all stumble and bump together in the dark. </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">Whereas, the Gs by taking a stand at 35 at least they succeed in moving things to the left or maybe they'll get lucky... </span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">It's not an exact science, which is what it should be. We want people to pursue the center, but not too doggedly...</span><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">Sorry if that's fuzzy, but I think that's closer to real life...</span><span><font color="#888888"><br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">
<br style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif"><span style="line-height:19px;text-align:left;color:rgb(51,51,51);font-family:'Trebuchet MS',Verdana,Arial,sans-serif">dlw</span>
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<br></div></div>----<br>
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