<div>Dear Markus Schulze,</div>
<div> </div>
<div>thank you for your proposal.</div>
<div>It seems that your method is the one, which fulfills the requirements I set up for the Green party council elections the closest at the moment.</div>
<div>Its drawbacks is however, that it is a new, complex method with only limited testing on data an no usage in real life.</div>
<div>I would indeed like to include the top-down proportional ranking approach as a requirement for council elections.</div>
<div>The bottom-up approach has never been used for single-winner elections as far as I know, and I don't like that the top-most winner may not be the president fulfilling the majority rule. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Due to the complexity of the method and the minimum of descriptions for the lay-man, I am not sure that Schulze proprtional ranking necessarily is the best top-down method to propose to the green party, even though I like it.</div>
<div>A simpler top-down STV approach is discussed in: <a href="http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM">http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM</a> and in <a href="http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE12/P1.HTM">http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE12/P1.HTM</a> (references by Schulze in <a href="http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf">http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf</a>).</div>
<div> </div>
<div>What is the advantages of Schulze proportional ranking to the simpler top down STV modified method described in <a href="http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM">http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM</a>?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Otten ends his second article by stating: "I do not at this point advocate that a generalised Condorcet method is adopted. However, I think the idea has its merits, and I do believe the question of ordering demands further consideration. While a single rule may not be appropriate for all circumstances, it should be possible to narrow the field somewhat from that in section 5."</div>
<div> </div>
<div>How would you respond to Ottens remark above, which stems from the fact (?) that Condorcet methods (and thus Schulze proportional ranking) violate of the principle, that "that later preferences should not be allowed to count against earlier ones"?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>QUOTAS:</div>
<div>Quota rules are always intrusive on representative democracy, and their application is in the end a political question.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>The gender-quota feature you propose is the most natural, as it gives women representation in the top three places in the council and as it is similar to the party list ordering requirement.</div>
<div>However this representation is not required in our statutes, thus it is strictly not needed. </div>
<div>I will probably recommend your approach to the gender quota, if I will recommend using Schulze proportional orderings.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>However, I may face the opinion that we need to require only two women in the council, without any specific ordering and with a minimum impact on the proportionality of the top P and VP positions and on the council proportionality in general.</div>
<div>In this situation, what 2nd best solution would you propose and why?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>PROPORTIONAL ORDERINGS:</div>
<div>I have some questions about the Schulze proportional ordering (<a href="http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf">http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf</a>).</div>
<div>I would like to read your full paper (maybe I find time in the weekend), but a more detailed overview of the method would be a nice start. Maybe some reading instructions could help me and other readers.</div>
<div>In your comparison with Schulze STV, did your method ever differ by more than one council member?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Schulze proportional ranking for dummies - first try by a dummy:</div>
<div>If I understood it correctly, it finds the Condorcet extention (for instance ax) from the condorcet winner (for instance a) by selecting the candidate x which in the committee ax will have the strongest path.</div>
<div>I.e. the committee ax is the committee, which has the highest preferences among the voters and simultaneously includes the president a.</div>
<div>Please correct me if this is not a correct description of the method. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Properties of the proportional ranking:</div>
<div>We thus have a promising, alfa-tested method with a natural appeal (vote management, condorcet winner, proportional orderings), which builds upon a good, tried and tested single-winner method in a natural way.</div>
<div>Now we need to understand it and sell it to the masses or at least to the green party.</div>
<div><font face="arial,helvetica,sans-serif">What properties does this method fulfil (by properties I mean for instance something like WIHFR, Schwartz or Smith criterions)?</font></div>
<div>
<div>How is proportionality measured in the Schulze proportional ranking method? By proportional completion?</div>
<div>In other words how do we know that the method doesn't behave chaotically or unpredictive?</div>
<div>How does Schulze proportional ranking protect against vote management?</div>
<div>What is the connection to Schulze STV, if any?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>"Schulze proportional ranking - a brief introduction":</div></div>
<div>So far I have understood that the section 6 of your paper is not sufficient for a full understanding the method and that your paper is really deep. </div>
<div>Some reading instructions could help.</div>
<div>What other sections in the paper do you recommend to read for a good understanding of the Schulze proportional ranking method (for instance some parts of section 5 about Schulze STV)?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>A wikipedia article on Schulze proportional ranking for dummies might also be of use (I guess anyone with a good understanding of the method could do the dummies explanation).</div>
<div> </div>
<div>OK, so I have to start looking at the details of this method, and I have to start somewhere, so:</div>
<div>Thinking of page 60: <a href="http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf">http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf</a></div>
<div>What does: <font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">r ( </font></font><i><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">V </font></font></i><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">... </font></font><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">→ </font></font><i><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">ae </font></font></i><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">) <font size="2">mean in the first diagramme? I guess it is the strength of the vote-management. Where is this concept discuseed?</font></font></font></div>
<div>Why do you calculate r ( <em><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">V </font></font><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">ae </font></font><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">→ b</font></font><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">e </font></font></em><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">)<font size="2">?</font></font></font></div>
<div>How do you calculate r ( <em><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">V ae</font></font><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"> </font></font><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font lang="ZH-CN" face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">→ b</font></font><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman,Italic" size="3">e </font></font></em><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3"><font face="TimesNewRoman" size="3">)<font size="2">?</font></font></font></div>
<div>How do you calculate the strongest path from ae to be?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Finally I would need to nail the method down in the party statutes, if the method will be greeted by interest.</div>
<div>Is this doable?</div>
<div>A peer-review of the Schulze method (formal - in a paper or at least informal - here on this list) is appropriate.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Best regards</div>
<div>Peter Zborník<br><br></div>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 2:42 PM, Markus Schulze <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:markus.schulze@alumni.tu-berlin.de">markus.schulze@alumni.tu-berlin.de</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">Dear Peter Zbornik,<br><br>this is my proposal:<br><br>--Use the Schulze proportional ranking method.<br><br>
--The top-ranked candidate becomes the president.<br><br>--The second-ranked candidate becomes the vice president.<br><br>--If the first two candidates happen to be male, then,<br> when you calculate the third-ranked candidate, restrict<br>
your considerations to female candidates.<br><br> If the first two candidates happen to be female, then,<br> when you calculate the third-ranked candidate, restrict<br> your considerations to male candidates.<br><br> The third-ranked candidate becomes the 2nd vice president.<br>
<br>--The fourth-ranked candidate becomes the 3rd vice president.<br><br>--The fifth-ranked candidate becomes the 4th vice president.<br><br>--If 4 of the already elected candidates happen to be male,<br> then, when you calculate the sixth-ranked candidate, restrict<br>
your considerations to female candidates.<br><br> If 4 of the already elected candidates happen to be female,<br> then, when you calculate the sixth-ranked candidate, restrict<br> your considerations to male candidates.<br>
<br> The sixth-ranked candidate becomes the 5th vice president.<br><br>--The seventh-ranked candidate becomes the 6th vice president.<br><font color="#888888"><br>Markus Schulze<br></font>
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