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ied-at-Top-Pairwise-Beats-All, Top Ratings. <br><br>In keeping with Kevin's naming, and reflecting its relation to ICA, it could be called <br>Improved Condorcet-Top (ICT).<br><br>I'll use that because it's shorter.<br><br>One thing that I like about the tied-at-top methods is that they elect A in the ABE,<br>meaning that one-sided coalition support is sufficient to defeat C, but without giving<br>the election away to B.<br><br>Of course the election of A violates the Plurality Criterion, but that's fine with me.<br>To me, the _practical_ advantage described in the previous paragraph is worth more than<br>the non-practical, aesthetic, Plurality Criterion.<br><br>ICT has burial strategy. In the ABE, the B voters can make B win by burying A, by middle-<br>rating C but not A. Then A doesn't have any indifference on his side, in hir comparison<br>with C.<br><br>But B still beats C, because B>C is still greater than C>B. For the same reason, C<br>still doesn't beat everyone.<br><br>And B still beats A, because<br>B>A + B=A is greater than A>B. <br><br>So B is now the only beats-all candidate. B wins.<br><br>As currently defined, ICT elects C in Kevin's MMPO bad-example.<br><br>No one is indifferent between A and B.<br><br>So, since A=B is zero, then A>B + A=B is no greater than B>A. <br><br>Likewise vice-versa, of course, since A & B are symmetrically-related.<br><br>Therefore, neither beats the other.<br><br>Maybe that can be fixed, by defining "beat" in the opposite way, so that x beats y<br>if x>y is greater than y>x + x=y, and then saying that the winning set is the set<br>of unbeaten candidates.<br><br>In summary, ICT does three things that some find unacceptable:<br><br>1. Plurality Criterion violation<br>2. Successful burial strategy<br>3. Noncompliance in Kevin's MMPO bad-example.<br><br>#1 and #2 aren't a problem to me. #2 could be, but I don't know what burial-deterrence<br>ICT has.<br><br>With the sole exception of MMT, the conditional methods meet Mono-Add-Plump.<br><br>They probably meet the Plurality Criterion too, because of their close relation to<br>Approval. If B defects, those methods elect C, in compliance with the Plurality Criterion.<br><br>Burial strategy has no meaning in the conditional methods. As I've been saying, they're<br>a completely new kind of method, with a new kind of strategy, a milder strategy.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br> </div></body>
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