<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style="RIGHT: auto">My system isn't quota based and doesn't involve any reweighting or redistribution. It looks at every possible result (potentially problematic in itself) and works out a score for each one. Because there is no redistribution, a voter can lose out more than some other systems by voting too high for a candidate that is going to get elected anyway. But I would argue that it gives the best proportional results for honest voting, and could still potentially deliver good overall results unless some candidates' supporters are much better at adopting strategy than others. A bit like with single-winner range where you wouldn't expect one particular faction of v<VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR>oters to vote approval style and "ruin" the whole thing. (Not that it would necessarily ruin
it)</SPAN></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto"><BR style="RIGHT: auto"></div>
<DIV style="FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SIZE: 12pt">
<DIV style="FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><FONT size=2 face=Arial>
<DIV style="BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; MARGIN: 5px 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; HEIGHT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-TOP: 0px" class=hr readonly="true" contenteditable="false"></DIV><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:</SPAN></B> Ted Stern <araucaria.araucana@gmail.com><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> election-methods@lists.electorama.com<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cc:</SPAN></B> Ted Stern <araucaria.araucana@gmail.com><BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Monday, 3 October 2011, 20:49<BR><B><SPAN style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subject:</SPAN></B> Re: [EM] PR approval voting<BR></FONT><BR>On 03 Oct 2011 12:23:10 -0700, Toby Pereira wrote:<BR>><BR>> I noticed on your page that you suspect that all multi-winner<BR>> methods fail participation. I
don't think that's the case. I would<BR>> suggest that Forest Simmons's Proportional Approval Voting passes<BR>> it. Also I think my versions of Proportional Approval Voting and<BR>> Proportional Range Voting pass.<BR><BR>Since I wrote that, I have come to believe (but still haven't proved)<BR>that Approval-based methods will generally pass participation and<BR>IIAC.<BR><BR>A range based method will pass participation, at least in<BR>single-winner, if it doesn't adjust ratings.<BR><BR>In many cases my version of Range Transferable Vote will elect winners<BR>without having to raise ratings to meet quota. It only fails<BR>participation in those cases where the quota is not met, which most<BR>often happens on the last or penultimate seat.<BR><BR>Is your PRV method quota-based? If so, does it pass Droop<BR>proportionality? If so, how do you deal with elevating preferences if<BR>no candidate achieves a
quota?<BR><BR>Ted<BR></DIV></DIV></div></body></html>