Note that this poll was promoted on the Election Methods list and the instantrunoff list. So another thing this may indicate is the relative size of those lists. However, since the counting method was not pre-announced and the OpenSTV software was associated with the poll (a system which is equivalent to IRV in the single-winner case), there may be some small pro-IRV bias even beyond that.<div>
<br></div><div>JQ<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/10/25 Jeffrey O'Neill <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jeff.oneill@openstv.org">jeff.oneill@openstv.org</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<p>The results are in for the Poll for Favorite Single-Winner Voting
System. Note that I deliberately used the word "Favorite" and not the
word "Best". The results indicate merely the preferences of the voters
(a small and biased sample) and should not be take too seriously. I
find the results interesting because they provide clues as to what
people who like one voting system think of other voting systems. If the results below are not formatted correctly, this is also posted on my blog at <a href="http://www.openstv.org/node/165" target="_blank">http://www.openstv.org/node/165</a><br>
</p><p>Regardless of which way you count the votes, Instant Runoff
Voting is the winner. Results are shown below for (1) Instant Runoff
Voting, (2) Condorcet Voting, (3) Approval Voting, (4) Borda Count, and
(5) Coombs Method. I find these all to provide interesting information.
Ballots are available here: <a href="http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGO25GQw" target="_blank">http://www.opavote.org/vote?ekey=agNzdHZyEAsSCEVsZWN0aW9uGO25GQw</a>
</p><h3>Instant Runoff Voting</h3>
<p>IRV had double the votes of the next runner up in the first
round and maintained a clear lead through the end with a final tally of
IRV 18 and Condorcet 11 with 3 exhausted votes. Some highlights:
</p><ul><li> The 2 Range Voting votes went to Condorcet and Approval. Not much of a surprise.
</li><li> Of the 4 Approval votes, only 1 went to Condorcet with the
other 3 being exhausted. I expected all of these to go to Condorcet.
</li><li> Of the 5 Other, 3 went to IRV. I would have expected the
Other votes be people who wanted something rather complex and would not
be IRV supporters.
</li></ul>
<h3>Condorcet Voting</h3>
<p>This one mostly speaks for itself. I was surprised that Borda
only beat Plurality by 12 to 7 and that there were a few people who
voted Plurality higher than Approval, Range, Coombs, and Bucklin.
Perhaps some voters did not know the details of these other voting
systems. This illustrates a totally different problem with elections:
unknowledgeable voters who don't take the time to learn about the
candidates.
</p><h3>Approval Voting</h3>
<p>This one has to be taken with a grain of salt. I counted a
vote as an approval if the candidate was ranked. Since 14 voters ranked
all the candidates and likely didn't actually approve of them all, I am
overcounting. Nonetheless, there are some interesting nuggets.
</p><p>IRV, Condorcet, and Approval were all very close in the number of
approvals. I'm surprised that Coombs is among the least approved as I
think it is a good one (it was my first choice).
</p><h3>Borda Count</h3>
<p>In doing the Borda Count, I "completed" the ballots, meaning
that all unranked candidates on a ballot shared the remaining count for
the ballot. The eliminates some of the impact of strategic voting with
the Borda Count. Again, IRV, Condorcet, and Approval were all
significantly ahead of the others. I find it interesting that Condorcet
is much closer to IRV with this method. This is probably due to the
fact that many Condorcet supporters strongly dislike IRV, while the
converse is less likely to be true (in my opinion).
</p><h3>Coombs Method</h3>
<p>Lastly, Coombs method. As I noted above, this was my first
choice. With the Coombs method, the candidate with the most last place
votes is eliminated at each round. Since centrist candidates are less
likely to be eliminated, Coombs is more likely than IRV to elect the
Condorcet winner.
</p><p>The least liked candidates in order are: (1) Plurality, (2)
Other, (3) Borda, (4) Coombs, (5) Bucklin, (6) Range, (7) Approval, (8)
Condorcet, and (9) IRV.
</p><h3>Summary</h3>
I hope you found this to be an interesting exercise. I will do it again
for multi-winner voting systems next month. Please contact me directly
to make nominations.
<hr><pre>Counting votes using Instant Runoff Voting.
R|Instan|Plural|Condor|Borda |Approv|Range |Coombs|Buckli|Other |Exhaus
|t runo|ity vo|cet vo|count |al vot|voting| metho|n syst| |ted
|ff vot|ting |ting | |ing | |d |em | |
|ing | | | | | | | | |
========================================================================
1| 14| 0| 7| 0| 3| 2| 1| 0| 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count of first choices.
========================================================================
2| 14| | 7| | 3| 2| 1| | 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Plurality voting, Borda count, and Bucklin
| system and transferring votes. Since this is the first elimination
| round, all candidates without any votes are eliminated.
========================================================================
3| 15| | 7| | 3| 2| | | 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Coombs method and transferring votes.
========================================================================
4| 15| | 8| | 4| | | | 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Range voting and transferring votes.
========================================================================
5| 15| | 9| | | | | | 5| 3
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes.
========================================================================
6| 18| | 11| | | | | | | 3
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Other and transferring votes. Candidate
| Instant runoff voting is elected.
