This is good math, and very interesting, but it doesn't speak at all about the politics of the matter. Have you figured out any tentative explanation for the Condorcet cycles you postulate? Why would, for instance, O>B>G voters be more common than O>G>B voters, yet in the mirror-image votes, B>G>O voters more common than G>B>O ones? (I realize that the Condorcet cycle does not require exactly that circumstance, but it suggests something of the kind).<div>
<br></div><div>I understand that any such explanation would be post-hoc and speculative, yet it is still worthwhile to make the attempt.</div><div><br></div><div>Jameson<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2009/12/8 Warren Smith <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:warren.wds@gmail.com">warren.wds@gmail.com</a>></span><br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">preliminary page on Romania 2009 election now available here<br>
<br>
<a href="http://rangevoting.org/Romania2009.html" target="_blank">http://rangevoting.org/Romania2009.html</a><br>
<br>
The results are not as impressive as I originally thought they were going to<br>
be.<br>
<font color="#888888"><br>
--<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class="h5">Warren D. Smith<br>
<a href="http://RangeVoting.org" target="_blank">http://RangeVoting.org</a> <-- add your endorsement (by clicking<br>
"endorse" as 1st step)<br>
and<br>
<a href="http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html" target="_blank">math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html</a><br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>