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<br>It's natural to look for a method based on the Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC). I posted one about a week ago. It wasn't written right.<br><br>In this post, I propose a different wording of MMT. It's only slightly different from my initial wording, modified to meet FBC. This new wording<br>is now what I mean by MMT:<br><br>MMT:<br><br>For any set of candidates who are all voted equal to or over everyone outside that set, by each member of the same majority of voters,<br>the winner must come from that set.<br><br>If there is such a set, the winner is the most top-rated member of that set. If there is not such a set then the winner is just the most<br>top-rated candidate in the election.<br><br>[end of MMT definition]<br><br>MMT is a very briefly-worded method that meets the criteria that I want, and seems to avoid the (not-valid) criticisms of<br>MMPO and MDDTR.<br><br>MTAOC simplification:<br><br>I feel that, for most people, the option to mark some of one's top-rated candidates as "coalition-sufficient" is too much of<br>a complication. Just one too many complication can be enough to put someone off, and cause hir to dismiss the method as<br>too complicated.<br><br>Additionally, if you are top-rating some compromise candidates, it's for a good reason. It's important to you to elect them instead<br>of someone who is unacceptable. Therefore, there is little if any reason to expect that someone wouldn't want all of hir<br>top-rated candidates to be available for coalition. So then, in this revised MTAOC, all of a voter's top-rated candidates are<br>"coalition-sufficient", and so there is no need for the distinction that I've called "coalition-sufficient".<br><br>So, in both places in the pseudocode where "if sufficient(b,x) = "yes" " appears, it should be replaced by:<br><br>"if top(b,x) = "yes".<br><br>Likewise, where "coalition-sufficient" appears in the comments, and in the initial description of the 3 program sections, it<br>should be replaced by "top-rated".<br><br>Alternative definition of voting x over y:<br><br>You're voting x over y is switching the names of x and y on your ballot could change the winner from x to y, but<br>could not change the winner from y to x.<br><br>[end of alternative definition of voting x over y]<br><br>This avoids the "probably" or the phrase "consistent with more configurations of other voters' ballots". It's simpler and<br>neater. Either definition would do.<br><br>Of course by this #2 definition, in IRV you never really know whether you're voting x over y or y over x.<br><br>No problem.<br><br>My criteria still apply to IRV. A criterion-failure-example-writer can always make up a monotonic example for hir<br>failure example.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br> </div></body>
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