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<BR>>><I> Also, Approval is like a solid, reliable and simple hand-tool. It<BR></I>>><I> isn't as labor-saving as a good rank method.<BR></I>>><I> The rank-methods are labor-saving machines. But machines can have<BR></I>>><I> their problems &/or idiosyncracies.<BR></I><BR>> The ranking methods are like the saw, labor<BR>> intensive and expensive to use whereas the approval method is like the<BR>> axe, rough and crude but fast and efficient and does exactly what needs<BR>> to be done and no more. <BR><BR>
Approval definitely does what needs to be done. And, as you pointed out,<BR>
Approval-polls before the election will give a whole different kind and amount<BR>
of information, as compared to our present Plurality polls. Our polls always ask<BR>
people how they'd vote if the election were held today. So of course, they vote for<BR>
their "lesser-evil", whom they don't like, and no one ever find out, from the poll, <BR>
what people's actual preferences are.<BR>
<BR>
That trick wouldn't work with Approval polling. Asked how they'd vote if the election<BR>
were today, people would give Approval votes to everyone they like more than their<BR>
perceived necessary compromise. There's no way to word an Approval poll that<BR>
could avoid the voting public having that information.<BR>
<BR>
So yes, with Approval polling, as you said, the first Approval election might be enough<BR>
to bring full improvement.<BR>
<BR>
(By the way, let's do, in all our communities around the country, a Condorcet poll on the <BR>
2012 candidates, to find out who's CW. Then we aggregate the results, and share that CW info with various progressive<BR>
political leaders, small-party leaders, and progressive media.)<BR>
<BR>
Relevant to something else said in the thread, in a different message, one of the<BR>
good strategies in Approval is to vote for every candidate who's better than your <BR>
expectation in the election. In other words, vote for every candidate whom (if you had<BR>
that power) you'd rather put in office instead of holding an election.<BR>
<BR>
The result would be: We'd get a result that would be a pleasant surprise to the most <BR>
people, and an unpleasant surprise to the fewest people. <BR>
<BR>
Only a very few of the very best rank methods are as good as Approval.<BR>
<BR>
But the best rank methods are quite adequate too. I'd be glad to have them, if<BR>
that's what we eventually get. Either would be fine.<BR>
<BR>
Of course Approval meets the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC). Condorcet(wv) doesn't.<BR>
I've been present when a friend voted in an Internet presidential poll, by rank balloting.<BR>
I don't remember what the count method was. Though she prefers Nader's policies to <BR>
those of Kerry and other Democrats (and of course, of the Republicans who have the same<BR>
policies), she voted all of the Democrats over Nader. With Condorcet(wv), I couldn't assure<BR>
her that she can never benefit from that. That's when I began to feel that FBC is<BR>
absolutely essential in U.S. elections.<BR>
<BR>
There are some good rank methods that meet FBC, along with other helpful criteria such as<BR>
SDSC, SFC.<BR>
<BR>
The deciding factor, in the choice between Approval and a briefly-defined, FBC-complying<BR>
rank method should be "Which will the voters sign an initiative petition for? Which will they<BR>
vote yes for the enactment of? That's what matters. I'd be delighted if voters enacted<BR>
Approval or a good rank method.<BR>
<BR>
I don't know which people would be more likely to support. I've noticed that rank methods<BR>
seem to elicit more interest. More like "Yeah!" than "Yeah".<BR>
<BR>
On the other hand, as I said, we'd have the big issue and battle about which rank count. The<BR>
IRVists might have already wined, dined, and power-lunched the national leaders of small parties we<BR>
approach. Choosing a good method is one thing, but telling the man-in-the-street why it's a<BR>
good method is a difficult task.<BR>
<BR>
Polling is the only way to find out for sure what the voters will be most likely to enact.<BR>
<BR>
> However I think in many elections nuance<BR>> is wasted effort and allowing it is actually harmful to the process,<BR>> especially since ranking and range can be used strategically (I guess<BR>> you guys call it burial?).<BR>
<BR>
In some rank methods. In Condorcet(wv). But, there, the order reversers must have<BR>
the biggest candidate (in terms of favoriteness), and a quite large fraction of them<BR>
must reverse. And only a small fraction of the intended victims need to truncate, in<BR>
order for the reversers to get an outcome worse, in their view, than the one that they buried.<BR>
<BR>
But there's no offensive order-reversal in Bucklin. Maybe it can be tried in MDDA, but most likely<BR>
defensive truncation thwarts it as in wv. I haven't thorougly checked that out yet. The version of<BR>
Bucklin that I like allows equal ranking, giving whole votes to those equal ranked, with all rankings<BR>
giving to next choices simultaneously if no one yet has a vote total exceeding half the number of<BR>
voters. I call that version "Stepwise Approval" (SA), though I don't claim to be its first proponent.<BR>
<BR>
There's fascinatingly large array of rank methods that meet FBC, and many that meet SFC & SDSC<BR>
too. I've barely begun to check out the reversal-deterrence of the pairwise-count ones. But I've<BR>
read of the impressive criterion-compliances that they have.<BR>
<BR>
SA has strategy resembling Approval. Though I don' t know it as specifically as Approval's strategy,<BR>
SA can be said to have three levels of protection for majorities, as opposed to Approval's two: Equal-ranked<BR>
at top; ranked; not ranked. That means that voters could fully protect a majority-supported Democrat from<BR>
the Republican, while still fully protecting majority-protected progressives from the Democrat.<BR>
<BR>
But you're right: Rank methods, as good as some are, are gadgets, and the solid, sturdy and<BR>
reliable hand tool, Approval is quite sufficient.<BR>
<BR>
Let's find out what the public will most support, because that's the deciding factor.<BR>
<BR>
And, here, let's keep systematically discussing and listing the criterion-compliances of the proposed<BR>
methods, and also discuss the desirability and need for the various criteria, and why one or another<BR>
method will better suit the needs of voters.<BR>
<BR>
Mike Ossipoff<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
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