In exploring SODA's criteria compliance, I've realized that 4 candidates is a bit of a magic number for SODA. For many criteria, the non-compliant scenarios for SODA require at least 5 candidates: one "threat candidate" who will win unless three of the other four can pool their votes; 2 "delegator candidates" for whom the delegation order matters; and 2 "target candidates" who can win if they get the votes from both delegator candidates. The delegators both prefer either target over the threat, but each delegator prefers the two targets in a different order.<div>
<br></div><div>Of course, in most real-world elections I've ever heard of, 4 candidates are plenty. So is there a way to fix SODA to make those pesky 5-candidate scenarios go away? Analogously, Condorcet's paradox arises for 3 or more candidates, but you can make 3 candidates paradox-free if you require a 2/3 supermajority, and continue to etcetera with an arbitrarily high supermajority.</div>
<div><br></div><div>One possibility would be for predeclared candidate preferences to be a single approval ballot, rather than a preference ordering. That way, in the scenario described above the delegator candidates could not disagree on the order of preference of the target candidates. This would actually simplify SODA rather than complicating it.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I've explored some other ideas, and the above is the only one I've found so far which works, but from my exploration it seems possible that there are others.</div><div><br></div><div>I'd like to further explore this "compliant SODA", and hear other suggestions of how to sweep the annoying 5-candidate scenarios under the rug. However, this is just exploration for now; as a serious proposal, I'm leaving SODA as it is.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div>