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<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>Response to Robert's statement...</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>"I guess I still haven't heard a good justification
for why the Condorcet winner, if one exists, should *ever* be rejected as the
elected winner."</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>...</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>Imagine this scenario. ..</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>A highly polarized electorate with a three
candidate race. Only two candidates are seen by the media and the public as
viable, with 49% favoring candidate A and 46% favoring B, and 5% favoring C
slightly over A. Most voters don't know much about C, but C has carefully
avoided alienating any constituency by only stressing his likeability, rather
than issues. However while the supporters of both A and B don't think much of C
they rank C second because they subscribe to the "anybody but X" notion. The A
supporters all rank A>C>B, while the B supporters all rank B>C>A and
the C voters all rank C>A>B</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>49 A>C>B</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>46 B>C>A</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial> 5 C>A>B</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>In a traditional runoff or IRV, A would win over B,
after C's elimination by 54 to 46. I think that is a reasonable expression of
"the public will" though not the only possible one.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>With Condorcet, </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>C would defeat A by 51 to 49</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>and C would defeat B by 54 to 46</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>Thus C is the Condorcet winner. </FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>It is certainly justifiable to argue that C is the
"rightful" winner. But it is not unreasonable to say that C is not
the "rightful" winner, since 95% of the voters are highly dissatisfied with
C being elected. This is where the Range voting utility advocates enter the
fray. My point is merely that the Condorcet-winner criterion is desirable in
most cases, but not the only legitimate, nor ultimate criterion.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2 face=Arial>Terry Bouricius</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>