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<pre><br>Hi Kevin--<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so
does Range.)<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it doesn't get get rid of strategies<br>possessed by much simpler methods. <br><br>The conditional methods, offerable as voting-options in Approval election, do much to alleviate the<br>problem of help for a lower choice hurting your favorite.<br><br>You wrote:<br>
If you go lower in the rankings (e.g. consider safety of 2nd preference from the specified 3rd preference) I think
the numbers just get more and more unclear as to whether you stand to gain anything for the risk you definitely
take.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Yes, things get more doubtful and uncertain lower in a ranking.<br><br>For one thing, in a 3-slot method, if you're a progressive, then you might feel safe in the belief that no progressive will<br>middle-rate a Republican, though many might (at first) middle-rate one or more Democrats. You might also feel safe in assuming<br>that Democrat top-raters won't middle rate Republicans. They consider the Republicans to the main thing they need to defeat.<br><br>(Sure, the Democrat and Republican candidates are really so policy-identical that one would expect a top-rater of one to like<br>the other too, but I feel that most or all Democrat voters don't really like the Democrat policies best. I believe that most or<br>all Democrat voters are really progressives who feel that they need to strategically give it to the Democrats)<br><br>Knowing those things in a 3-slot election gives some sureness to the protection and enforcement of majority rule.<br><br>In ABucklin, with unlimited rank positions, at lower rank positions, you can't really expect to guess reliably at what<br>point a group of voters will refuse to rank less-liked candidates, and so you don't have the assurances that<br>you'd have in a 3-slot method. Not unless there is some explicit organizing for co-operation among factions.<br><br>For that reason, I said earlier that I'd only advocate AOCBucklin if AERLO is available. <br><br>So, now that I won't propose AERLO, then I probably won't propose AOCBucklin (or ABucklin or Bucklin either, of course) either.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br>
By the way, I agree that AERLO methods probably violate FBC. The effects are too unpredictable.</pre> </div></body>
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