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How do we save Edits on the electowiki....?<br>
I can't see changes I made to the Proportional Representation page..<br>
<br>
On 2011-11-18 00:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAO82iZynFLrAqLHxb4QDjUs+BgJYv0zzJWYSem-g3b4654Z_YQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div>I agree with Chris.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>But mostly, I'm writing to say that I would really like
someone to fill in:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR</a></div>
<div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Of course, redirects are fine. And you don't have to put in
all sorts of sections for compliances and such if you don't know
them, just a few sentences explaining the method itself is
plenty.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div>Jameson<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2011/11/17 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt
0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);
padding-left: 1ex;">
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt
0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);
padding-left: 1ex;">
49: C<br>
27: A>B<br>
24: B<br>
<br>
I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike
specifies then a<br>
just interventionist mind-reading God<br>
should award the election to A.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in
other instances?<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Yes. If the method used meets Later-no-Harm but fails
Later-no-Help, i.e has<br>
a strong random-fill incentive like the MDD,TR method that
Mike is advocating, there<br>
isn't any good reason to assume that the Middle ratings are
sincere.<br>
<br>
So it could be that all the voters really have no interest
in any candidate except their favourites<br>
and sincere is<br>
<br>
49: C<br>
27: A<br>
24: B<br>
<br>
in which case C is the strong sincere Condorcet winner, or
as Jameson pointed out it could<br>
be worse still and the A voters were Burying against C so
sincere is<br>
<br>
49: C<br>
27: A>C<br>
24: B<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt
0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);
padding-left: 1ex;">
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is
advocating, it is<br>
only reasonable to assume that the truncators<br>
are all sincere<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a
problem in MDDTR or MMPO. In fact,<br>
my point is that it is _not_. <br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Truncation isn't a "problem" (for the full-rankers) as an
"offensive strategy". The problem is that it<br>
isn't fair to the sincere truncators.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt
0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204);
padding-left: 1ex;">
Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B,
and C.<br>
<br>
How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not
majority-defeated, A<br>
has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
Translation: "I love this arbitrary algorithm, so any winner
it produces is by definition legitimate."<br>
<br>
A's win lacks legitimacy simply because there is another
candidate that was vastly better supported on<br>
the ballots.<br>
<br>
If we add between 2 and 21 ballots that plump for A, then
C's "majority-defeatedness" goes away and<br>
the winner changes from A to C, another failure of
Mono-add-Plump.<br>
<br>
If we nonetheless accept that C but not A should be
immediately disqualified, electing the undisqualified<br>
candidate with the most top-ratings is just another
arbitrary feature of the algorithm.<br>
<br>
Why that candidate and not the one that is most approved?
Based on the information actually on the ballots,<br>
no faction of voters has a very strong post-election
complaint against B.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
49: C<br>
27: A>B<br>
21: A (new voters, whose ballots change the MDD,TR winner
from A to C)<br>
24: B<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Mike Ossipoff wrote (17 Nov 2011):<br>
<br>
Chris said:<br>
<br>
Mike refers to this scenario:<br>
<br>
> The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll
give it again here:<br>
><br>
> Sincere preferences:<br>
><br>
> 49: C<br>
> 27: A>B<br>
> 24: B>A<br>
><br>
> A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Actual votes:<br>
><br>
> The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the<br>
> co-operativeness and<br>
> responsibility of the A voters:<br>
><br>
> 49: C<br>
> 27: A>B<br>
> 24: B<br>
><br>
<br>
I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike
specifies then a<br>
just interventionist mind-reading God<br>
should award the election to A.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in
other instances?<br>
<br>
Chris continued:<br>
<br>
But a voting method's decisions and philosophical
justification should<br>
be based on information that is actually<br>
on the ballots, not on some guess or arbitrary assumption
about some<br>
maybe-existing "information" that isn't.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if,
by so doing,<br>
it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other
cases?<br>
<br>
And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the
