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I was speaking of MTAOC and MCAOC as options in an Approval election, but those names of free-standing methods probably aren't <br>good names for voting-options. I'll collectively refer to those two methods as "top-majority methods".<br><br>(Of course, MTAOC and MCAOC are still good as separate free-standing methods)<br><br>That
sort of voting works in an Approval election, more or less. The election
could be regarded as a top-majority method election in which<br>the plain Approval ballots are treated as having top-rated the candidates whom they vote for. <br><br>Of course MTA and MCA differ only when there are 2 or more top-majority candidates.<br><br>Since
I'm talking about a voting-option, maybe the voter needn't commit
hirself to giving or not giving votes to hir middle-rated<br>candidates
who have a top-majority. Why not just say "When 2 or more candidates
have top-majority, your ballot gives a vote to its middle-rated
candidates only if 1 or more of your<br>middle-rated candidates, but none of your top-rated candidates has a top-majority."<br><br>That
would make more sense. But, since it's an Approval election, where the
count rule makes no mention of majority, how much sense does it make for<br>some particular voter to place her approvals based on majority, which isn't mentioned in the Approval count rule?<br><br>An alternative to top-majority occurred to me, for a 3-slot voting option in an Approval election.<br><br>I'd
like to clarify that I'm speaking of something to replace the "MTA..."
part of "MTAOC", replacing the top-majority approach. This has no effect
on the<br>conditionality options, which are offerable with any of these 3-slot voting-options, or with plain Approval.<br><br>My
alternative to top-majority, for 3-slot voting-options in an Approval
election, might sound naive, as it would be if I claimed too much for
it:<br><br>How about saying that your ballot gives a vote to its middle-rated candidates only if none of your top-rated candidates win?<br><br>First
there's a count of everyone's top-ratings. Every ballot that doesn't
top-rate the winner of that count gives a vote to its middle-rated<br>candidates,
and there is a 2nd count. If that doesn't deny top-rated winners to any
middle-rating-witholding ballots, the count is over. But if it does,
then there is a<br>3rd count in which every ballot gives votes to all of
its top-rated and middle-rated candidates, and that count's winner wins
the election.<br><br>Of course that could, and often would, just amount
to an Approval count. Say your favorite wins the 1st count. Everyone who
doesn't top-rate <br>that winner gives votes to their middle-rated
candidates, automatically. Say that changes the winner, and you no
longer have a top-rated<br>candidate who wins. Your ballot then gives
votes to all of its top candidates and middle candidates, as does every
ballot that no longer top-rates<br>the current winner. So it ends up as an Approval count.<br><br>But
maybe, in the 2nd count, you still have a top-rated candidate who wins.
Then your ballot doesn't give a vote to its middle-rated candidates.<br>Of course you wouldn't want it to. That possibility justifies this count suggestion.<br><br>I'm not saying that's a _big_ benefit, but it does seem desirable.<br><br>Whereas
my previous 3-slot voting-options were top-majority voting options,
I'll call this alternative one, described above, "Middle-When-Necessary".<br><br>It sounds a little like conditionality by top-count,
but, for one thing, those two things act differently. For another thing,
they're completely different _kinds_ of<br>things: Conditionality by
top-count is one of two kinds of conditionality (the other being
conditionality by mutuality--for which I've described several<br>implementations).
Those conditionality options can and should be available to voters
choosing the Middle-When-Necessary 3-slot option, just as <br>it would be when choosing the majority-top 3-slot options that I formerly proposed, or for approvals on an Approval ballot too.<br><br>I'm
not saying that Middle-When-Necessary brings a big improvement over
just voting an Approval ballot with maybe some conditional approvals. <br>But it seems to me that it a voter could sometimes thereby get a better result, and that it allows better expressivity.<br><br>By
the way, I should probably clarify that, regardless of whether the
voter is using, or not using, the 3-slot voting option, conditionality
by mutuality could be<br>offered and implemented as shown in the MTAOC
pseudocode;or by MMT; or by GMAT. Three different ways that the
conditionality option could be offered.<br>Any one of those 3 would work
as a conditionality option in an Approval election, and could be
applied by the voter whether or not s/he is using the<br>3-slot option (for which I now propose the modest Middle-When-Necessary).<br><br>The MTAOC pseudocode kind of conditionality, and MMT, and GMAT are mutually incompatible as Approval options, but any one of them<br>would work well as a conditionality option in an Approval election.<br><br>It
only recently occurred to me that Middle-When-Necessary could be
practical and useful, and so of course it could have a problem,
drawback,<br>or shortcoming that I don't know of yet. For instance, I don't know if it could spoil FBC compliance. So, at this point, it's only a tentative<br>possibility-suggestion, and not a proposal.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br> </div></body>
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