<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Forest,<BR></SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">"....the IRV- Condorcet you <BR>describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and count them as whole (as <BR>opposed to fractional):"</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">I am strongly opposed to allowing equal ranking (except for truncation) in IRV or IRV-like Condorcet</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">methods. As I've explained more than once on EM, that just makes Push-over strategising much easier.</SPAN></div>
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<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">And in this respect the "whole vote" version is much worse than the "fractional" version. If you are confident</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">that your favourite will make the final runoff and that your favourite will have a pairwise win versus some<BR>turkey with you being merely neutral (not supporting the turkey as you'd have to do in regular IRV) then</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">you should vote the turkey equal-top with your favourite.</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto"></SPAN> </div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">You are still giving a whole vote to help your favourite make the top 2, so on the whole the strategy is </SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">much less risky and easier to carry out than with regular IRV and to a lesser extent the Fractional version.</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto"></SPAN> </div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">Chris<VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR></div>
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<DIV style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; MARGIN: 5px 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; HEIGHT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-TOP: 0px" class=hr contentEditable=false readonly="true"></DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:</SPAN></B> "fsimmons@pcc.edu" <fsimmons@pcc.edu><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> C.Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cc:</SPAN></B> em <election-methods@electorama.com><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Thursday, 10 November 2011 5:54 AM<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> Re: IRV variants<BR></FONT><BR>> I don't get it. (I am confused by your explanation of the <BR>> algorithm).<BR>> How do you think this is better than your latest version of <BR>> Enhanced
DMC?<BR><BR>It takes care of the chicken problem. But forget my confusing process; the IRV- Condorcet you <BR>describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and count them as whole (as <BR>opposed to fractional):<BR><BR>> <BR>> I think a good method is the IRV-Condorcet hybrid that differs <BR>> from IRV <BR>> only by before any and each elimination<BR>> checks for an uneliminated candidate X that pairwise beats all <BR>> the other <BR>> uneliminated candidates and elects the<BR>> first such X to appear.<BR><BR>Yes this is simpler.<BR><BR>> <BR>> That of course gains Condorcet, and it keeps IRV's Mutual <BR>> Dominant Third <BR>> Burial Resistance property.<BR>> So if a candidate X pairwise beats all the other candidates and <BR>> is <BR>> ranked above all the other candidates on more than<BR>> a third of the ballots then (as with IRV) X must win and a rival <BR>>
candidate Y's supporters can't get Y elected (assuming<BR>> they can somehow change their ballots) by Burying X.<BR>> <BR>> Does your method share that property?<BR>> <BR>> > 49 C<BR>> > 27 A>B<BR>> > 24 B<BR>> ><BR>> > Candidate A starts out as underdog, survives B, and is beaten <BR>> by C, so <BR>> > C wins.<BR>> <BR>> <BR>> From what I think I do understand of your algorithm <BR>> description, <BR>> doesn't candidate B start out as "underdog"?<BR><BR>Yes, I was in too much of a hurry when I wrote that.<BR><BR>Also contrary to my hopes the method turned out to be non-monotonic, because the IRV elimination <BR>order can eliminate a candidate earlier as a result of more first place support. Only elimination orders <BR>without this defect can be used as a basis for a monotone method.<BR><BR>Forest<BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV></div></body></html>