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<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2
face=Arial>Peter</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial>If you
want to address your argument to ordinary party members and convince them, for
goodness sake, forget all the stuff you have laid out below.</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2
face=Arial>Jameson said it all: "<FONT color=#000000 size=3
face="Times New Roman">The whole point of having a representative body is that
it represents the diversity of an organization."</FONT></FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial>A
voting system like STV-PR (or whatever similar you choose) gives practical
effect to that, without imposing any restrictions on the candidates or the
voters and will produce a representative result..</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial>James
Gilmour</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=687554717-19052010><FONT color=#0000ff size=2
face=Arial></FONT></SPAN> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<DIV><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial></FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr lang=en-us class=OutlookMessageHeader align=left><FONT size=2
face=Tahoma>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B>
election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com] <B>On Behalf Of
</B>Peter Zbornik<BR><B>Sent:</B> Wednesday, May 19, 2010 6:39
PM<BR><B>To:</B> Jameson Quinn<BR><B>Cc:</B> Election
Methods<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re: [EM] Why proportional elections - Power
arguments needed (Czechgreen party)<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>Dear Jameson,</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>yes your argument is similar to the one of Terry Bouricius ("the wisdom
of crowds", and yes it is a good one.</DIV>
<DIV>Diversity also has an appeal to a diverse set of voters, allowing for
improvements in voter preferences.</DIV>
<DIV>That is a good line of argument, thanks.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>A very nice argument for proportional elections would be one founded
in welfare economic theory.</DIV>
<DIV>That would be very interesting at least for me, and I quess this argument
should not be too difficult to formulate for elections (but I have no clue
how)</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I am not sure if the resulting argument would be interesting for normal
party members, but I think it is an important and very fundamental question to
answer.</DIV>
<DIV>I have seen technical arguments flying around in this forum (Bayesian
regret, socially optimal pareto fronts, and Kristian's intruigung graph at: <A
href="http://munsterhjelm.no/km/elections/multiwinner_tradeoffs/">http://munsterhjelm.no/km/elections/multiwinner_tradeoffs/</A>),
which I haven't been able to understand.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>What I do understand is that we have a preference ordering when voting,
which can be used in social welfare functions (see <A
href="http://aede.osu.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/Welfare5rev.pdf">http://aede.osu.edu/programs/Anderson/trade/Welfare5rev.pdf</A>,
page 8 and on). </DIV>
<DIV>Maybe it can be shown that proportional elections are better than
winner-takes-it-all elections for a wide range of social welfare
functions.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><U>Some wild speculation about things I don't understand very
well:</U></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>Selecting a social welfare function (i.e. selecting between a utiltarian,
bernoulli-nash or rawlsian social welfare function) can indeed be a voting
task itself. I just don't have the proper training in economy to understand
the details, like the publication below:</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I quote a publication I found:</DIV>
<DIV>"<FONT size=4 face="Times New Roman"><FONT size=4
face="Times New Roman"><FONT size=2 face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>The
isoelastic </FONT></FONT></FONT><FONT face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>SWF [see
the publication <EM>PZ comment</EM>] takes on a number of familiar
foms depending on the value of <B><I>p. </I></B></FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>When <B><I>p </I></B></FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>=O, it is the classical utilitarian. The limit
as p-1 is the Bernoulli-Nash <B>(linear </B>in the </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>logarithms). <B>And </B>as <B><I>p-m,
</I></B></FONT><FONT face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>it is the Rawlsian
maximin fom. These cases are characterized </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>by the shape of the social indifference curves
shown in Figure 2.1. Because it is a function </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>(i.e. the inverse) of the elasticity of
substitution along <B>these </B>indifference curves. p reflects </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>society's willingness to made-off utility
berween individuals. <B>A </B>greater value of <B><I>p </I></B></FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>reflects </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>greater social aversion to inequality .
