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<br>First, let me say that, probably, GMAT or MMT conditionality could be used with an Approval options<br>system such as the one that I propose. <br><br>I chose MTAOC conditionality because of its straighforwardness, and because it's<br>easy for it to be optional, even by candidate.<br><br>Poll conditionality options:<br><br>1.Instead of marking middle ratings to particular candidates "(conditional)", one could,<br>instead, just annotate one's ballot "(all middle ratings conditional)".<br><br>2. I spoke of the following options for designation of coalition-suitable candidates:<br><br>1. All above-AERLO candidates are coalition-suitable. If the ballot doesn't use AERLO,<br>then all of its top-rated or top-ranked candidates are coalition-suitable. I've suggested<br>that that be the default assumption, when the voter doesn't address the matter, and I<br>still suggest that (unless others disagree).<br><br>2. Only the ballot's initially top-rated candidates are coalition-suitable.<br><br>3. The voter could individually designate any particular candidate(s) as coalition-suitable.<br><br>I'd like to suggest an additional option:<br><br>4. The ballot's _current_top-rated or top-ranked candidates are coalition-suitable. Of course<br>a ballot's current top-rated candidates can differ before and after the application of AERLO.<br><br>I still suggest that #1 is the best default assumption, because any one of a person's <br>AERLO protected candidates would surely be a good compromise to hir. That's why<br>those candidates were given AERLO protection.<br><br>The following isn't intended to apply to the poll that I propose.<br><br>Conditionality approaches:<br><br>1. Sequential nested conditionality:<br><br>This is just a tentative comment, but maybe a method could use nested conditionality, <br>with a rank-ballot, instead of Bucklin's stepwise vote assignments and majority-requirement.<br><br>Starting with the last rank level as the "outer candidates", and based on (say)<br>MTAOC conditionality, counting your inner candidates (those ranked over your<br>outer candidates) as coalition-acceptable,<br>determine whether you withdraw your middle-rating to the outer candidates.<br>Then include the next higher rank of candidates among the outer candidates,<br>and make the same determination regarding your middle ratings to them.<br><br>With this being done simultaneously for all the ballots, I don't know if that simultaneous<br>application of this process would cause a prohibitive problem. Maybe not. If not,<br>this method could be a substitute for AOCBucklin.<br><br>If it works, I don't know what its merits would be, as compared to AOCBucklin.<br><br>Maybe it could work as an Approval election option, along with Approval, the<br>voting methods of AOC, MTA, MCA, MTAOC and MCAOC.<br><br>2. Conditionality by top-2:<br><br>I don't know if this would work. <br><br>It would be nice if it were possible, for conditionality, for the voter to indicate that<br>s/he wants to drop hir middle rating to a candidate if that candidate, and one of hir<br>top rated or AERLO-protected candidates are the top-two votegetters.<br><br>Of course the big problem with that is that its application could change who the<br>top-2 votegetters are. If the process is then repeated, with those as the top-2,<br>then of course the winner could change with each new application of that <br>conditionality option, resulting in an unstable mess.<br><br>I don't know if there's a way to avoid that problem. If there were, it might be<br>a good substitute for conditionality by mutuality.<br><br>I should add that that consideration is the best basis for Condorcet: <br><br>One would like to give, to below-favorite candidates, a vote that doesn't count<br>against anyone s/he ranks higher. That goal naturally leads to a rank count that<br>amounts to Condorcet--the method that elects the CW if there is one.<br><br>But all the Condorcet versions that I've heard of fail FBC and CD (they have<br>the Co-operation/Defection problem; they fail in the Approval bad-example).<br><br>But what if those two problems could be somehow fixed for Condorcet?<br><br>After all, Condorcet is what naturally follows from the desire to give to<br>below-favorite candidates a vote that doesn't count against anyone<br>higher-ranked.<br><br>These comments about fixing Condorcet in that way, and about top-2<br>conditionality are just preliminary tentative comments.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br><br><br> <br><br><br> </div></body>
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