<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto"><VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR>Hi Mike,</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">does Range.)</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">If there are three candidates, you can rank them A>B>C and get protection for A from the B preference if you</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">believe that A's viability depends on A having a top-slot majority. If you think that A could still win with, say, a</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">49% plurality, it doesn't make a lot of sense to give a preference to B (unless B is about as good).</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">In constructed scenarios it's not hard to imagine situations where this could be a useful guarantee. You can</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">easily make a situation where if A only gets 49%, it must be that opposing candidates and voters made up the rest,</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">in which case it's safe to give the second preference, because A definitely lost.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">But in real elections I would be concerned by the fact that a narrow majority can be thwarted just by adding in</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">a few ballots for non-contenders.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">If you go lower in the rankings (e.g. consider safety of 2nd preference from the specified 3rd preference) I think</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">the numbers just get more and more unclear as to whether you stand to gain anything for the risk you definitely</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">take.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">By the way, I agree that AERLO methods probably violate FBC. The effects are too unpredictable.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Kevin</SPAN></div>
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<DIV class=hr style="BORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; MARGIN: 5px 0px; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; PADDING-TOP: 0px; BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; HEIGHT: 0px" readonly="true" contenteditable="false"></DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">De :</SPAN></B> MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp@hotmail.com><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">À :</SPAN></B> election-methods@electorama.com <BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Envoyé le :</SPAN></B> Lundi 30 janvier 2012 15h09<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Objet :</SPAN></B> [EM] Majority Judgement<BR></FONT></DIV><BR>
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<DIV dir=ltr><BR>Does anyone here know the strategy of MJ? Does anyone here know what valid strategic claims can be made for it? How would one maximize one’s utility in an election with acceptable and completely unacceptable candidates who could win? How about in an election without completely unacceptable candidates who could win?<BR><BR>And no, I don't mean refer to a website. The question is do YOU, as an MJ advocate, know what MJ's strategy is?<BR><BR>Of course, if anyone here advocates MJ, then they, themselves, should know MJ’s strategy, and its advantages and disadvantages, and be able to state them here.<BR><BR>I’m just guessing, but isn’t MJ’s strategy the same as that of RV? (Maximum rating for candidates you’d vote for in Approval, and minimum points for candidates you wouldn’t vote for in Approval).<BR><BR>And surely the u/a strategy of MJ is to max-rate the acceptables and min-rate the unacceptables.<BR><BR>But of course MJ
differs from RV in the following way: In RV, if you rate x higher than y, you’re reliably, unquestionably, helping x against y. In MJ, of course that isn’t so. In fact, if you like x and y highly, and at all similarly, and rate sincerely, then you’re unlikely to help one against the other, at all.<BR><BR>Another difference is that, in MJ, even if you correctly guess that you’re raising a candidate’s median, you can’t know by how much.<BR><BR>Suppose x is your favorite. y is almost as good. Say the rating range is 0-100. You sincerely give 100 to x, and 90 to y.<BR><BR>Say I prefer y to x, and, as do you, I consider their merit about the same. If I rated sincerely, I’d give y 100 and x 90.<BR><BR>But, unlike you, I don’t vote sincerely. Because x is a rival to y, and maybe also because I expect you to rate sincerely, I take advantage of your sincerity by giving y 100, and giving x zero.<BR><BR>Because different people have different
favorites and near-favorites, your high rating of x and y is probably above those candidates’ median ratings. So you’re raising the medians of both candidates, with no particular reason to believe that you’re raising one’s median more than that of the other.<BR><BR>In our above-described example, that’s what you’re doing: Raising the medians of x and y. Probably by about the same amount. I, however, am raising y's median and lowering x's median. You’re raising my candidate’s median, and I’m lowering your candidate’s median. You aren’t helping x against y. I’m helping y against x.<BR><BR>You’ve been had. <BR><BR>At least in RV, you’d have reliably somewhat helped x against y.<BR><BR>There's something familiar about that strategy situation :-) MJ fully has the co-operation/defection problem.<BR><BR>Discussion of a method’s strategy shouldn’t have to come from someone who doesn’t advocate that method.<BR><BR>A tip:
Don’t have confidence in a method whose advocates evidently don’t know its strategy.<BR><BR>Another thing: Just as one example, try MJ on the Approval bad-example. What you thereby find out is that, to be usable, MJ needs bylaws and patches, such as to make it too wordy and elaborate (and arbitrary?) to be publicly proposable. <BR><BR>Mike Ossipoff<BR> <BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV></DIV><BR>----<BR>Election-Methods mailing list - see <A href="http://electorama.com/em" target=_blank>http://electorama.com/em</A> for list info<BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV></div></body></html>