<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/1/9 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: Jameson Quinn <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>Cc: <br>Date: Sun, 8 Jan 2012 19:03:29 -0600<br>Subject: [EM] A problem with IRV3/AV3<br>
Imagine a scenario of an ABCD one-dimensional continuum:<div>
<br></div><div>41: A>B>C</div><div>19: B>A>C</div><div>20: B>C>D</div><div>20: C>B>D</div><div><br></div><div>If the A voters vote A>>D then A will win. By raising the turkey D over the true CW B, they have stolen the win. Even if their strategy fails to keep B out of the top 3, they lose nothing; B will still win.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>thanks for doing this. In the first stage wouldn't B and C tie for 3rd place if only the first set of voters all voted strategically together in the same way? </div></div></blockquote>
<div>Right, though of course it would be easy to fix that by changing some fraction of the B>A>C voters to B>A.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote"><div> They'd both get rankings from 59 of the voters. So if it came down to a coin-toss, there'd be a 50-50 chance of the CW winning vs the 2nd place candidate given a massive coordinated strategic vote by only a subset of the sample (We assume none of the 3rd or 4th set of voters decide to strategically leave off D rankings)? </div>
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<div><br></div><div>To be honest, it was harder to tune this scenario than I thought it would be. Thus, having taken the time to write this down, I am no longer opposed to IRV3/AV3. (For IRV2/AV2, it's easier to get this problem. It's also easier to get the problem if there are clones involved, but real-world clones beyond 3 candidates are unlikely.)</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Thank you again. </div><div><br></div><div>The MSM+relevant portion of the Blogosphere shd be helpful in identifying clones in real world. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Since I'm now not opposed to IRV3/AV3, I consider it one of the 3 reforms (along with SODA and IRV) that would be most acceptable to incumbents, because it avoids the weak Condorcet winner problem. </div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>remind me what is the weak Condorcet winner problem? </div></div></blockquote><div><br>A polarized electorate, 49% A, 49%B. 2% support an unknown centrist X. Now, 25% each from A and B decide, "X couldn't possibly be worse than the other side", so add a second choice, without really looking into whether X really is better or worse. Most systems would then make X win, even if they would be crushed by either in an actual runoff where the voters actually took a serious look at them.<br>
</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>Still, it is basically just as bad as IRV for nonmonotonicity and spoilers; all the spoiler scenarios I consider realistic are essentially 3-candidate anyway. As such, I see no reason to believe that it would not lead to lesser-evil voting and 2-party domination, as IRV does. Since I see 2-party domination (as opposed to just having 2 strongest parties, a logical necessity) as a source of the most-serious problems with Plurality, I still feel that SODA is a much better option than IRV3/AV3.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: And our difference is that I see the near exclusive use of Plurality voting rules as the source of my country's current evils, since it's not hard to imagine 2 party dominated system that is a lot better. All it takes is for there to be better checks and balances between them and for there to be two quite different major parties plus scope for outsiders/dissenters to express themselves via minor parties and LTPs. </div>
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div><div>ps, I'm going to repost this on my blog.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div>
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