<html>
<head>
<style><!--
.hmmessage P
{
margin:0px;
padding:0px
}
body.hmmessage
{
font-size: 10pt;
font-family:Tahoma
}
--></style>
</head>
<body class='hmmessage'><div dir='ltr'>
<br>There should be brief names for Bucklin (= whole simultaneous) and IRV(= whole).<br><br>I suggests ABucklin and AIRV ("A" for "Approval"), or BucklinA and IRVA.<br><br>UP is met by MMC-complying methods with the (= whole) specification. Methods allowing equal ranking, with a whole vote <br>to everyone you rank at a particular position. Maybe that could be generalized to say "with equal-ranked candidates having the full status of that<br>shared rank position, as if ranked there alone".<br><br>What I like about protection levels is that, if a majority agree with you about who goes in one of the protection levels, then you have<br>a big assurance, and the method will enforce that distinction.<br><br>Say you're a progressive who feels that the Democrat candidates are worth protecting against the (identical) Republicans.<br><br>(I'm going to sometimes abbreviate "progressive(s) as "P"; "Democrat(s) as "D"; and "Republicans" as "R").<br><br>So you can refuse to rank any Republicans (unless there's an exceptional one--I won't name names), and equal-top-rank all of the progressives.<br><br>In DP, that means preferring only all the P, Approving the D, and none of the R.<br><br>In ABucklin or AIRV, as I said, you equal-top-rank the P, and rank the D in whatever order you like, and you don't rank any R.<br><br>If a majority agree with you about the equal-top-ranking, or the truncation, then a 3P method will enforce that distinction.<br><br>That's why I like 3P and UP. <br><br>UP enforces such a distinction at any rank-position.<br><br>Say you're a P who has no use for the D. You equal rank a few of the _best_ P. <br><br>In ABucklin or AIRV, you rank the other P in any order you like. And of<br>course you refuse to rank any Republocrats ({R,D}).<br><br>In DP, you prefer the best D, and approve the rest, but none of the R.<br><br>I like the power that 3P and UP give to voters who are in a majority.<br><br>Of course we have an antagonistic electorate, maybe (probably?) so antagonistic that there are no mutual majorities, <br>no solid coalitions. Then 3P and UP won't offer anything. <br><br>Certainly I don't expect P and D to be in a mutual majority, though they most surely add up to a majority. Though the D is (at least a little) <br>better than R, to the P, that isn't mutual: If the policies, humaneness and honesty-record of the D are really your favorite, then R will be your 2nd choice,<br>since they're nearly identical, in terms of their policies, humaneness and honesty-records. So, no mutual majority there.<br><br>Regrettably, I don't know if there's any mutual majority among the P either. They're at least as antagonistic among eachother as they<br>are toward non-P. But there could and should be mutual majority among the P. MMC, 3P, and UP _are_ of value.<br><br>What if there are no mutual majorities, solid coalitions?<br><br>The ABE non-failure of DP and AIRV might do much to mitigate the lack of mutual majority, as will the SDSC-compliance of<br>DP and ABucklin.<br><br>With DP and ABucklin, if a majority all rank even one same candidate, and there's a candidate-set that none of them rank, no one they don't<br>rank can win. There should be a criterion about that. Maybe it's covered by another criterion. It sounds almost like it comes under MMC (but not literally). But<br>doesn't AIRV meet MMC? And does AIRV have the property stated in this paragraph's 1st sentence? I don't think it has it (but tell me if I'm <br>wrong).<br><br>If that property in the previous paragraph's 1st sentence isn't covered by another criterion, I'll call it "1 candidate mutuality" (1CM or OCM)<br><br>AIRV probably doesn't meet 1CM, and I don't know if its LNH-compliance can make up for that. Bucklin fails in the ABE. That leaves DP. <br>Since DP meets 3P, I don't think UP is as important as ABE non-failure. So doesn't DP emerge as the best method, by these considerations?<br><br>CD, LNH, SDSC, and 1CM can mitigate the lack of mutual majority.<br><br>When I say "CD", I'm referring to the tentative replacement for CD that I posted yesterday. My original CD, the one mentioning the<br>sincere CW (SCW), I'll now call "CCD", for "Condorcet CD".<br><br>I'd like to add one more premise stipulation to CD:<br><br>The A voters are more numerous than the B voters.<br><br>[end of added CD premise stipulation]<br><br>That makes for a more demanding requirement for CD taking effect, which would improve it, from the perspective of anyone who<br>isn't sure that they like CD.<br><br>My advocacy of SFC was based conclusions about offensive-order-reversal-deterrence based on 3-candidate examples.<br><br>If order-reversal is well-deterred, then SFC's premise is likely to be effectively met (not enough order-reversal to affect the outcome).<br><br>But is order-reversal well-deterred when there are more candidates?<br><br>Say D is SCW. The P & D voters vote D over R, giving R a majority defeat. But the R voters rank, over D, some candidate W, who is<br>terribly majority-beaten, making a large majority against D too. Now the R needn't worry that there insincerely upranked candidate W will<br>win.<br><br>Without reversal-deterrence, SFC loses its reassuringness.<br><br>Other criteria, some of then named above, remain as assurances when there is no mutual majority.<br><br>Is SDSC a little too demanding?<br><br>How about a WSDSC that requires only that no one need to rank someone equal to or over their favorite, in order<br>to assure that Y won't win?<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br> </div></body>
</html>