The basic truncation dilemma is a familiar one on this list. There are two near-clones A and B who split a majority of the vote - say, with 35% and 25% honest-first-choice support - and one distinct candidate C who has a plurality of first-choice support - say, 40%. Since C voters don't care much which of A or B is elected, they are willing to truncate, even if A and B are the frontrunners. So in many voting systems, including both Approval-like and Condorcet-like systems, A and B voters are faced with a collective prisoners-dillemma like situation; they can cooperate and perhaps help elect their second preference, or truncate, giving the most possible relative support to their favorite but risking the worst-case winner.<div>
<br></div><div>Note that I am speaking of a true truncation dilemma, where A and B voters honestly see little a priori utility difference between the two (though the strategic need to truncate may lead to demonization and/or bad feelings over the course of the campaign). If they actually had strong preferences, truncation might simply be more honest than strategic. So, in all that follows, I'm assuming that A is the honest Condorcet, Range, and social utility winner, by clear margins.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This is a true dilemma; it's no more an artifact of the voting system than an honest Condorcet cycle. And I believe that it would be much more common than such a cycle, to the point where the majority of apparent Condorcet cycles would actually be caused by truncation/burial strategy.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So, what are the possible responses, from the point of view of voting system design? There really are only a few.</div><div><br></div><div>1. Embrace the dilemma. Either A and B voters manage to cooperate, or the system elects C; deal with it. This approach is perhaps best exemplified by Approval.</div>
<div><br></div><div>1a. Probabilistic dilemma. If truncation causes a cycle, then there is some probabilistic tiebreaker which always includes some chance of C winning. This can act as a goad to A and B voters to cooperate. I suspect that some system like this might be the theoretical optimum response if voters were pure rational agents; however, real people tend not to like probabilistic election systems.</div>
<div><br></div><div>2. Obfuscation; that is, hope that the voters don't really notice. I'd say that the best example of this is Bucklin. One hopes that the voters are satisfied by expressing a strong preference for their favorite, and they don't notice the strategic dilemma in adding lower preferences. This is not a vain hope. Between strategically naive voters and principled honest voters, there may well be enough to ensure A is elected. However, it's still obfuscation.</div>
<div><br></div><div>3. Elimination. IRV is the preeminent example of this response. If B is to be eliminated first, then there's no strategic reason for B voters to truncate. However, this can lead to other problems with the voting system - IRV's nonmonotonicity and center squeeze are directly related to this issue. Also, if it isn't clear which of A or B is the frontrunner, elimination might not help, because the best strategy is to loudly pronounce that your faction will truncate, and perhaps too many people will carry through with the threat.</div>
<div><br></div><div>3a. Quasi-elimination. I believe that winning-votes Condorcet methods, like Schulze, are an attempt to ensure that A wins even in the face of B's truncation. However, this only works if C voters truncate rather than splitting evenly between CBA and CAB. Other stronger quasi-elimination systems that I know of have IRV-like problems.</div>
<div><br></div><div>4. Runoff. Viewed in an outcome-oriented game-theoretic vacuum, this is just the same as elimination, and it suffers the same problems. However, if voters have some negative utility for the runoff itself, then a system can use the threat of one to motivate honest voting in the first round. Since the scenario assumes that there is a clear winner with no cycles under honest voting, that may be enough.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think that's it. Does anyone have any other possible responses?</div><div><br></div><div>To me it's clear that option 4 is the best. Like options 1 and 1a, it's using the threat of something voters don't want to motivate honest voting. However, a runoff is a less extreme threat than N years of bad leadership, and so much more palatable if it actually comes to pass.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This has clear implications for system design. If the main purpose of a runoff possibility is to motivate honest voting and thus never actually have a runoff, it's important to be as decisive as possible in the first round. In general, I think that at a minimum, if there's a first-round Condorcet winner evident from the ballots, there should be no need for a second round.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This analysis suggests that, in response to this dilemma, two-round Condorcet systems deserve a closer look. I'd also suggest simpler systems which make a good approximation of that: for instance, 2-approved-rank Range, with a runoff if the winner's approval score doesn't beat all other Range scores.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think that two-round Condorcet systems have been neglected because the Condorcet matrix offers a seductive plethora of tiebreaking possibilities.</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson Quinn</div>