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It probably does that with any method. <br><br>Suppose it's Nader, some Democrats, and some Republicans.<br><br>You equal-top-rank Nader and all the Democrats.<br><br>Nader wins. If you and others like you had left Nader out, a Democrat would have won.<br><br>The Republicans have ranked all the Republicans and Democrats, and protected them all with AERLO, in order to<br>protect against the election of anyone they like less than the Democrats.<br><br>Nader's win, therefore, triggers the Republican AERLO, bringing lots of Republicans and Democrats to top-ranking<br>among the Republican ballots.<br><br>That gives the win to a Republican.<br><br>If you had only top-ranked the Democrats, and left Nader out of your ranking, a Democrat would have won.<br><br>That violates FBC.<br><br>Sure, a verbally-described non-numerical scenario like that isn't as conclusive as a numerical example, but it sounds<br>like something that could happen, and it's convincing. AERLO probably spoils FBC compliance.<br><br>So I don't propose AERLO for public elections. I want it to always be possible to assure voters that there is absolutely no<br>way that they could regret voting their favorite at top rank or rating.<br><br>I feel that majority working-together, to enforce majority rule, would be more difficult with more than 3 ranking slots. A<br>3-slot method makes it easier to assume what your compromise's supporters will do. AOCBucklin would involve more<br>strategic guesswork and risk than would MTAOC. <br><br>So now I don't know if I'd propose any method with more than 3 rating slots. <br><br>Well, in my conversations with people new to voting systems, I've been told that ABucklin is too complicated anyway.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br> </div></body>
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