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<pre><br>(Sorry to change the subject line, but this one is much easier to write.)<br><br><br>Kevin wrote:<br><br>Mike's method is Condorcet//MMPO//Condorcet//MMPO//etc.<br><br>[unquote]<br><br>No. I initially defined such a method. Then I said that I propose only<br>MMPO (applied to its own ties), because FBC is more important than Condorcet's<br>Criterion. I said that, as I define MMPO, it _doesn't_ include a CW search, because<br>I want FBC compliance.<br><br>I propose MMPO//MMPO//MMPO...<br><br>Kevin wrote:<br><br>However, even if Mike's method were just MMPO//MMPO//MMPO//etc I<br>still highly doubt that would satisfy FBC, because the candidate<br>eliminations and recalculations make it unclear that votes will work<br>as expected. I don't know how to say this much more clearly than that.<br>But let me ask you, how many FBC-satisfying methods involve eliminating<br>candidates and then recalculating scores once those candidates are<br>removed? Not a one.<br><br><br>[unquote]<br><br>I mentioned and answered that argument yesterday on EM.<br><br>I'd say it again today, but I don't have long on the computer today. I refer you to<br>my posting yesterday.<br><br>Kevin wrote:<br><br>Hypothetically, off the top of my head, lowering your true favorite<br>could remove him from a three-way score tie which then (as a two-way)<br>is resolved for one of your "other" favorites, whereas the three-way<br>contest is resolved for a disliked candidate. <br><br>If a compromise (C) could win in a tie, but your favorite (F) couldn't, that must<br>be because C has lower maximum pairwise opposition (MPO) than F.<br><br>But, if that's so, then why do you need to vote C over F, to get C into a tie?<br><br>I'll be visiting, staying with, relatives this weekend, and I may not get much, if any,<br>time on computers this weekend. For instance, today there's only time for this one posting.<br><br>Quinn said that criteria cannot mention sincere preferences.<br><br>He neglected to say why he thinks that.<br><br>What dictionary is he using?<br><br>Look up "criterion". It's a standard for judgment of something. Period.<br><br>Someone could say that a votes-only criterion, but not a preferences criterion, can be<br>used to detect noncompliance in an actual election.<br><br>Really? What criterion is shown to be violated, by Plurality election results?<br><br>Anyway, we don't use criteria in that way, citing actual examples of failure. We speak of what _could_<br>happen. That can be done just as well with criteria that aren't votes-only.<br><br>Did you know that Plurality meets the Condorcet Criterion?<br><br>It does, if we use a votes-only CC definition.<br><br>If for every y not x, more people vote x over y than vice versa, in Plurality, then x must win.<br>Plurality meets votes-only CC.<br><br>You might object "But the criterion says "rank" instead of "vote". <br><br>If you vote x over y in a 3-slot ballot, everyone would agree you're ranking x over y.<br><br>What justification is there for arbitrarily saying that that isn't so with a 2-slot method such as<br>Plurality? In Plurality, you're allowed to rank one candidate over the others.<br><br>Look up "rank" in a dictionary. It says what we'd all expect,what rank means to us all.<br><br>In Plurality, you're ordering one candidate above the others, giving hir a higher position than the others.<br><br>But if you still want to say that votes-only CC says "rank", and that somehow doesn't apply to Plurality, then<br>you're saying that votes-only CC can't apply to Plurality. Plurality doesn't fail it.<br><br>Votes-only CC, then, applies only to one class of methods.<br><br>You might say that's ok,because we already know we don't like Plurality, and none of us are<br>advocating it. But what about Approval? It, too, meets votes-only CC, unless you deny that "voted for" and <br>"not voted for" are not different hierarchial levels (ranks). And if you say they aren't, then, again,<br>votes-only CC can't apply to Approval. Can't compare Approval and Condorcet.<br><br>My criteria apply seamlessly to all methods, and can compare any and all of them to eachother.<br><br>Votes-only criteria don't work.<br><br>By the way, Plurality meets Minimal Defense too.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br><br><br><br>Mike Ossipoff</pre> </div></body>
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