<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">"Why ranked and not graded ballots?"</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Because <BR></SPAN><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">(a) part of the traditional definition of ER-Bucklin(whole), aka "ABucklin", is that it uses ranked ballots</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto"></SPAN><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto"><BR style="RIGHT: auto">(b) in some circles/jurisdictions there is no interest in "graded" ballots, and there are sometimes more<BR>candidates than available grades (or rating slots) so ranked ballots allow voters who want to stricly rank</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">all the candidates to do so, and</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">(c) if we can use graded ballots then it would be simpler to use multi-slot MTA.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">MTA stands for "Majority Top,Approval" or "Majority Top//Approval".</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">But I agree that these FBC and some of the Condorcet methods run more smoothly on grading ballots.<BR><BR></SPAN><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">"This method would be consistent with non-normalized ballots (with no top-ratings or no bottom-ratings) being </SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">strategically optimal in some cases, arguably in most real-world cases."</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">I don't see how it could be "strategically optimal" to submit a ballot "with no top-ratings or no bottom-ratings".</div></SPAN>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Chris Benham</SPAN></div>
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<DIV style="FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SIZE: 12pt" class=ms__id12752><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:</SPAN></B> Jameson Quinn <A href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Tuesday, 22 November 2011 10:53 AM</DIV>
<DIV style="FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SIZE: 12pt" class=ms__id12752><B style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto; FONT-WEIGHT: bold"><VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR>Subject:</SPAN></B> Re: [EM] MTA vs. MCA (was "An ABE solution")<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV style="FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SIZE: 12pt; RIGHT: auto" id=yiv1433517948 class=ms__id12752>Why ranked and not graded ballots? This method would be consistent with non-normalized ballots (with no top-ratings or no bottom-ratings) being strategically optimal in some cases, arguably in most real-world cases. As Balinski and Laraki argue, using commonly-understood ratings/grades is the only way to avoid having strategy be, not just a consideration in rating, but the only logically coherent one. And it's easier, cognitively, to separately rate each candidate on a meaningful scale than to sort them into a rank order.
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<DIV>Jameson<BR><BR>
<DIV class=yiv1433517948gmail_quote>2011/11/20 C.Benham <SPAN dir=ltr><<A href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" rel=nofollow target=_blank ymailto="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</A>></SPAN><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex" class=yiv1433517948gmail_quote><BR>Forest Simmons wrote (17 Nov 2011):<BR><BR>MTA vs. MCA<BR><BR>I like MTA better than MCA because in the case where they differ (two or more<BR>candidates with majorities of top preferences) the MCA decision is made only by<BR>the voters whose ballots already had the effect of getting the ”finalists” into<BR>the final round, while the MTA decision reaches for broader support.<BR>Because of this, in MTA there is less incentive to top rate a lesser evil. If<BR>you don’t believe the fake polls about how hot the lesser evil is, you can take<BR>a wait and see attitude by voting her in the middle slot. If it turns out that<BR>she did end up as a finalist (against the greater evil) then your ballot will<BR>give her full support in the final round.<BR><BR><end Forest quote><BR><BR>I buy this. I agree that MTA is a bit better
than MCA. Well done Mike.<BR><BR>* Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom signifying least<BR>preferred and not approved. Top-rating signifies most preferred and approved.<BR>Middle-rating also signifies approval.<BR><BR>If any candidates are Top-rated on more than half the ballots, elect the one of<BR>these with the most approval.<BR><BR>Otherwise elect the most approved candidate.*<BR><BR>A slight marketing problem could be that the difference between this and MCA<BR>(and also between those and a third possible similar method: the TR winner wins if<BR>s/he has majority approval, otherwise the most approved candidate wins) could<BR>to some members of the public appear to be quite arbitrary and unimportant.<BR><BR>Also of course MTA is little bit more complex to count than MCA. But on the positive<BR>side, it has just occurred to me that it would work better than MCA extended to using<BR>4-slot ballots (with as with 3 slots, any
rating above the bottom-most slot is interpreted<BR>as approval).<BR><BR>I suppose by the same reasoning we could improve ER-Bucklin(whole), which has<BR>been given the briefer and quite apt new name by Mike O. of "ABucklin".<BR><BR>My stab at defining the so improved version:<BR><BR>*Voters submit ranking ballots, equal-ranking and truncation allowed. Ranked (i.e.not<BR>truncated) candidates are considered to be approved.<BR><BR>Rankings are interpreted as ratings thus: candidates ranked below no others are in the top<BR>ratings slot. Those with x candidates ranked above them are in (x-1)th. ratings slot from<BR>the top. (So A=B>D is interpreted as A and B in top slot, second-highest slot empty,<BR>D in third-highest slot).<BR><BR>Say the ratings slots are labelled from highest (signifying most preferred) down as alphabetical<BR>grades A, B, C, D etc.<BR><BR>If any candidates are graded A on more than half the ballots then elect the most approved
one<BR>of these.<BR><BR>Otherwise if any candidates are graded A or B on more than half the ballots then elect the most<BR>approved one of these.<BR><BR>Otherwise if any candidates are graded A or B or C on more than half the ballots then elect the<BR>most approved one of these.<BR><BR>Continue in this vein considering the next lowest grade each round until there is a winner, or if<BR>that fails then elect the most approved candidate.*<BR><BR>I think IBIFA is still quite a lot better than any of these methods, but it is more complicated.<BR>IBIFA has a less strong truncation incentive and the IBIFA winner will never be pairwise-beaten<BR>by the winner of any of these methods.<BR><BR>Chris Benham<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>----<BR>Election-Methods mailing list - see <A href="http://electorama.com/em" rel=nofollow target=_blank>http://electorama.com/em</A> for list info<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></DIV></DIV>
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