Therefore, <B><I>p </I></B></FONT><FONT face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>may be
considered an equity parameter, </FONT><FONT
face=arial,helvetica,sans-serif>chosen by consensus or some other political
means."</FONT>(see page 24-25 in <U><FONT color=#810081><A
href="https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/10891/1/NQ27722.pdf">https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/10891/1/NQ27722.pdf</A></FONT></U>) </DIV></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Threse publications seems to be on a path which could have something
to do with voting (selects the bernoulli-nash social welfare
function):</DIV>
<DIV>Economic analysis and distributive justice, page 49: <A
href="http://people.ku.edu/~dburress/econ-ana.pdf">http://people.ku.edu/~dburress/econ-ana.pdf</A></DIV>
<DIV>Page 9: <A
href="http://www.cherry.gatech.edu/mod/pubs/proceed3/c14_burr.pdf">http://www.cherry.gatech.edu/mod/pubs/proceed3/c14_burr.pdf</A></DIV>
<DIV>Isoelastic function again: Page 9, equation 10: <A
href="http://www.mi.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/tol/ereaggregation.pdf">http://www.mi.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/tol/ereaggregation.pdf</A> (there
is even a maximin function)</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>I personally like the Bernoulli-Nash welfare function on page 13, as it
has good properties, where the utilities are multiplied instead of
added (i. the form is the same as the other functions in the Pareto
framework ii. it gives logaritmic weighs to utility by multiplying them
efficiently preferring more "equal" utility distributions without demanding
that utility should be distributed equally). Samuelson and Bergson proposed
the Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function themselves.</DIV></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Ok, I am not sure if I made things clear or not, i touched (very
lightly) upon this stuff in my studies. Seems to be an area which is not
well understood.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Best regards</DIV>
<DIV>Peter Zborník<BR><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 5:55 PM, Jameson Quinn <SPAN
dir=ltr><<A
href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A>></SPAN>
wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>
<DIV>The whole point of having a representative body is that it represents
the diversity of an organization. It's not just a matter of diversity of
opinion; it's a diversity of strengths, of outlooks, of focus, which makes
the organization stronger than any one person. A non-proportional system
tends in the other direction, of electing N clones of the same bland
majority candidate. Selecting only for broad appeal means selecting only for
bland schmoozing; certainly a valuable skill in politics, but not the only
skill you want your party to cultivate.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Is that a good start?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Jameson Quinn<BR><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>2010/5/19 Peter Zbornik <SPAN dir=ltr><<A
href="mailto:pzbornik@gmail.com"
target=_blank>pzbornik@gmail.com</A>></SPAN><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>
<DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=h5>
<DIV>Dear all,</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>just a post scriptum to the email below to make things clear:</DIV>
<DIV>I wonder if there is a short and to the point argument for
dummies, why proportional elections (say elections meeting the droop
quota) leave the voters happier than winner-takes it all elections.</DIV>
<DIV>This "for dummies" explanation of the advantages of proportional
voting could be combined with a longer technical explanation,
perhaps using social welfare functions. for people with time and
interest to understand the argument in full.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I don't mean that the argument above would be the best argument, but
it could be a really interesting one.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Best regards</DIV>
<DIV>Peter Zborník<BR><BR></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 4:58 PM, Peter Zbornik
<SPAN dir=ltr><<A href="mailto:pzbornik@gmail.com"
target=_blank>pzbornik@gmail.com</A>></SPAN> wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>
<DIV>Dear Kristoffer, dear readers,</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Kristofer, you wrote below: "A minor opinion within the party
might need time to grow, and might in the end turn out to be
significant, but using a winner-takes-it-all method quashes such
minority opinions before they get the chance."</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Thanks, yes I have used this line of argument a lot (we actually
have a global charter of the greens, according to which the
greens are obliged to put the same principles into practice in
thei organizations as they work for in society).</DIV>
<DIV>The problem is, that this argument does not "stick", it is simply
not sexy.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Would it be possible to measure the "utility"
or "happiness" among the voters in the party compared to
different election methods. I saw you Kristofer did some work on this
but I didn't understand it, I guess I lack the preliminaries.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I guess the notion of "Bayesian regret" or something similar could
be used to argue that proportional elections are better than
block-voting, but I have no idea of how to explain this, as I don't know
the subject at all (pareto optimal social allocations, or
whatever).</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>It seems intuitive that economic tools could be used (I know almost
no economics), since ranked ballot elections simply are explicitly
stated preference orderings. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I guess that voting and elections, could be indeed one of the
best imaginable real-world examples, where preference orderings of
the actors actually are known, and thus all of the machinery of
economic equilibria and social welfare functions could be applied (like
the Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function).</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I am personally interested in the possiblity of measuring utility,
is there some (preferably short) literature on social welfare,
utility and voting theory for proportional elections (I know some
undergrad maths and statistics)?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Best regards</DIV>
<DIV>Peter<FONT color=#888888><BR><BR></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>On Tue, May 18, 2010 at 1:03 PM, Kristofer
Munsterhjelm <SPAN dir=ltr><<A href="mailto:km-elmet@broadpark.no"
target=_blank>km-elmet@broadpark.no</A>></SPAN> wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>
<DIV>Peter Zbornik wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>Dear all,<BR> thank you for your help with
the election system for the council elections of the green
party.<BR>I will try to move on with technical testing of Schulze's
methods and the specification of the elections to the party lists as
soon as time allows.<BR>Thanks all for the support and all methods
supplied.<BR>I never could imagine that I would get such a
response.<BR>When advocating proportional elections in the party, I
have found it difficult to explain to other members of the green
party why proportional elections to our party organs is a good
thing.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE><BR></DIV>As far as I remember, your party, the
Czech Green Party, is a minor party. Therefore, it might be possible
to draw an analogy to the proportional methods used by the Czech
Republic itself. Without proportional representation, the Green Party
would have next to no chance of ever getting into parliament. However,
since your nation does use proportional representation, there is some
chance.<BR><BR>The same argument could be used within the party. Since
the Green Party is a minor party, I reason that the party membership
honestly believes the presence of that party is a good thing. Thus,
they would also know (to some extent, at least), that minor groups of
opinion - like their own party in comparison to the major parties -
can be good and can add valuable ideas to governance. Then could not
the same argument be used for the party itself? A minor opinion within
the party might need time to grow, and might in the end turn out to be
significant, but using a winner-takes-it-all method quashes such
minority opinions before they get the
chance.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></DIV></DIV><BR></DIV></DIV>----<BR>Election-Methods
mailing list - see <A href="http://electorama.com/em"
target=_blank>http://electorama.com/em</A> for list
info<BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>
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