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<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance</a><br>
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<blockquote type="cite">MCA-AR satisfies the <a
title="Guaranteed majority criterion"
href="/wiki/Guaranteed_majority_criterion">Guaranteed majority
criterion</a>, a criterion which can only be satisfied by a multi-round
(runoff-based) method.</blockquote>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Guaranteed_majority_criterion">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Guaranteed_majority_criterion</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p>The <b>guaranteed majority criterion</b> requires that the
winning candidate always get an <a title="Absolute majority"
href="/wiki/Absolute_majority">absolute majority</a> of valid votes in
the last round of voting or counting. It is satisfied by <a
title="Runoff voting" href="/wiki/Runoff_voting">runoff voting</a>, <a
class="mw-redirect" title="MCA" href="/wiki/MCA">MCA-AR</a>, and, if
full rankings are required, <a class="mw-redirect" title="IRV"
href="/wiki/IRV">IRV</a>. However, if there is not a pairwise champion
(aka CW), there could always be some candidate who would have gotten a
majority over the winner in a one-on-one race. Since, unlike most
criteria, this criterion can depend on both counting process and
result, there could be two systems with identical results, with only
one of them passing the guaranteed majority criterion. </p>
</blockquote>
<br>
This is an example of what Mike Ossipoff used to rightfully excoriate
as a "rules criterion".<br>
<br>
To me if "two" voting systems/methods always give the same results
with the same impute, then they are really <br>
just one method (which perhaps has alternative algorithms) and so they
both meet and fail all the same (non-silly)<br>
criteria.<br>
<br>
A voting method criterion should relate to some desirable standard.
Is IRV that doesn't allow truncation somehow<br>
better that IRV that does?<br>
<br>
Why can't normal IRV (that allows truncation) just have a rule that
says that exhausted ballots in the "last round of <br>
counting" are no longer "valid"? <br>
<br>
Or better yet, since IRV meets Woodall's Symmetric Completion
criterion, why can't it include a rule that all ballots<br>
are "symmetrically completed" so then the winner in the "final round of
counting" will certainly have an "absolute <br>
majority of valid votes"?<br>
<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
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