I honestly don't understand your hostility to me. Can you explain it?<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/11/29 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div><div dir="ltr">
<br>
Jameson--<br><br>You had said:<br><br>
Majority<br>
Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
I asked:<br><br>Does it? Who knows? <div><br>You replied:<br><br></div><div>Anyone who takes the time to read the <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment" target="_blank">academic literature</a>.<br>
<br>[endquote]<br><br>Translation: You yourself don't know the answer. <br><br>MJ's advocates are peculiarly reticent about its specific properties, advantages and criterion-compliances.<br><br>Alright, I'll answer it for you. MJ does not have advantages similiar to those of MTA.<br>
<br></div><div> </div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Have its proponents told what criteria it meets and specifically what guarantees it<br>
offers?<br>
<br>
How does it do in the Approval bad-example? </blockquote><div><br></div><div>You answered:<br><br>Same
as MTA. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Ok, in other words, MJ doesn't pass in the ABE. Thank you.<br><br>You continued:<br><br>That is, honest-votes will reliably give a good result, unlike
unstable Approval; but strategic voting will lead to failure.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Nonsense. That's a remarkably naive statement. In every nonprobabilistic method, strategy is advantageous.<br></div></div></div></blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>Sorry, you misunderstood me. I meant that strategic voting would be advantageous for the voters, and thus would lead to the method failing the ABE/Chicken Dilemma. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>So you think that you've found one for which that isn't so? :-)<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No. Actually, it seems to me that you think I'm an idiot and/or an enemy of yours and so you interpret everything I say in the most uncharitable possible way. I hope I'm wrong about that impression, because I am neither of those things.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br><br></div>
<div> </div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">(to compare it to MTAOC)<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If you're unwilling to research the
published answers to your own questions, why do you persist in asking
us to look up your alphabet soup in old posts? For instance, I know what
you mean by MTAOC (a system with a strong dishonest-fill incentive<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>In MTAOC, your middle rating of a lesser-evil (B) can't help the lesser-evil beat your favorite (A). And the B-favorite voters reciprocate that middle rating, then it's more likely that one or the<br>
other of those 2 candidates will win, instead of someone (C) less-liked by both factions. If it looks as if that would elect A, then the B voters don't benefit from middle-rating A<br>unless they sincerely prefer A to C. Likewise if A and B are reversed in that sentence.<br>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>All that is true. And has nothing to do with the problem I pointed out. The method has a strong dishonest-fill incentive. A Gore>Bush>Nader voter could in some circumstances elect Gore only by strategically voting Gore>Nader; but if Nader had slightly higher-than-expected support, then that dishonest strategy could lead Nader to win even with as little as 25% honest support. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>You continued:<br><br>, but searching past
messages for that acronym just gives the written-out name<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>No, each method's definition was announced in a post whose subject line contained the name of that method, written out,<br>and, in nearly every case, with the abbreviation in parentheses.<br>
<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div>False. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div></div>
<div> </div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
What majority-rule guarantees does it offer? Does it meet 3P or 1CM?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You replied:<br><br>It meets 3P, which I happen to remember what it means. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>The 3P complying methods that I'm aware of all make two special distinctions, usually a distinction between top rating vs rating below top; and between rating vs not<br>
rating. MJ makes no such distinctions. So, if it meets 3P, then what are the two protection-levels required for 3P compliance?<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes it does. Every single rating level in MJ is a "protection level" for 3-level-protection.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>You continued:<br><br>If you <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM" target="_blank">define 1CM</a> I'll tell you if it meets that.<br>
<br>[endquote]<br><br>Oh, that's ok. _I'll_ tell _you_: It doesn't. For the reasons stated in my paragraph above.<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You just told me nothing more than if I told you that it meets QWERT or that it doesn't meet ZXCVB. I suspect that your 1CM is actually a pernicious criterion that it's better not to pass, but since you prefer to make unreliable assertions about what methods pass it than actually re-posting or linking the definition, I'm not going to bother checking.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>As I said, I've been meaning to post my definitions in the wikipedia. Lately I haven't had a lot of time for computer. But I'm soon<br>
going to post those definitions.<br></div>
<div> <br>Ok, it doesn't pass in the ABE, and it doesn't pass 3P or 1CM. Well, if we defined a 2P (as compared to 3P), it would pass that, as would Approval<br>and RV. Maybe there should be a 2P criterion. It probably passes WDSC too, and probably FBC. <br>
<br><br></div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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It probably has a strategy situation very much like that of ordinary RV. The method of summed scores.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You replied:<br><br>No.
For most voters in real-world studies of MJ, their honest,
not-even-normalized MJ ballot was strategically optimal. That is clearly
far better than Range. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Oh, that's different! In MJ, some voters don't have incentive to rate other than sincerely :-) <br><br>And the strategizing voters won't affect the outcome?<br>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Remember, this discussion started when I said MJ was comparable to MTA. You think you've refuted that by pointing out that MJ doesn't violate the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem?</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br>By the way, if you're going to advocate MJ, it needs a better name. Majority Judgement might be ok as a promotional name, but it is not a descriptive name.<br>
How about (the obvious) "Cardinal Median" or "Median Cardinal".<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A good name allows people to find out what a method means. It is far more reliable to use <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_Judgment">wikipedia</a> or the <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=12522">library</a> for that, than just interpolating based on a descriptive name.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div></div>