<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/2 Kevin Venzke <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div><span>Hi Jameson,<var></var><br></span></div>
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</div><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT:bold">De :</span></b> Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT:bold">À :</span></b> Kevin Venzke <<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>> <br>
<b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT:bold">Cc :</span></b> em <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>> <br></div><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT:bold">Envoyé le :</span></b> Jeudi 2 février 2012 11h35<div class="im">
<br><b><span style="FONT-WEIGHT:bold">Objet :</span></b> Re: [EM] SODA criteria<br></div></font></div><br></blockquote><div class="im">
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<div>In </div>
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<div>your criteria list you had "Majority" but for that you must actually be assuming the opposite of what I am trying, namely that</div>
<div>*everyone* is delegating, is that right?</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>
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<div>Everyone who votes for the majority candidate is either delegating to them, or voting them above all other alternatives - that is, approving only them but checking "do not delegate". This is the standard meaning of the majority criterion. For instance, by this meaning, approval meets the majority criterion.</div>
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<div>For MMC, everyone in the mutual majority is either delegating to one of the candidates, or approving all of them and nobody else.</div></div></blockquote></blockquote>
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<div>Oh, I missed that the voter can't rank at all. So you are good with FBC. But I don't regard Approval as satisfying what I</div>
<div>call MF and Woodall's Majority. It's possible to say it satisfies MF, but I prefer Woodall's treatment.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>
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<div>I don't know what MF stands for. I agree that it fails Woodall's majority, though not in the unique strong Nash equilibrium.</div>
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<div>(The criteria framework</div>
<div>I use doesn't have any way to say that Approval satisfies MMC. You can equate approval with equal-top, above-bottom, or</div>
<div>call it something external, but I can't say that voters stick to a limited number of slots. I understand the meaning of "two-slot </div>
<div>MMC" or "voted MMC" but I see these as inferior versions.)</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>
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<div>"voted", because delegation means there's sometimes effectively more than two slots. </div>
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<div>In response to your last line, if the majority set involves more than one candidate, the delegating voters are never part of it</div>
<div>and are unnecessary in getting one of these candidates elected. (I'm using your treatment that voters only have two rank </div>
<div>levels.) If you don't agree, I'd like to hear how you are interpreting MMC, because I can't think of how else it would work.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>
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<div>10: A(>B>C>?...)</div>
<div>10: B(>C>A>?...)</div>
<div>10: C(>A>B>?...)</div>
<div>21: ABC</div>
<div>49: ????</div>
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<div>One of A, B, or C must win.</div></blockquote></div></blockquote>
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<div>MF is Majority Favorite.</div>
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<div>If I understand you correctly, you're treating voters as casting either an approval ballot, or else one of the predeclared</div>
<div>preference orders.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes. </div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif">
<div style="FONT-SIZE:12pt;FONT-FAMILY:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div style="FONT-SIZE:12pt;FONT-FAMILY:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div> I guess that makes sense though it's quite tricky to analyze. If a voter is counted as voting A>B>C, it's</div>
<div>not possible to raise C above only B. But when I analyze this, it has to result in something consistent with the desired ranking</div>
<div>unless that's completely impossible. I guess that could only be A, AC, or ACB approval ballots. I think that would result in </div>
<div>some criteria problems. For instance, suppose that A>B>C elects C, but A=C=B elects B. Since I look at how the voter </div>
<div>wanted to rank, and not the options the method made available, I would call that a Mono-raise failure.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I guess I'd have to agree with that... well, if your vote for A=C causes C to lose. So failing participation in this way – for which I recently posted an example scenario, impossible with 4 candidates but possible with 5 – means failing mono-raise.</div>
<div><br></div><div>My claim of monotonicity was based on comparing only approval ballots to approval ballots, delegation preferences to delegation preferences, and undelegated bullet votes to delegated votes. I did not consider this case.</div>
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<div>You might think that's unfair, but I don't know what framework you can suggest that will be more apparent and also allow</div>
<div>you to fairly evaluate something like Mono-raise.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, you could do as I had done, and evaluate it when the candidate A changes from B>C to B=C.</div>
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<div>Personally I think it would be easier to assume voters have no idea what candidates predeclare. In that case MMC doesn't</div>
<div>apply in your scenario above.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Easier, but I think less realistic. At that point, it's basically approval.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div>Granted, this might make it hard for criteria that are supposed to deal with optimal strategy assumptions or equilibrium.</div>
<div>I just don't worry about those criteria because I don't know how to evaluate them.</div>
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<div>I also wanted to note, here instead of in a separate post, that I wonder about the FBC. I was thinking it must satisfy</div>
<div>it because you could cast an approval ballot, but that's not good reasoning (see: any Condorcet method). What if it</div>
<div>is possible to get a superior result by delegating your vote to someone other than your favorite? It's not clear to me</div>
<div>that this is impossible.</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Say your favorite is W, but you delegate to some other X. They add approvals Y and Z, so that your ballot is counted for X, Y, and Z; and Z wins. You could have just voted for W, X, Y, and Z for the same result. Your approval vote for X gives them the same boost in the delegation order that a delegated vote would have given them.</div>
<div><br></div><div>In fact, if you don't like Y, you can probably leave them off.</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div>Kevin</div></font></span></div></div></div></div><br>----<br>
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