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I spoke of MTA (or MCA) &/or MABucklin as optional ways of voting in an Approval election. I should add that,<br>not only can those forms of voting be optional, but the options, which I've described, for giving or with-holding middle ratings can be<br>selectively applied, by a voter, to particular candidates.<br><br>When MMTA is voted in that way, with optional middle-rating with-holding to particuilar candidates, the result is quite similar to<br>MTAOC.<br><br>By the way, though my description of MTAOC here was in the form of pseudocode, a description of the options offered by <br>MTAOC, a description of how it is MTA with a conditionalilty option, is a lot simpler to tell to someone. After all, <br>with, for example IRV, does FairVote have to depend on everyone reading, understanding and liking the computer<br>program, or do they merely describe what the method does? Likewise STV and, in fact, other PR procedures. <br><br>Therefore I don't rule out MTAOC, either as an option for use with MTA, or as a freestanding method proposal.<br><br>I've been saying that MTA and MABucklin are compatible as options in an Approval election. So let me say a little about<br>how that is so (or at least for ABucklin and MCA):<br><br>ABucklin, as you know, is stepwise Approval. MCA is 2-stage ABucklin.<br><br>Say, in an Approval election, with optional ABucklin voting, the sum of the Approval votes and ABucklin's<br>first vote assignment give some candidates majorities.<br><br>Of course, as always in Approval, the biggest votegetter wins.<br><br>Then, by ABucklin's rules, the count is over. The winner is the majority candidate with most votes. <br>ABucklin won't have a chance to give its 2nd round of vote-assignments, because there will already<br>be a majority winner.<br><br>If, however, no one has a majority, then ABucklin can proceed till someone has a majority, and is elected<br>by ABucklin's rules. --also in keeping with Approval's rules, because the ABucklin ballots have added more<br>Approvals.<br><br>MCA is 2-stage ABucklin. <br><br>What about MTA's compatibility as an option in an Approval election?<br><br>It's probably somehow workable too--with MTA, and an MTA-like ABucklin modification as options in an Approval election.<br><br>Of course, for Approval-election-option-compatibility, MCA and ABucklin have a simplicity advantage.<br><br>Of course, all of the middle-rating-witholding standards that I've spoken of could be used with MCA, MTA, or ABucklin,<br>resulting in such methods as MMTA, MABucklin, etc.<br><br>And, as I said, the voter could apply those middle-rating-witholding standards optionally, individually, to various particular candidates,<br>too.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br> </div></body>
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