Approval bad-example. They,<br>
in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding
whether you should middle-rate<br>
a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance,
consider the<br>
A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example.<br>
<br>
In MCA, there's a question about whether you should
middle-rate or bottom-rate B. In<br>
MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated.<br>
<br>
In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir
against your favorite(s).<br>
<br>
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the
information on<br>
the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates<br>
candidate Y then we should not elect Y.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic
criteria.<br>
<br>
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as
"merely<br>
aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters<br>
of X a very strong post-election complaint with no
common-sense or<br>
philosophically cogent answer, X is highly<br>
likely to be higher Social Utility (SU), Y's victory will
have<br>
compromised legitimacy.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B,
and C.<br>
<br>
How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not
majority-defeated, A<br>
has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.<br>
<br>
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion
that says that<br>
C is so much stronger than A that the election<br>
of A can't be justified. .<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
There are lots of aesthetic criteria that say things like
that, and they all sound<br>
aesthetically reasonable. How great is their practical
strategic importance?<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris continued:<br>
<br>
There are other criteria I find reasonable<br>
that say the same thing:<br>
<br>
"Strong Minimal Defense": If the number of ballots on which
both X is<br>
voted above bottom and Y isn't is greater than<br>
the total number of ballots on which Y is voted above
bottom, then don't<br>
elect Y.<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
But can you word that in such a way that it isn't met by
Plurality?<br>
<br>
What sort of strategic guarantees are protected by the
criteria<br>
that you propose in this posting?<br>
<br>
Chis continues:<br>
<br>
The election of A is unacceptable because C's domination of
A is<br>
vastly more impressive than A's pairwise win over<br>
B. The Plurality criterion plus the three other criteria I
define above<br>
all loudly say "not A".<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
In other words, it looks bad from those perspectives.<br>
<br>
The election of A is justified by its being consistent with
FBC, SFC or SFC3,<br>
freedom from dilemma about middle-rating a compromise, and
either<br>
Later-No-Harm or non"failure" in Kevin's MMPO bad-example.
--things that are<br>
guaranteed by MMPO and MDDTR.<br>
<br>
Additionally, as I was showing to Jameson, electing A in
these methods<br>
isn't really wrong.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
> The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the<br>
> co-operativeness and<br>
> responsibility of the A voters:<br>
<br>
Chris replies:<br>
<br>
The plausibility of arbitrary claims about the voters'
sincere<br>
preferences and motivations<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
More a matter of "what if", rather than claims.<br>
<br>
Chris continued:<br>
<br>
can weighed in the light of the<br>
used election method's incentives. How is it so
"co-operative and<br>
responsible" of the A voters to rank B when doing<br>
so (versus truncating) can only help their favourite?<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
It's co-operative because it defeats the candidate commonly
disliked by A<br>
voters and B voters, in MCA, MDDTR and MMPO.<br>
<br>
If neither did that, C would win.<br>
<br>
If the A voters refused to, and, instead, the B voters
co-operated, then it would<br>
be B would win, by being the defectors.<br>
<br>
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
And why would the<br>
B voters be insincerely truncating ("defecting")<br>
when doing so can only harm their favourite?<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
In MCA that defection could give their favorite the win, if
the A voters have<br>
co-operated, in spite of the A voters being more numerous.<br>
<br>
In MPPO or MDDTR, the problem doesn't exist. The A voters
can co-operate or<br>
defect, and A will still win, having more top ratings.
Hardly a controversial<br>
result.<br>
<br>
Chris continues:<br>
<br>
Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is
advocating, it is<br>
only reasonable to assume that the truncators<br>
are all sincere<br>
<br>
[endquote]<br>
<br>
Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem
in MDDTR or MMPO. In fact,<br>
my point is that it is _not_. But co-operaton/defection is
indeed a problem in MCA.<br>
Hency my advocacy of MDDTR and MMPO.<br>
<br>
<br>
----<br>
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</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
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</pre>
</blockquote>
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