The point of those criteria was not to have any merit, it was to show why preference-applying criteria are silly.<div><br></div><div>Let's forget about those criteria, because apparently the fact that they are bad criteria is distracting from the issue here. Here are three statements of the Condorcet criterion:</div>
<div><br></div><div>1. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more voters prefer X to Y than vice versa, and no voter insincerely voted Y over X, then X must win.</div><div>2. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, there are more ballots that could prefer X to Y (that is, either they explicitly show that preference or they were unable to express a preference for X over Y without losing some other preference information) than those which definitely prefer Y over X, then X must win.<br>
3. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more ballots prefer X to Y than vice versa, then X must win.</div><div><br></div><div>Plurality passes criterion 3. Any non-full-ranking method, including Condorcet methods like Schulze, fails criterion 1. Obviously, we should be using criteria which are like 2. Often, we speak of preferences when specifying the criteria, as a shorthand for the longer-winded precision as in criteria 2 above.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson<br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/11/21 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
Jameson--<br>
<br>
I said or implied that your criterion was un-applyable because no one can establish<br>
that someone preferred opppositely to how s/he voted.<br>
<br>
I take that back. Your criterion isn't unapplyable for that reason.<br>
<br>
After all, the failure-example-writer can say anything s/he wants to about any matter<br>
stipulated in the criterion's premise. As the failure-example-writer, you can say:<br>
"That voter prefers B to A, though voting for A, because I say so." You, after all,<br>
are the one writing the scenario.<br>
<br>
For that reason, every method would fail your criterion<br>
<br>
<br>
...or would if it were written in a way that said something.<br>
<br>
But it isn't.<br>
<br>
So, really one can only say that it isn't that you've written a criterion that is un-applyable.<br>
One can only say that you haven't written a criterion, because you haven't written something<br>
that has a meaning.<br>
<br>
Why do I say that? What do you mean by "votes for A"? Votes A over B as I've defined the term?<br>
Votes for A when the method is Plurality? (So your criterion applies only to Plurality?)<br>
<br>
If s/he votes A over B as I define that, then A will probably be elected, but not necessarily,<br>
depending on the method. But of course even the fact that it _could_ elect A (and would, with every<br>
method ever proposed or used), means that every method fails your criterion.<br>
<br>
Criteria that are necessarily failed by every method aren't at all useful.<br>
<br>
Anyway, you didn't say what you meant by "votes for A", and that means that you haven't<br>
really defined your criterion.<br>
<br>
I just wanted to tell you some things that are wrong with your criterion.<br>
<br>
<br>
Here are your two "definitions" of your inadequately-defined criterion.<br>
<br>
Reductio ad absurdem. One voter, two candidates. Preference-based<br>
criterion: "If the voter votes for A but actually prefers B, then B should<br>
win".<br>
<br>
<br>
Preference-mentioning criterion: "Imagine the voter prefers B, but due to<br>
an epileptic seizure, votes for A. The correct winner in this case would be<br>
B. Therefore, whenever we see a vote for A, we should elect B."<br>
<br>
<br>
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</blockquote></div><br></div>