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I'd like to say a few more things about the methods, correcting at least one error of mine, and then<BR>
I'd like to briefly reply to a few statements in posts in the "Methods" thread.<BR><BR> <BR>First, my comments:<BR>
<BR>
When I said that MDDA wasn't looking as good as PC, that was before I re-found-out that the wv methods fail FBC. At<BR>
that time, I was asking what I'd liked so much about MDDA. Of course now I realize that it was FBC compliance. So I<BR>
retract what I recently said about liking PC better. <BR>
<BR>
With its compliance with FBC and SFC, MDDA is one of the top rank methods. One of the top methods, period. I don't know<BR>
enough about the criterion compliances of other methods, such as DMC. But, for their simplicity, and from the fact that I<BR>
know them to meet FBC and SFC, MDDA and MAMPO, along with ER-Bucklin(whole) are the rank methods that now look<BR>
to me like the most likely best choices for proposing or polling about.<BR>
<BR>
...because, before dealing with public proposal, one would have to have more information than I now have about<BR>
the methods' criterion compliances and properties.<BR>
<BR>
I appreciate the information that I've received so far here, regarding that subject, and of course any additional information<BR>
that I can get. Of course I'll have to look for it too.<BR>
<BR>
Even for polling people on alternative voting systems, which I intend to do, I'd need to have a good idea, based in info regarding<BR>
lots of methods, which few rank methods would be the ones to ask about. A poll must only include a few of the best alternatives.<BR>
<BR>
Right now, I guess my poll will include Approval, Bucklin, MDDA, and MAMPO. <BR>
<BR>
MDDA and MAMPO almost count as just one method, for the purpose of how much I'm asking people to choose between, because <BR>
of course they're symmetrical use of the same two standards.<BR>
<BR>
Of course if everyone rejects those, I might try Range Voting.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>Matt--<BR><BR> <BR><BR>You're a bit unfair to rank methods. You said that it's difficult to figure out the right strategy. <BR><BR> <BR><BR>Approval voting is easiest when some candidates are acceptable and some are entirely unacceptable: Just vote for the acceptables.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>If you have no information about winnability, then the strategy is simply to vote for all the above-average candidates.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>But if there aren't "unacceptables", and if there is winnability information of some kind, then Approval is inherently a strategic method. <BR><BR>Approval voting is strategic then. As I said, a good strategy is to just vote for all candidates who are better than what you expect<BR><BR>from the election.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Bucklin has Approval-like strategy, with, as I said, 3 protection-levels instead of two. If it's clear who belongs in each protection category,<BR><BR>then the strategy isn't difficult. Other than that, I don't think Bucklin's strategy is known, to the extent that Approval's simpler strategy<BR><BR>is known. But, knowing who you'd vote for in Approval can inform your Bucklin voting, because Bucklin lets you rank people you wouldn't vote<BR><BR>for in Approval, safe in the knowledge that you've equally top-ranked the best set of candidates.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Condorcet(wv), MDDA & MAMPO can be more free of strategy if no one falsifies preferences, due to their SFC compliance.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>But, if some voters are likely to use burying strategy, then it's desirable to thwart them, and enforce the methods' SFC benefit,<BR><BR>by refusing to rank the candidates of the likely reversers. If that sounds complicated, it isn't really. Just use some judgement about<BR><BR>how far down you rank. Don't rank the really odious candidates, or the ones who (or their supporters) are antagonistic to your<BR><BR>candidate. <BR><BR> <BR><BR>Additionally, of course, the buriers intended victims have the same polling information as do the buriers. And it isn't possible to<BR><BR>organize a large scale burial strategy without it leaking to the intended victims. Burial only works against people who are trying to help you. <BR><BR> <BR><BR>And, finally, what if the burial succeeded, this time. What about subsequent elections. Do you think that party will get ranked in the<BR><BR>victims' rankings again?<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Oh, one more thing, in the above-listed methods, as I said, to steal the election for a candidate by burial requires that a large fraction of his<BR><BR>favorite-supporters do burial. And thwarting and penalizing the burial requires only a small fraction of the intended victims to<BR><BR>truncate the buriers' candidate.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>I don't agree that rankings are awkward or painful to vote. I know whom I like better than whom. But I'll agree with you on this:<BR><BR>I consider our elections to consist of acceptables and unacceptables. That kind of election is _made for_ Approval. Bucklin, however, <BR><BR>can let you rank among the acceptables, while still giving them full SDSC protection from the unacceptables, if they have majority<BR><BR>support. And if they don't have majority support, not method can save them.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Likewise, MDDA and MAMPO make the same thing possible.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>And no one needs to vote 50 times in succession.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Someone quoted James Green-Armytage as saying that Approval is "vulnerable to strategic manipulation" (!)<BR><BR> <BR><BR>What does he mean? (Rhetorical question)<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Approval, like all methods to some degree, of course has strategy. But calling strategy "manipulation" implies that the strategy<BR><BR>is tampering with and changing a rightful result. What rightful result, in Approval, is being tampered with by strategy.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Strategy is merely the determination of how to vote, to maximize your expectation. Some kinds of elections require strategy<BR><BR>in Approval, but to me, our current public political elections don't require any strategy decisions, other than "vote for acceptable<BR><BR>candidates and don't vote for the entirely unacceptable ones."<BR><BR> <BR><BR> <BR><BR>"Vulnerable to" implies the same thing.<BR><BR> <BR><BR>Those words imply an unsupported assumption.<BR><BR> <BR><BR> If James is here, maybe he'd like to explain what he means.<BR><BR><BR> </div></body>
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