I appreciate RBJ's analysis of a possible failure mode of approval. It's true, if Approval were implemented and then repealed, that would be a blow to voting reform.<div><br></div><div>However, for me, there are two problems with that.</div>
<div><br></div><div>1. We have ample evidence of voters rejecting IRV - for instance, in the AV question in the UK. We do not have evidence of which other system (Approval, Condorcet, or other) is least likely to be rejected. RBJ believes that Condorcet is better, and therefore safer against repeal, than Approval. Others might dispute either or both of these contentions, and I don't see that we have the empirical data to decide.</div>
<div><br></div><div>2. Reform has at least two failure modes. It can be implemented and then rejected, as RBJ worries; or it can never be implemented in the first place. Our inability as activists to agree on anything, which would be highlighted if we can't agree on a consensus statement, accentuates the possibility of the latter failure.</div>
<div><br></div><div>2a. I'd argue that while we can't know whether approval or Condorcet is better proof against repeal, we can be pretty sure that Approval is the most likely to get consensus from theorists. For that, we have not just strong logical arguments (Approval is the simplest system, and represents a step towards any better system); we have <a href="http://www.rangevoting.org/DuBaffy2010_Laslier.pdf">empirical evidence</a>.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Robert: I would be interested to hear your response to these points<br><br></div><div>JQ</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/8/22 robert bristow-johnson <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class="im">On 8/19/11 12:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
These are better than Plurality:<br>
<br>
Plurality has big problems. Any of these would solve most:<br>
<br>
* Approval<br>
* Bucklin<br>
<br>
/ (Majority Judgment)<br>
<br>
* Condorcet<br>
* Range<br>
* SODA<br>
Approval is ideal as a first step in voting reform.<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
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alright. may i offer some perspective here? this is a little more of what i've been thinking in the past couple of days: what have we learned from (or should be learning from) the ongoing IRV experiment and Fairvote and such? i remember hearing or reading a little concession from some knowledgeable IRV advocates (will not mention names) that Condorcet was better than IRV and Burlington 2009 sorta epitomized how and why it's better. but they said the same thing, that IRV was a good "first step". something like "let's get Ranked Choice Voting in first and optimize later."<br>
<br>
now here's the problem: if a voting reform has some anomalous result or doesn't exactly deliver on its promise, the reactionary opponents of that reform will be happy to point that out and this makes the rest of the electorate suspicious or skeptical of the next reform effort when it comes up. in Burlington 2005, we adopted IRV with 65% mandate and it was narrowly repealed in 2010 with less than 52%.<br>
<br>
the problem is that if Approval is adopted and later disliked (it might not be an anomalous result, but might be that voters tire of having to decide whether or not to approve of their 2nd-choice candidate) they will be disinterested in any second step. there is a finite number of times that voters are willing to try something new. (see <a href="http://vtdigger.org/2010/03/05/vermonters-should-consign-irv-to-the-ash-heap-of-electoral-history/" target="_blank">http://vtdigger.org/2010/03/<u></u>05/vermonters-should-consign-<u></u>irv-to-the-ash-heap-of-<u></u>electoral-history/</a> ) i'm afraid that we'll have to wait for another generation (and i hope that we continue to have 3 or more competitive parties in Vermont) to revisit the issue of a better method than FPTP or TTR. the anti-IRV crowd likes to think that the traditional vote-for-one ballot is handed down by God and the other people that voted against IRV (and had voted *for* IRV in 2005) just didn't like how it turned out and will be more skeptical of the next reform than they were in 2005.<br>
<br>
so besides Aspen CO, Cary NC, Pierce Co WA, maybe Ann Arbor MI (can't remember who else, Burlington VT, of course), other towns, perhaps Cambridge or Mpls/St.P. or SF will also have a problem and revisit the IRV issue, and with that, other ranked-choice systems like Condorcet. other methods of voting reform get stained (from the POV of traditionalists, and this seems to be close to religion for them) by a failure of one method.<br>
<br>
so, i think we should learn from FairVote's error(s). and i think we really should be careful and aim for the *final* step, rather than the first step.<div class="im"><br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Gerrymandering and safe seats are also problems. Proportional<br>
representation would solve it. There are many good options, including<br>
some with geographical aspects, but closed party list is not good.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
i'm definitely in favor of mapping algorithms that, given a few parameters from humans, sorta "blindly" draw legislative districts according to mandated rules (like equal population districts, statewide proportionality regarding groups and class of voter, community centered, and competitiveness - not to ensure someone's safe seat).<br>
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