Winner is Instant runoff voting.
</pre><hr><pre>Counting votes using Condorcet Voting.
Pairwise Comparison Matrix:
|Inst|Plur|Cond|Bord|Appr|Rang|Coom|Buck|Othe
----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
Inst| 0| 28| 18| 26| 24| 23| 25| 24| 22
Plur| 0| 0| 0| 7| 2| 5| 4| 3| 4
Cond| 11| 26| 0| 24| 23| 22| 22| 22| 22
Bord| 2| 12| 3| 0| 8| 7| 8| 8| 9
Appr| 8| 24| 8| 18| 0| 18| 18| 17| 11
Rang| 6| 16| 4| 14| 9| 0| 12| 12| 9
Coom| 3| 12| 4| 10| 8| 8| 0| 7| 9
Buck| 5| 13| 4| 10| 8| 7| 9| 0| 6
Othe| 6| 16| 6| 11| 15| 14| 11| 13| 0
Smith Set: Instant runoff voting
</pre><hr><pre>Counting votes using Approval Voting.
Candidate | Count
=============================
Instant runoff voting | 28
Plurality voting | 14
Condorcet voting | 26
Borda count | 17
Approval voting | 25
Range voting | 19
Coombs method | 14
Bucklin system | 14
Other | 17
Exhausted | 0
Winner is Instant runoff voting.
</pre><hr><pre>Counting votes using Borda Count.
Candidate | Count
=============================
Instant runoff voting | 202.5
Plurality voting | 67.0
Condorcet voting | 190.5
Borda count | 96.5
Approval voting | 140.5
Range voting | 117.0
Coombs method | 104.0
Bucklin system | 106.0
Other | 128.0
Exhausted | 0
Winner is Instant runoff voting.
</pre><hr><pre>Counting votes using Coombs Method.
R|Instan|Plural|Condor|Borda |Approv|Range |Coombs|Buckli|Other |Exhaus
|t runo|ity vo|cet vo|count |al vot|voting| metho|n syst| |ted
|ff vot|ting |ting | |ing | |d |em | |
|ing | | | | | | | | |
========================================================================
1| 14| 0| 7| 0| 3| 2| 1| 0| 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count of first choices.
========================================================================
2| 14| | 7| 0| 3| 2| 1| 0| 5| 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Plurality voting and transferring votes.
| Last place votes: Instant runoff voting, 0.575000; Plurality voting,
| 9.109524; Condorcet voting, 0.866667; Borda count, 3.476190;
| Approval voting, 1.134524; Range voting, 5.109524; Coombs method,
| 4.976190; Bucklin system, 3.309524; and Other, 3.442857.
========================================================================
3| 16| | 7| 1| 4| 2| 1| 1| | 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Other and transferring votes. Last place
| votes: Instant runoff voting, 1.678571; Condorcet voting, 1.021429;
| Borda count, 3.888095; Approval voting, 3.309524; Range voting,
| 5.438095; Coombs method, 5.638095; Bucklin system, 5.088095; and
| Other, 5.938095.
========================================================================
4| 17| | 7| | 4| 2| 1| 1| | 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Borda count and transferring votes. Last
| place votes: Instant runoff voting, 1.833333; Condorcet voting,
| 1.116667; Borda count, 7.433333; Approval voting, 3.566667; Range
| voting, 5.766667; Coombs method, 6.183333; and Bucklin system,
| 6.100000.
========================================================================
5| 18| | 7| | 4| 2| | 1| | 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Coombs method and transferring votes. Last
| place votes: Instant runoff voting, 2.100000; Condorcet voting,
| 1.300000; Approval voting, 4.950000; Range voting, 7.383333; Coombs
| method, 8.216667; and Bucklin system, 8.050000.
========================================================================
6| 18| | 7| | 5| 2| | | | 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Bucklin system and transferring votes. Last
| place votes: Instant runoff voting, 4.750000; Condorcet voting,
| 1.666667; Approval voting, 5.583333; Range voting, 8.500000; and
| Bucklin system, 11.500000.
========================================================================
7| 18| | 8| | 6| | | | | 0
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Range voting and transferring votes. Last
| place votes: Instant runoff voting, 6.000000; Condorcet voting,
| 2.333333; Approval voting, 9.333333; and Range voting, 14.333333.
========================================================================
8| 18| | 11| | | | | | | 3
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Approval voting and transferring votes. Last
| place votes: Instant runoff voting, 6.500000; Condorcet voting,
| 4.000000; and Approval voting, 21.500000.
========================================================================
9| 28| | | | | | | | | 4
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
| Count after eliminating Condorcet voting and transferring votes.
| Last place votes: Instant runoff voting, 12.500000; and Condorcet
| voting, 19.500000. Candidate Instant runoff voting is elected.
Winner is Instant runoff voting.
</pre><br clear="all">_________________________________________________________<br>OpenSTV -- Software for counting STV and ranked-choice voting<br>OpaVote -- Online elections for ranked-choice voting<br><a href="http://www.OpenSTV.org" target="_blank">http://www.OpenSTV.org</a><br>
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