<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Aug 24, 2011, at 6:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jlundell@pobox.com">jlundell@pobox.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div></div><div class="h5"><div><div>On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:42 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/8/24 Jonathan Lundell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jlundell@pobox.com" target="_blank">jlundell@pobox.com</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>On Aug 24, 2011, at 7:33 AM, Warren Smith wrote:<br>
<br>
>> Lundell:<br>
>> Arrow would not, I think, quarrel with the claim that a cardinal ballot has a pragmatic/operational "meaning" as a function of its use in determining a winner.<br>
>><br>
>> But but it's an unwarranted leap from that claim to use the ballot scores as a measure of utility. Arrows objection to cardinal scores, or one of them, is that they are not and cannot be commensurable across voters.<br>
><br>
> --(1) using, not range voting, but DOUBLE RANGE VOTING,<br>
> described here:<br>
> <a href="http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html" target="_blank">http://rangevoting.org/PuzzRevealU2.html</a><br>
> the ballot scores ARE utilities for a strategic-honest voter. Any<br>
> voter who foolishly<br>
> uses non-utilities as her scores on her ballot, will get a worse<br>
> election result in expectation. This was not an "unwarranted leap,"<br>
> this was a "new advance"<br>
> because the Simmons/Smith double-range-voting system is the first<br>
> voting system which (a) is good and which (b) incentivizes honest<br>
> utility-revelation (and only honest) by voters.<br>
<br>
</div>It still seems to me that you're arguing in a circle. A utility score needs to have meaning logically prior to a voting system in order for a voter to vote in the first place. What is utility, from the point of view of a voter?<br>
<br>
Let me put the question another way. Suppose I'd rank three candidates A > B > C.<br>
<br>
On what grounds do I decide that (say) A=1.0 B=0.5 C=0.0 is honest, but A=1.0 B=0.7 C=0.0 is dishonest?<br>
<div><br></div></blockquote><div>In double-range, you'd say that if you felt that B was clearly better than a 50/50 chance of A or C, but as good as a 70/30 chance.</div></div></blockquote><br></div></div></div><div>
And if the polls suggest that A & B are strong favorites and C is doing poorly, how should I vote to maximize my utility?</div><div><br></div></div></blockquote></div>The point of double-range is that it introduces a small random factor to keep you honest. Thus, I don't think most societies would accept it as a serious system, but it does demonstrate that cardinal ballots can have a "meaning" beyond rankings.</blockquote><br></div><div>How does it keep me honest in that scenario? Presumably I'd vote 1-0-0; what's my motivation to do otherwise?</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></body></html>