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Jameson Quinn wrote (18 Oct 2010):<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I edited Electowiki to essentially replace the
Bucklin-ER article with a<br>
new, expanded MCA article. In this article, I define 6 MCA variants. I
find<br>
that as a class, they do surprisingly well on criteria compliance.
Please<br>
check my work:<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Choice_Approval#Criteria_compliance</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Again quoting from the linked-to page:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">The <a class="mw-redirect"
title="Condorcet criterion" href="/wiki/Condorcet_criterion">Condorcet
criterion</a> is satisfied by MCA-IR if the <a class="mw-redirect"
title="Pairwise champion" href="/wiki/Pairwise_champion">pairwise
champion</a> (aka CW) is visible on the ballots <br>
and would beat at least one other candidate by an absolute majority. It
is satisfied by MCA-AR if at least half<br>
the voters at least approve the PC in the first round of voting.</blockquote>
<br>
Both these claims are wrong, as we can see from this old Woodall
example:<br>
<br>
4: A>B<br>
6: A>C<br>
6: B>A<br>
2: B>C<br>
3: C>B<br>
<br>
No candidate reaches the majority threshold of 11 in the first round,
and A alone reaches it in the second so<br>
all the suggested versions of MCA elect A (there being no need for any
"resolution method").<br>
<br>
But the Condorcet winner is B, who pairwise beats both other candidates
with an absolute majority.<br>
<br>
B>A 11-10, B>C 12-9.<br>
<br>
The page contains some other blunders and inanities that I might
address later..<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
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